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"Action-Research and the Nature of Social Inquiry" 
Abstract 
Action-research's epistemological problem is that it proposes 
an opposition to positivist forms of social inquiry while implicitly 
using a positivist epistemology to justify its own procedures. 
This work is an attempt to formulate an alternative epistemology for 
action-research. A selection of action-research writing is 
critically reviewed in order to show the lacunae and inconsistencies 
which necessitate a more thoroughly argued theoretical framework. 
This alternative epistemology is based on a reflexive theory of 
consciousness and language, and on a dialectical theory of the 
self-other relationship. In this way it proposes the possibility 
of a theorizing Subject, and in particular its specific autonomy 
in relation to theories of ideology and of societal and psycho-
analytic determinism. 
The argument has the following stages. Chapter One introduces 
the general theme. Chapter Two analyzes the relationship between 
action and research, not as a process of evaluation or prescription, 
but as a dialectic of reflexive and critical questioning. Chapter 
Three critically considers theories of the self and of the unconscious 
in order to formulate the possibility of critical self-reflection. 
Chapter Four analyzes the social relationships of the research process, 
criticizing the Habermasian notion of -emancipation", and analyzing 
the relationship between criteria for the improvement of professional 
practice and the criteria for adequate research, including a 
consideration of how action-research might relate to the processes 
of professionalized institutions. This section involves an analysis 
of theories of professionalism and bureaucracy. In Chapter Five 
the argument turns more generally to the forms of validity to which 
action-research might aspire, criticizing such notions as "natural-
istic theory" and "illumination", and formulating validity in terms 
of reflexivity and dialectics. In this context, also, action-research' 
attempts to invoke "aesthetic" modes of understanding are considered, 
and a contrast is drawn between action-research's reliance on forms of 
representational realism and reflexive theories of textual structure 
and response. Chapter Six, the conclusion, draws together the fore-
going arguments in order to present six critical propositions, as a 
set of implications for the renewed practice of action-research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: ACTION-RESEARCH AND THE INTELLIGIBILITY 
OF SOCIAL INQUIRY 
Preliminary 
This work is about action-research. And it is 
also about the nature of inquiry in the social sciences. 
The pairing of these themes was originally a biographical 
necessity, the result of many years of engagement with 
action-research - both that which I initiated for myself 
and that of others which I have attempted to guide. 
This experience of action-research raised the problems of 
inquiry itself as a set of immediate worries concerning 
not only what to do but also one's grounds for such decision. 
their aims, their criteria, their mode of justification -
in short: their intelligibility. Complex activities alway: 
pose questions of what to do; in this respect experimental 
natural scientists are not unlike their own technicians. 
However, neither of them is necessarily challenged by their 
activities to provide grounds for the intelligibility of 
those activities. Yet, here precisely is action-research's 
specificity - its challenge, its vulnerability, and its 
interest. For action-research claims to reject both 
institutional traditions which propose grounds for its 
activities: action-research rejects the tradition of 
scientific research by invoking as a central principle,as a 
criterion the need for practical effectiveness at the level 
J 
of mundane activity; and it rejects the tradition of 
mundane practice by invoking as a central principle the 
scrutiny of practical judgements by means of research. 
- ~ -
It is highly significant therefore that action-
research has arisen in certain contexts of professional 
work, namely social administration, management, and (in 
particular) in education, which is the biographical 
context and the overall emphasis of this work. 
"Professional practice" in these contexts conventionally 
exhibits a fundamental contradiction which action-research 
seeks to address: professional expertise represents a 
cognitive authority based in "science", an authoritative 
formulation of knowledge as qenerally valid, such that 
clients' experiences can be conceived as predictable 
specific instances of prior generalities, ie. as "cases". 
And yet the corpuses of knowledge appropriate to the 
contexts where action-researchers have been active (the 
"theory of" administration, or management, or education) 
is precisely not of that authoritative and general form: 
the individual "case" is acknowledged to present a degree 
of "uniqueness" which threatens the relevance of experts' 
prior understanding and thus the authority by which they are 
"expert". Action-research has not, therefore, arisen 
in such "professions" as engineering or agriculture, nor 
even in what might have been expected to be the interest-
ing "intermediate" case of medicine. Essentially, then, 
action-research seeks to re-cast the authority of the 
professional practitioner in "people-processing" 
organizations, by means of a version of inquiry which 
aims to mediate between the prescriptive authority of 
science and the unique experience of the individual case 
for which such prescription conspicuously cannot provide. 
- T -
The intelligibility of action-research's project 
depends, therefore, on the problematic nature of knowledge 
in the social sciences. Hence the double significance 
of "education" in this work. Not only have professional 
educators espoused the notion of action-research to 
a greater extent than most other professionals, as a 
version of thier practice, but action-research writers 
in other contexts have proposed "education" or "training" 
as their version of the action-research process itself. 
(See Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, pp. 523-4; Lewin, 1946, 
p. 42; Lippett, 1948, p. 240ff.) The meaning of 
both "education" and "training", however, conventionally 
depends on an authoritative version of knowledge as the 
prescription for action, whereas action-research is 
concerned to question, if not - indeed - to reverse, 
such prescriptions. Action-research poses the question 
of the nature of inquiry both by its challenges and by 
its claims: it challenges a scientific method of inquiry 
based on the authority of the "outside" observer and the 
"independent" experimenter, and it claims to reconstruct 
both practical expertise and theoretical insight on the 
basis of its own inquiry procedures. 
Action-research thus plays both ends against the 
middle, with inevitable consequences: "scientists" are 
scornful of action-research's claims to validity (action-
research is muddled science); and practitioners are 
scornful of action-research's claims to feasibility 
(action-research undermines practical skills). The 
problem is that the "middle", for which action-research 
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wishes to speak, lacks theoretical definition, and 
is thus (with rare exceptions) defended by action-research 
only rhetorically or pragmatically. Such defences, 
lacking principles and grounds, are open to immediate 
refutation, as noted above. Thus it is in order to 
provide a theoretical elaboration of action-research's 
own mode of inquiry that this work is proposed. This 
will entail both a critique of the current state of 
writing on action-research, and the provision of 
theoretical resources for establishing in principle its 
intelligibility. 
In the remainder of this Introduction, I shall 
first of all introduce the parameters of the main 
discussion, in order to show how they constitute action-
research's central issues, and how the central issues 
for action-research are also central issues for the 
general project of inquiry in the social sciences. 
Secondly, as a preliminary to the following chapters, I 
shall a~gue for a number of general epistemological and 
ontological positions, as theoretically necessary 
presuppositions, not only for action-research but for 
sociology in general. 
Towards a Problematic for Action Research 
"Analytic Grounds" 
My argument could not begin by tracing a "history" 
nor by reviewing "the literature" of action-research, 
since that would be to presuppose a definition and a 
- 9 
coherence for action-research whose absence, precisely, 
is the occasion for the work. Admittedly, my initial 
step was to consult the range of writing in which a 
mode of inquiry was described as "action-research" (since 
I had no theoretical basis for rejecting any examples as 
cases where the label was either claimed or avoided 
"illegitimately") but the "legitimate" nature of action-
research is a crucial topic for the analysis, and 
indeed this initial step merely raised the question as 
to what form of analysis could address "legitimacy"; 
or in other words: how could "action-research" be created 
as an object of theory? 
Kant provides us with an indication of the requisite 
level of approach when he describes the "transcendental 
exposition" of a concept as an exposition which shows the 
necessary assumptions for the concept to be "possible" 
(Kant, 1933, p. 70). Hence his famous a priori categories 
of space and time as the conditions for the possibility 
of conceptualizing consciousness (ibid., pp. 72-8). 
However, Kant also draws attention to the limits (as well 
as the necessity and the possibility) of such transcenden-
tal knowledge: it is concerned "not with objects but 
with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as 
this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori". 
(ibid., p. 59). Kant makes an important distinction 
between "analytic" thought, whose "highest principle" 
is that of non-contradiction (ibid., p. 189) since it 
is concerned with single concepts (ibid., p. 48), and 
"synthetic" thought, which is concerned with the nature 
- 10-
of the connections between concepts (ibid., p. 51), 
and whose highest principle is the unity necessary for 
the possibility of experience (ibid., p. 192). 
Now, given the complexity and thus the conceptual 
multiplicity of lived experience - the starting pOint 
for a social science - the form of its unity must remain 
high problematic, and thus it is important to note that 
Kant's emphasis upon the provision of a priori grounds is 
qualified by his emphasis upon the role of "imagination" 
(ibid., p. 112), by a rejection of the "sophistical" 
pretensions of prescriptive methods such as classical 
logic (ibid., p. 99) and by a reminder of the inevitability 
of the "illusion" by which "we take the subjective 
necessity.of a connection iItl our concepts ••• for an objective 
necessity in the determinatioITI of things in themselves" 
(ibid., p. 299). In other words, this work is not 
intended to prescribe a priori grounds for identifying 
an object ("action-research"), but to provide grounds 
for identifying a mode of knowing such an object. 
It is at this level and in this spirit, then, that 
I have sought to elaborate a general problematic for 
action-research. The work represents what certain 
sociologists have called an "analysis" - in which they 
perhaps follow Kant rather loosely, given the distinction 
above. 
"Analysis is the concern not with anything said or 
written but with the grounds of whatever is said -
the foundations that make what is said possible, 
sensible, conceivable". 
(McHugh et al., 1974, p. 2) 
For action-research: what assumptions seem to underly 
its claims and self-descriptions? What principles 
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might unify the concrete diversity of its experiences, 
as themselves, in their diversity, nevertheless constituting 
that unity to which the self-proclaimed label "action-
research" seems to aspire? It is as answers to such 
questions that the four main chapters of the work are 
presented: Chapter Two, on action and research, 
articulates the central meaning of the term itself and 
hence its implicit problematic, and Chapter Three/0n 
self-reflection, attempts to provide for the theoretical 
possibility of this problematic. Chapters Four and 
Five are concerned with criteria by which examples may 
be judged to be adequate examples: Chapter Four approaches 
this question concretely, from the starting-point of a 
proclaimed aspiration, and Chapter Five more generally 
and comprehensively. These four chapters thus present 
four constitutive themes for an analytical theory of 
action-research, a set of conditions for its theoretic 
possibility. The four themes are summarily introduced 
in the following section. 
Four Constitutive Themes for Action-Research 
A) Action and Research 
In proclaiming the intelligibility of a coupling 
between "action" and "research", action-research by its 
own self-categorization challenges a conventional 
distinction between one type of act whose rational 
properties are necessarily taken for granted as culturally 
institutionalized glosses upon meaning, motive and 
communication; and another type of act whose necessary 
claim is that it "brackets out" precisely such features 
in order to question the nature of meaning, motive, etc. 
The question therefore is: what form of unity could 
provide the site for such a challenge? Does action-
research propose that research is necessarily a form of 
action(~nd thereby question science's claim to be 
independent of its context) or that action is a form of 
research (and thereby support the claims of the mundane 
social actor to create adequate innovative understanding)? 
If the distinction action / research is to be transcended, 
what mediating category or categories could provide 
grounds for such a transcendence? 
B) Critical Self-reflection 
In order to realise the aspiration noted in Theme A, 
action-research must reject the separate roles of an actor 
who is merely the object of research and a researcher 
who merely observes; instead, action-research proposes 
both researchers who participate in the action under 
inquiry and actors who inquire into the actions they 
engage in. For such a proposal to be intelligible, it 
requires the possibility of a potential theoretic competence 
among social actors. This in turn requires the 
possibility of formulating consciousness in terms of a 
specific independence of both its cultural context and its 
psychic history. Analytically, action-research's 
problematic may be formulated as a search for a coherent 
mediation between its necessary denial of determinism and 
its equally necessary historical and cultural situatedness. 
- ];) -
C) The Improvement of Professional Practice 
The concrete version of its unity which action-research 
presents as reconciling its originary disparity (see Theme 
A) is that of professional practice. Professional 
practice is that form of action which claims explicitly 
to be guided by the discursive elaboration of theory, 
where actors invoke as their auspices the findings of 
"research", and thus present a mundane rationality in 
the form of a scientific expertise. In this way 
criteria for practice and for knowledge can be made to 
coincide: the improvement of professional practice becomes 
a criterion for research, since for action-research this 
dichotomy is precisely what has, supposedly, been removed. 
However, this "professional" knowledge derives its 
authority over action from the scientific auspices of 
positivism, which action-research wishes to challenge. 
Action-research therefore finds itself simultaneously 
and from the same intrinsic principle both supporting 
and opposing the cognitive authority of professional 
work, and, in order to resolve this contradiction, seeks 
a criterion by which an analytically justifiable 
formulation of validity may be distinguished from the 
conventional authori ty of insti tutionalized roles.. The 
analytical question posed by action-research here is: 
can theory (or "research") be related to the institutional 
life of practical action except in the form of an always 
unfulfilled - because "idealistic" - promise? 
- ll4-
D) The Problem of Validity 
Following directly from the considerations raised 
in Themes A and C, it must be a condition for action-
research's intelligibility that it should address the 
possibility of its own validity: by insisting on the 
association between research and action, action-research 
claims to achieve particularized relevance and effective-
ness (ie. for "practice"), but appears by the same token 
to forfeit the possibility of generalizing any of its 
outcomes. In this respect action-research reverses the 
familiar paradox generated when a natural science model 
of inquiry is applied to social situations: namely, that 
the validity of a general conclusion always lacks 
relevance for particular contexts - to the extent that the 
"significance" of the results of an investigation 
becomes a pun between statistical and interpretive 
meaning. Action-research's reversal converts the pun of 
positivist significance into an anxiety and thus into an 
issue. Its analytically necessary form is: what 
formulation of validity (of "significance") could inquiry 
aspire to which might "unify" the disparate notions 
of adequacy which inspire action (on the one hand) and 
science (on the other)? 
Action-Research and the Nature of Inquiry in the Social 
Sciences 
It must be clear from the above set of themes that 
the analytical requirements of a coherent theoretical 
basis for action-research's problematic are of the deepest 
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relevance for the social sciences. Each theme raises , 
anew long-standing questions concerning the conditions 
under which social inquiry itself is possible as a 
theoretical enterprise (as opposed to its relatively 
clear-cut status as a sophisticated elaboration of 
I 
mundane management) • Thus, Theme A raises the issue of 
the relation between theory and practice, and Theme B 
poses the epistemological dilemma concerning the apparent 
interpretive freedom of consciousness, yet its (equally 
apparent) constitution within a specific biographical 
and cultural (ie. historical) matrix. Theme C poses: the 
I 
! 
problematic relation between theoretic and institutional-
ized authority, and Theme D challenges once more the 
widespread acceptance of analogies between the natural 
and the social sciences. 
In the main part of this work these four themes will 
be elaborated in relation to action-research. However 
the four themes themselves can be seen as exemplifying 
two principles which are even more fundamental in 
providing grounds for the possibility of social inquiry 
in general, as well as action-research in particular, 
namely the epistemological and ontological principles 
of 1) reflexivity and 2) dialectics. Thus, it will be 
argued that the issues of theory and practice (Theme A) 
and freedom and determinism (Theme B) can only be grasped 
in terms of a dialectical relationship; and that only in 
terms of the reflexivity of inquiry can the issue of its 
theoretic as opposed to its institutional authority 
(Theme C) be satisfactorily addressed without recourse 
·]6~ -
to spurious analogies with natural science's positivist 
auspices (Theme D) . 
These two principles (reflexivity and dialectics) 
will progressively unify the series of arguments 
concerning action-research, and it is in their terms 
(it will be argued) that action-research must seek to 
resolve its constitutive dilemmas. Both terms suggest 
their potential status as grounding principles for 
inquiry by their fundamental significance as principles 
for the understanding of both language and consciousness, 
which must indeed be presupposed as conditions for the 
possibility of inquiry, if not for social life itself. 
Hence the remainder of this chapter will be concerned 
with the introduction of these two principles. 
Reflexivity, Dialectics, and the Intelligibility of Inquiry 
Reflexivity: Language, Theory, Self, and Other 
Language is indexical: the sense of verbal 
expressions is decided by a hearer (reader) in the light 
of his or her elaborated understandings of the speaker's 
(writer's) relevancies, the situation in which the 
expression is used, and the verbal and cultural system 
of which the particular expression forms an element. 
The "indexicality" of language is thus "irremediable" 
except for the "practical purposes" of particular cases 
(Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 6-7). Communication therefore is 
not merely the transmission of a message. The words of 
a telegram may be "transmitted" between two pieces of 
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electrical equipment, but its properties as a communication 
of meanings are created by the interpretive activities 
of the sender and the receiver (at either end, as it were) . 
(A single index is related to a plurality of books in 
a library or to a plurality of references in a single 
book in the same way as a single signifier is related to 
a plurality of signifieds, ie. concepts in the 
consciousnesses of the members of a semiotic community 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 67). Hence the intelligibility of 
language is a potentiality: language users always have 
before them the task of realizing this potential by 
means of their own interpretive procedures, and a number 
of these practical interpretive procedures for realizing 
the potential intelligibility of language have been 
specified (Cicourel, 1973, pp. 52-6). What they all 
share is a quality of reflexivity. 
A reflexive action is one which is "bent back" so 
that it affects the doer: in doing the action to 
Another, I necessarily do it myself. This to be under-
stood as follows. Given the indexical quality of 
language, I can only communicate by presupposing the 
intelligibility of my speech for the Other, and I can 
only make this presupposition because I decide its 
intelligibility for myself by envisaging its intelligibi-
lity for the Other. In other words, intelligibility 
resides in the presupposition of the interchangeability 
of perspectives between speaker and hearer, writer and 
reader. The shifting structure of this intersubjectivity 
is handled by means of the accomplishments of practical 
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reasoning ("etc.", "ad-hocing","retrospective-
prospective sense creation" - see Cicourel: loc. cit.) 
which remain unnoticed by members, as do so many other 
routinized cultural skills. Communication, then, is 
always a formulation of the Self (Blum, 1971, p. 313) in 
the light of the Self's mastery of the language, the 
setting, and (above all) through the Self's awareness 
of its own nature as the grounds for its assumptions 
about how this speech or writing will be received by 
others, and hence what this speech or writing should or 
might mean. This is why educators and therapists 
think that people learn by talking and writing: talking 
and writing (including this writing~) are not descriptions 
of an already existing state of awareness, but a means 
for the self-reflective formation of awareness. 
Now these taken-for-granted reflexive competencies 
required by mundane interaction may be "uninteresting" to 
lay members of a signifying community (Garfinkel, 1967, 
p. 7), and indeed the repression of an awareness of such 
reflexivity may well be a condition for the routine 
accomplishment of social intercourse in a culture where 
"knowledge" is taken to be a descriptive grasp of an 
external object-world through the supposedly transparent 
medium of a referential language. But for sociology 
to be a "science" it needs to theorize adequately both 
its objects and its methods (see Husserl's critique of 
* "Naturalism" - Husserl, 1965, pp. 80-3). Thus, 
* Otherwise, as Rutherford is supposed to have put it: 
"There is only Physics - everything else is stamp-
collecting" . 
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sociology must formulate the relation between lay 
members' methods for managing intelligibility and 
sociology's own methods for managing lay members' 
management, and this relation must in turn be formulated 
in relation to the culture, in which both sociologist 
and lay members are engaged, where the reflexivity of 
language and consciousness is energetically denied by 
a positivist ideology of facts and labels. There is, 
in other words, an inescapably sociological relationship 
between sociologists and the social world they purport 
to account for. 
This is the sense in which reflexivity is an 
analytical issue for sociology - a condition of sociology's 
intelligibility as a general project, and a condition it 
frequently ignores. For example, whereas Garfinkel 
reveals lay members' reflexivity as a feature of their 
speech which is uninteresting to them but interesting 
to a sociologist, Garfinkel's own speech, like theirs, 
relies on reflexive features which are tacitly used as 
an "uninteresting" resource for his revelation. For 
Garfinkel, the "task" for sociology is that members' 
reflexive procedures for constructing mundane 
intelligibility may and should be treated as "data" 
for "empirical research" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 281-2), 
but Garfinkel has already argued at length that the 
substitution of objective for indexical expressions 
cannot be other than an "unsatisfied programme" (ibid., 
p. 4) except as a matter of practical social management 
- 20: 
"in every particular case" (ibid., p. 6), and thus his 
own "data" and "research" couid be no more than yet 
another practical and reflexive management of an indexical 
communication. In more general terms, Garfinkel's 
own text glosses (in its writing) the glosses of members 
which are its topic. His own text is itself an example 
of "practical social management" within the highly inter-
esting institutionalized speech community of "sociology". 
As Garfinkel himself says (quoted by Filmer, 1976, 
p. 80): sociologies are "made to happen as events in 
the same ordinary affairs that in organizing they 
describe". 
Filmer's article makes clear the general significance 
of reflexivity as an analytical principle. Sociology's 
conventional tradition is one in which the "essential 
reflexivity" of sociology's "authorship" of its own 
speech is denied by invoking instead "the generalized and 
generalizable authority of science". Whereas for 
"science" the "essential reflexivity of accounts .•. is 
uninteresting", a "reflexive sociology" takes this 
essential reflexivity as its central interest. (Filmer, 
1976, pp. 82 - 3) • In other words, to be "interested" 
in the reflexivity of accounts is an analytical 
requirement for social inquiry. To propose an "objective" 
description of lay members' practices is to reproduce 
a process of mundane stratification, which denies the 
reflexive socio-linguistic processes of the social 
relation by which it is accomplished, in the same way 
as do lay members' practices themselves (see Phillipson, 
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1975, p. 165). The analytical requirement for sociology 
is to address the reflexive practices by which alone 
it is possible: a sociology which fails to do this is 
merely an instance of cultural stratification, an example 
of what Becker calls a "hierarchy of credibility" 
(Becker, 1970, p. 126), a legitimizing agency within a 
functionally differentiated institutional order, such 
as a "sociology of knowledge" (for example) would 
necessarily wish to investigate. Thus, only in taking 
its own essential reflexivity as its topic does sociology 
differentiate itself from the mundane practices which 
are its object, as an analytical, a theoretical enterprise. 
The recognition of reflexivity is, generally, a 
basic mode of ordering and presenting communicative 
adequacy, a claim to grasp the symbolic process by 
which communication is accomplished. For sociology 
this is a central task, but in a different but analogous 
way it is also a substantial and widespread feature of 
other cultural forms which aim at a high degree of 
persuasiveness. Thus: novels are written about 
writers, films about film-makers, and musicals about 
musicals; poems are written about language, plays include 
dramatic representations and multiple disguise, and 
paintings are maee of rooms hung with mirrors. At 
another level, jokes may be thought of as sudden 
reflexive turns, showing that the expectations on 
which mundane communication depends are indeed merely 
expectations, by suddenly thwarting them as expectations 
and revealing instead possibilities that had previously 
- 22. -
been concealed by their un-expectedness.* 
In other words, mundane reflexivity embodies the 
fragility of communication: it is by addressing this 
very fragility, by noting explicitly the art-fulness, 
the art-ificiality of the signifying process whose 
fragility is currently in question, that fragility can 
be survived, and communicability reassured and achieved. 
As a move against the fragility of the sign, the 
recogni tion of reflexivi ty reassures and disarms: by 
aligning the writer and the reader, the speaker and 
the hearer together, as it were, in complicity against 
the sign, it renews the very intersubjectivity on which 
the effectiveness of the sign depends. The recognition 
of reflexivity, then, is a source of rhetorical power, 
and hence a dimension of persuasiveness, of both aesthetic 
and theoretical adequacy. 
* The aesthetic power of music is often attributed 
to the way in which its "abstract" signifiers allow 
evocative reference to a realm of signifieds which 
is universal because it is completely individualized -
the "emotions" of Everyman. But perhaps the lack 
of a specific referent for the musical sign allows 
scope not so much for universal evocation but for 
unimpeded self-reference. Music is in this sense 
always "about" itself. Development sections in sonata 
form, variations on a theme, fugues, key modulations, 
shifts in orchestration (often, in Haydn, for example, 
quite consciously jokes - see above): these all 
represent explicit demonstrations of the transforma-
tive power, the effectful work of the musical art 
itself. And perhaps it is this expressiveness of its 
own reflexivity which makes the musical text such a 
powerful and inexhaustibly repeatable utterance. 
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Now, as a requirement for sociological theorizing, 
this "analytic" reflexivity has one important consequence 
which will be of great importance throughout the 
discussion of action-research: it denies the possibility 
that theory ("research") can achieve a final or a 
legislative relation to social action; rather, it 
presupposes a relationship between theorist and social 
actor which must be continuous and unending, because it 
is both irremediably particularized and endlessly 
problematic. This is because the theorist requires 
an Other, not as an object but, in some sense, as a 
"collaborator" in that intersubjectivity where meaning 
itself resides. 
The general point is made by McHugh et al., (even 
though for them "collaboration" is between theorists -
see Chapter Two, p.1S). Their argument is that there 
can be no finality to speaking, since to speak is 
always to assume (and hence, at that moment at least, 
to forget) the grounds of that particular speaking. 
Writing can thus never be complete for the basic reason 
that it needs to be read: "The papers in this book 
should be conceived of as displays which require alters. 
This is where readers come in. Readers are asked to 
treat our papers reflexively. They are asked to 
become our collaborators. That is our version of how 
to read". (McHugh et al., 1974, p. 8). This emphasis 
on the central theoretical importance of the creativity 
of the reader is found in the work of Barthes, as is 
the corollory that such a notion of creative reading 
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must involve abjuring or abolishing the unchallengeable 
authority of the author as a source for meaning. 
(Barthes, 1977). Similarly Alan Blum (1974, p. 252) 
empahsizes that "Speaking is controlled by its Rational 
relationship to hearing". 
Hence what McHugh et ale refer to as "the exemplary 
character" of their work (op.cit. p.12). The theorizer 
formulates an example not to provide an exhaustive 
description (impossible) nor to attempt a complete 
description which is regrettably doomed to incompleteness 
because of inadequate methods or funds (positivism): 
rather, the example stands as a provisional accomplish-
ment and an invitation to the reader to continue 
theorizing. (What sort of an example is this? 
What would be a further or a contrasted example? How 
was it chosen?) Examples only exist as such insofar 
as they are elaborately embedded, and thus are only to 
be understood by an act of constructive responsiveness: 
"Speech, except by example, would have to be 
perfect speech .•. Example is to say the 
speech is imperfect because it does not speak its 
own auspices, but usable because it allows alter 
(the reader) to formulate its auspices". 
(ibid., p. 10). 
Hence, speech can only proceed on the assumption 
that there is Another, whose rational being can only 
be postulated by analogy with, in reference to, the 
self-concept of the speaker. Whilst the irremediable 
indexicality of speech ensures that no speech can claim 
the finality of correctness (as in "logic" or "science"), 
this is not a regrettable, defeated lapse into solipsism; 
rather, the reflexivity of speech, by anchoring the 
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reality of the Other in the reality of the Self, through 
the processes inherent in acts of communication, allows 
(indeed requires) us to regard the Other and the 
communicative process as equally real along with the 
Self. (See McHugh, et al., 1974, final paragraph). 
In other words, the reflexivity of language entails 
a dialectical ontology of consciousness, a dialectic 
between Self, Other, and Symbol, to which the argument 
now turns. 
Dialectics: Self, Other, Language, Being, Time 
The general project of theorizing proposes a 
I 
relationship between self and world such that the develop-
ment of understanding is possible; the first question, 
then, is: what conceptions of consciousness are 
compatible with knowledge as a reflexive and developmental 
project? It follows from the considerations in the 
previous section that we cannot formulate a merely 
receptive subjectivity which simply registers the 
existence of an external object, since this would return 
us to a version of language as a system of descriptive 
labels for their external referents. Sartre, for 
example, rejects this simple dichotomization of 
consciousness and its objects as an "abstraction" 
(Sartre, 1969, p. 3) on the simple phenomenological 
grounds that "all consciousness is consciousness of 
something" (ibid., p. xxxvi). 
In this he follows Hegel, and Hegel's elaboration 
of the point begins to display the sense of a dialectical 
(rather than a dichotomous) relation between Subject and 
Object, within which a knowledge-constitutive process 
may be formulated. Hegel observes: 
"Consciousness knows SOMETHING; this object is 
the essence of the IN-ITSELF; but it is for 
consciousness the in-itself. This is where the 
ambiguity of this truth enters. We see that 
consciousness now has two objects: one is the 
first IN-ITSELF, the second is the being for 
consciousness of this in-itself .•• The first 
object, in being known, is altered for 
consciousness". 
(Hegel, 1977, p. 55). 
This self-consiousness of the act of perception leads 
each perceived quality to be surrounded by the awareness 
of its potential variants, and hence to have a necessary 
dimension of incipient self-transcendence, a sort of 
spontaneous disunity. From this starting point (see 
Hegel, 1977, pp. 58-64) Hegel traces an ontology of 
"The Thing" as a "manifold" of contradictions, 
experienced in almost instantaneous succession as a 
single essence and a plurality of qualities, as universal 
and specific, as self-defined and as defined-in-
relation-to-another" (ibid., pp. 67-71), in short as "a 
whirling circle" (ibid., p. 79). 
Further dialectical complexities follow. Firstly, 
since the consciousness which perceives the thing 
cannot distinguish between the thing, consciousness 
itself, and the act of perception, the constitution of 
the thing in consciousness becomes an act of self-definition: 
the complexity of the thing (the manifold of contradictions) 
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is reflected back into the structure of consciousness 
itself. (Ibid., pp. 73-5). Secondly, this complex 
structure of the process of experience can never be 
directly grasped by language, since language can only 
utter the general: our unique and fleeting experience 
of, for example, "this tree here" or "that house now" is 
swept away in our uttering of "tree" (referring to any 
tree), "here" (referring to any place), and "this" 
(a reference from anywhere), and so on. As Hegel says: 
"It is just not possible for us ever to say, or express 
in words, a sensuous being that we MEAN" (ibid., p. 60). 
With a similar purpose, Heidegger criticizes the 
equivocation which secretly undermines the pretension 
to unity and integration of classical logic. Logic, 
he says, is based on the distinction between subject and 
predicate, so that rules concerning the compatibility 
of the two can be devised, as a way of evaluating 
propositions (eg. the rule of no self-contradiction 
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 155)) But since propositions 
contain these two elements - subject and predicate -
the main emphasis can be on one or the other, so that. 
meaning has an inherent ambiguity, which cannot be 
accommodated in a hierarchically unified rule system, 
and thus, of necessity, "Logic becomes dialectic" (ibid., 
p.156). 
The rejection of classical logic is a refrain 
throughout What is Called Thinking? and indeed, the 
second series of lectures in that volume may be seen as 
an elaborate struggle against the structures of 
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conventional syntax in order to rescue the freedom 
and creativity of thought ("Thinking") from the 
stultifying restrictions of routinized linguistic 
usage: "Every dialogue becomes halting and fruitless 
if it confines itself obdurately to nothing but what 
is directly said". (Heidegger, 1968, p. 178). In 
other words, Heidegger's argument is that understanding 
cannot be accomplished simply by using language itself 
as a set of tools, to be carefully honed and skilfully 
manipulated as a descriptive ordering of reality 
(ibid., p. 153). 
Thus, since language cannot simply "label" exper-
ience, perception is never a uni-directional process but 
always "a reciprocal interplay" (Hegel, 1977, p. 84) 
in which successive stages of awareness "are themselves 
self-superceding aspects" (ibid., p. 81). It is 
interesting that Lenin founds his notion of a dialectical 
cognition in a theory of language which he explicitly 
derives from Hegel: 
"Dialectics is general as a method since, as Hegel 
noted, every proposition itself contains the 
notion of the contradiction of the relation 
between universal and individual". 
(Lenin, 1972, p. 361). 
This "contradiction" would, for Lenin, exemplify a 
"unity of opposites" which is "the condition for the 
knowledge of all processes in the world in their self-
movement, in their spontaneous development 11 (ibid., p. 360). 
In this way, we may formulate a dialectical knowledge-
generating process, in which Subject and Object, individual 
and universal, are inseparably bound up jn a process of 
reprocity and self-transcendence which constitutes the 
mode of being of human consciousness itself. However, 
"self-transcendence" is a rather elusive way of 
formulating this active principle of cognition. How 
might it be elucidated? 
The most famous version is Descartes', which may 
be summarized as: "I doubt the world; therefore I 
think: therefore I (doubtless) exist". Sartre 
explains in more detail. When consciousness registers 
the presence of an object, the acceptance of an idea, 
it is caught up by, and causally determined by "the 
positivity of Being" (Sartre, 1969, p. 23). This is 
consciousness without consciousness of itself as 
consciousness, and as such it is incomplete or at 
least untypical (cf. the state of being "lost in" 
contemplation) • For Sartre consciousness is always 
conscious of itself as not identical with its object, 
which he terms consciousness's "negative" aspect. For 
example: "To believe is to know that one believes, 
and to know that one believes is no longer to believe". 
(ibid., p. 69). Or, concerning objects: "absence 
appears necessarily as a pre-conditon of presence". 
(ibid., p. xxxvi), ie. objects are present to conscious-
nessnot as ineluctable causes of their appearance, but 
as contingently present, always potentially absent. 
The intelligibility of the experience of being is thus 
founded upon a sense of the discontinuity between 
consciousness and its objects: otherwise, for example, 
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"my present state would be (determined as - RW) a prolong-
ation of my prior state" (ibid., p. 28) and thus identity 
would lose its temporal dimension, which is a precondition 
of the experience of identity (see Kant, 1933, p. 79). 
Similarly, for the asking of a question to be intelligible, 
the questioner must "have the permanent possibility of 
dissociating himself from the causal series which 
constitutes being" (as unquestionable - RW) (Sartre, 
1969, p. 23). And because of this "impalpable fissure" 
(ibid., p. 77) which constitutes the experience of self 
in relation to world as one of possibility (it happens 
to seem thus now, but it could, has been, and will be 
different) consciousness cannot help but exist as a 
questioning state: "The being of consciousness is a 
being such that in its being, its being is in question" 
(ibid., p. 74). And this takes us back to Descartes, 
with "doubt" now established not as a technique or a 
choice, but as the very condition of being, as 
constitutive of consciousness itself. It also enables 
us to ground ontologically the competences whereby the 
reflexive procedures which render experience intelligible 
may be submitted to the analytical questioning of the 
theoretic subject. 
This last point suggests the structural parallel 
whereby "reflexiVity" and "dialectics" analytically 
require each other at the levels of both epistemology 
and ontology: the intelligibility of theorizing entails 
theorizing (reflexively) with others (see p.13 above), 
and the intelligibility of Being entails Being-with-Others. 
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Thus, Heidegger says: "The world is always the one 
that I share with Others" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 155). 
And: "Dasein's being is Being-with, its understanding 
of Being already implies the understanding of Others" 
(ibid., p. 161). Hegel's general argument also clearly 
links the two themes: it is through the dialectic 
between Self and Other that consciousness can develop 
towards "self-consciousness", ie. the comprehension of 
its own reflexive nature. Hegel phrases it as follows: 
"Self-consciousness .•• is the native realm of truth". 
(Hegel, 1977, p. 104). It "exists in and for itself 
when and by the fact that it so exists for another". 
(ibid., p. 111). This is because "being-for-itself" 
can only attain certainty of itself (ie. "its truth") by 
"confronting" itself, and thi:s is only possible when, 
between two self-conscious beings, "each is for the 
other what the other is for it" (ibid., p. 113). 
The true nature of one's own being is thus only achieved 
by confronting another (as the representative of 
oneself) in a "struggle" whose prize is simultaneously 
freedom and truth (ibid., p. 114). 
Although Hegel goes on to speak of the winners 
and losers of this ontological struggle in terms of 
"the history of Spirit", it is clear that at another 
level he is formulating what might be called an 
"interactive" dialectics of (*truthful") understanding, 
which he embodies in a sequence of "ideal types" of 
increasing complexity: 
a) the "bondsman" conceives himself as an object; 
(ibid., pp. 117-8); 
I 
b) the "lord" conceives the other as an object; (ibid. , 
p. 118); 
c) the "stoic" achieves a fragile freedom through 
withdrawal from the other - unity at the cost of 
isolation (ibid., p. 122); 
d) the "Sceptic" transcends isolation at the cost of 
internal contradiction, oscillating between conceiving 
himself as free and as contingent: he experiences 
the dialectic of Self and Other as a struggle, but 
does not recognise its structure (ibid., pp. 123-6); 
e) the "unhappy consciousness", which suffers the sense 
of its own contradictory and yet unified (ie., in the 
strictest sense, "dialectical") structure. (ibid. , 
pp. 126-32). 
Without following through Hegel's evocation of the 
progressive history of "Spirit", one can note the 
analytic value of a dialectic which thus concretely 
protrays the self-transcendental development of se~con-
sciousness, and which progressively reveals the conditions 
of its own possibility to be its own dialectical 
structure. Following on from previous arguments (see 
p. to above) , it is notable that Hegel ' s dialectic moves 
progressively from "stratifying" towards increasingly 
reflexive forms of consciousness. 
There is one further theme which is essential in 
a discussion of a dialectical formulation of consciousness 
for theorizing: that of its temporal dimension, within 
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which theorizing and consciousness must be situated 
for either to be intelligible, and which in particular 
seems to be implicit in action-research's coupling of 
action AND research. If action is linked with research, 
then it must be more than an instantaneous - and thus 
a-temporal - response; and if research is linked with 
action, then it must be more than an instantaneous -
and thus a-temporal - observation. Or, in other 
words: only if "meaning" must always be negotiated 
within the temporality of experience before it is 
imputed, can the possibility of "other meanings" 
conceivably be explored within a (temporal) process of 
inquiry. 
Although Kant himself posits Time as a constituent 
ca tegory of experience (see p. '\ above), Heidegger is 
concerned to rescue understanding from the abstract 
instant of Kantian "intuition" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 410), 
and to rescue truth from "the superficial theory of 
propositions and judgements" (ibid., p. 401), by locating 
both understanding and truth within the temporality 
of Being: 
"Only in terms of the temporality of discourse -
that is of Dasein in general - can we clarify how 
'signification' 'arises', and make the possibility 
of concept-formation ontologically intelligible". 
(Ibid., p. 401) 
Time, here, is not the chronological sequence of discrete 
"perceptions" by which a determinist model of cause and 
effect is erected, but the temporal dimension within 
which the Self is grounded in a structure of potential 
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"authenticity", l'e. of "Care" ('b'd 370) 1 1 ., p. with respect 
to its past and its future (ibid., p. 390). This Care-ful 
sense of responsibility towards truthful understanding 
is differentiated from "everyday interpretation" (ibid., 
p. 358) and from that mere "curiosity" which, says 
Heidegger, seeks the future only in order to make it 
into the present (ibid., p. 397); which, in other words, 
by seeking to make discoveries which are both "new" and 
final, thereby aspires to convert the temporality of 
future possibilities into a time-less present of 
unchanging certainties. In contrast, Heideggerian 
"Care" may be seen as that overarching principle under 
whose aegis the process of inquiry proceeds when it 
addresses the grounds of its speech in the necessarily 
temporal structures of experience, symbolization, a nd 
understanding,~and thereby provides grounds for its 
implicit commitment to an unending dialectic of 
developmental and reflexive understanding. 
Commentary: Grounds, Texts, Possibilities, and Resources 
In this Introduction I have tried to provide 
grounds for this writing. It is important to stress that 
these "grounds" are not intended as an origin, a set 
of principles prescribing the remainder of the work as 
necessary, nor as a declaration of allegiance to a 
school (of theory), showing how a few general beliefs 
subsume a variety of specific interpretations. Rather, 
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since this is being wri tten after the main text, it 
attempts to show the possibility of the work, now that 
it has been explored through, and now that the text has 
been reviewed and revised in the light of the inevitable 
first question: having written this, what made it 
possible? More elaborately: what notions of 
subjectivity, object-world, and language are consistent 
with the activity by which the subjectivity currently 
wielding this retractable pencil is assembling this 
text now? Hence, a brief comment on "texts" seems 
required. 
Since my text seems to display a Subject re-viewing 
a range of cultural resources (the published texts 
of McHugh, Hegel, Lenin, Krech and Crutchfield, and 
Kant, for example) in order to assemble its own speech 
relating to a current concern (action-research), it 
would be Quixotic {Another resource~ to propose this 
text except as a resource whereby its readers can review 
concerns: texts do not prescribe meanings for readers; 
they set meanings in "play": 
"Writing (does not) designate an operation of 
recording, notation, representation, 'depiction' ••• 
(it) traces a field .•• which, at least, has no 
other origin than language itself, language 
which ceaselessly calls into question all origins". 
(Barthes, 1977, pp. 145-6) 
-Reflexivity predicates the intelligibility of writing 
upon the reality of the reader, upon the inevitable 
question of language's origin in the Other. In this 
sense, the theoretic text can be seen in the light of 
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Wolfgang Iser's comment on the act of reading a literary 
text: "Textual repertol'res and t t ' s ra egles simply offer 
a frame within which the reader must construct for 
himself the aesthetic object" (Iser, 1978, p. 107). 
The "theoretical object" also is constructed by writers 
and readers through the repertoires and strategies 
of language, as organized provisionally in a "'J:ext". 
In~that a text is predicated upon the reality of 
a reader, as the necessary presumption of the intelligi-
bility of the act of writing, a text is essentially 
constituted not as a legislative declaration, but 
as a horizon of possibilities. It is this set of 
possibilities which is given by the "play" of the 
text: a ball "in play" is open to the unpredictable, 
skilful, improvisatory contingencies of the game-process 
and its idiosyncratic players; only "out of play" 
does it become subject to a single prescriptive rule. 
"Play", here, is therefore used in the sense of creative 
exploration (cf. theories of child development - see 
J enk s, C., 1982, p. 22). "Play" is a metaphor for the 
creation of meaning, and thus a metaphor for metaphoricity 
itself, that metaphoricity of language which maintains 
the interpretive open-ness of texts, and thus makes possible 
the creation of this text. In contrast, a non-playful 
text, in which, say, a prescriptive logic claims to 
organize correctly a system of propositions, in which 
language is supposed not to play but to work within a 
framework of tautologically valid definitions and object-
ively accurate references; such a legislative text must 
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propose to annihilate the legislations of its predecessors 
and thus fears its readers as potential executioners: 
since it proposes its own finality, its own existence as 
a text becomes an anomaly, a hopeful exception to the 
very rule whereby it supercedes its predecessors. 
But "possibilities" are rresented here only as 
preliminaries, as providing an intelligibiiity for 
theorizing as a project: "possibilities" do not remain 
"an open horizon"; they are culturally located as a 
set of limits and resources. As Alan Blum says 
( 1971, pp. 301-2) : "Theorizing .•• constitutes a 
particular method for treating and reconstructing one's 
biography as a practically conceived corpus of knowledge". 
Or, as John O'Neill quotes from Merleau-Ponty: 
"Expression is always an act of self-improvisation in 
which we borrow from the world, from others, and from our 
own past efforts" (O'Neill, 1972, p. 95). Now, my 
resources and thus my limits for theorizing are in-
evitablY'i) my membership of a societal community and 
of a number of epistemic "sub-communities" - professional, 
academic, political, domestic, etc., and ii) my conception 
of theorizing itself as my most complete and most fully 
grounded and articulated response to i). For me to 
theorize must involve me in seeking to integrate, 
transform, and transcend ~ actual resources, and 
similarly for others. Hence, in a sense, knowledge and 
cultural tradition are biographically contingent and 
thus mutually "limiting". 
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However, this is merely to say that self and 
cultural tradition define each other: the self as a 
I 
creative and changing "improvisation" constitutes and 
is constituted by culture as membership in a plurality 
of possibilities. Hence, theoretical resources and 
limits may be conceived without exclusivity or legislation, 
and not merely in an academic dimension: in that 
theorizing is above all an engagement with the reflexive 
processes of language and its relation to truth and 
experience, its resources are not just those of "sociology" 
and "philosophy"; rather, its resources are potentially 
as wide as the social world which is so overwhelmingly 
constituted by linguistic practices. The linguistic 
practices of the social world include not only the 
"mundanely reflexive" talk whereby members accomplish 
practical interaction (Garfinkel's topic), but also the 
playful, creative practices of joking, word-games, 
crosswords, satire, and parody - practices which implicitly 
but with varying degrees of elaboration begin to take 
mundane intelligibility as their topic - and also the 
widespread aesthetic practices of songs, films, dance, 
and narrative fiction (in print and on radio and TV), 
where again toe mundane world is framed, re-structured, 
and thus - in varying degrees - made available for 
re-formulation (see p. 1.1 above) . Thus, just as 
"possibilities" do not mean that any formulation is possible, 
nor that one correct possibility can be selected from a 
universal series, "limits" do not mean that cultural 
tradition imposes itself as a final closure, since culture 
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and tradition have their own constitutive play-fulness. 
This relationship between possibilities and limits 
applies to the ensuing work in two ways. Firstly, 
it evokes the sense in which the present text consults 
(and yet is constituted in) a series of resources for 
the conducting of its argument: its process is not the 
construction of an authoritative corpus which might 
then be evoked as a legislation, since this would be 
to deny the interpretive status of the meanings these 
textual resources can have for my argument. Resources 
are consulted to set meanings "in play", as the only 
rigorous and self-consistent sense for a reflexive 
and dialectical theorizing. Secondly, and consequently, 
the following attempts to provide theoretic grounds 
for action-research do not seek a site outside the 
culture in which action-research operates from which to 
impose upon action-research a legislative framework. 
Rather, in each chapter begins with the set of possibili-
ties and limits which action-research itself invokes, 
and proceeds to assemble and explore the further 
resources which action-research's self-proclaimed aspira-
tions and problematic seem to require. This introduction 
has sought to delineate the analytic limits within which 
such resources may be conceived to be on the one hand 
required and on the other hand available. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ACTION-RESEARCH, ACTION, AND RESEARCH 
"A t' c lon-research" 
What is the fundamental problematic within which 
" t' h" t ac lon-researc a tempts to formulate its aspiration? 
Simply and basically, the impulse towards "action-research" 
originates in the attempt to question what is taken to 
be a conventional differentiation between "action" and 
"research". Thus: "A realistic view of both action and 
research reduces the difference between them" (Halsey, 
1972, p. 178). Alfred Clarke makes the point in slightly 
different terms: "Action-research ... follows Popper's 
idea ... that all social administration should be conducted 
as experimentation" (Clarke A, 1976, p. 1) and thereby 
"combined discovery and implementation in one process" 
(p. 2). By formulating discovery ("research") and 
implementation ("action") as one process rather than as 
two distinct processes, Clarke argues, action-research 
will be able to ensure that the "findings" of research 
will be "applied" to action, and thereby also ensure 
that the research efforts of "social science" will be 
able to claim "relevance" (ibid., p. 2). Thus "action-
research" poses for social science the challenge of 
relevance. Jon Nixon, for example, begins, crudely: 
"What is educational research? Disputation on 
irrelevant issues in impossibly esoteric journals ?" .... 
before going on to formulate "action-research" as "research 
... initiated, conducted, and disseminated from the inside" 
(Nixon, 1981a, p. 5) - ie. from a vantage point where 
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"1 " d re evance coul not be questioned. 
Clarke's version of action-research's question takes 
the form of a paradoxical juxtaposition: "social 
administration" evokes a form of life in which bureau-
cratic procedures require a specific emphasis on the 
predictability of rule-guided actions, where knowledge 
of general rules is invoked (deductively) as the authority 
for particular actions~ "experimentation" in contrast 
conventionally suggests an attempt to derive the authority 
for general rules (inductively) from the knowledge of 
particular actions - ie. action-guided rules. Action-
research asserts the unity underlying this distinction 
in order to assert an ambiguity underlying a simple 
polarization, an ambiguity which must be faced at the 
level of epistemology, in theorizing the cognitive 
practices which relate the rules of knowledge and action. 
Hence Clark's parallel rejection of a dichotomy between 
discovery and implementation: action-research desires 
an epistemology which will in principle transcend the 
terminology of journeys of discoverx: (where "truth" 
is "somewhere else") and of implements (which exist in 
themselves and mayor may not be utilized) - cf Heidegger's 
various arguments against language and artefacts as 
"tools" (Heidegger, 1971). The nature of this proposed 
epistemology, the nature of the principles which underly 
the invocation of the "one process", is the theme of this 
work. 
But in spite of its bold speaking for a problematic 
unity against established separations, action-research 
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also recognizes its fragility: as Halsey observes: 
"Bringing together what is normally conceived as separate 
has caused the confusion over the nature of action-research" 
(Halsey, 1972, p. 178), a confusion created in part by 
the attempt to integrate procedures and professional 
roles with different traditions, methods, styles, and 
interests (ibid., p. 165). The challenge of action-
research is thus not only epistemological but political 
(and indeed also a challenge to that very distinction) 
(see Chapter Five, p. t~') . In institutional terms action-
research wishes also to recover unity, the unity which 
a "division of labour" in the production of knowledge 
has fragmented and thereby lost. Action-research speaks 
for the possibility of a set of social relations in 
which "Theory" and "Practice" are no longer institutionally 
segregated around a dichotomy which fractures the coherence 
and rationality of social inquiry and creates a "problem 
of relevance". Hence it is central to Clark's assertion 
that in order for action-research to avoid the problem 
of "relevance" the researcher must act "in collaboration" 
with the subjects of the research, so that his problems 
are also their problems. In this way, he claims, the 
experimental "additions" to the situation do not need 
"partial ling out or controlling" (p. 1). Thus a concensual 
politics of inquiry is proposed as a resolution of a 
methodological dilemma. 
This theme of a collaborative relationship underlies 
many formulations of action-research's ideal. 
Cory (1953) observes: 
For example, 
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~(Action-research is) a cooperative activity: 
lnterested parties to the action proposed need to be 
collaborators ... " (p. 18). 
Similarly, Eric Midwinter (1972) explains: 
"So we had to join in dialoque with the h I sc 00 s ... 
By these means we endeavoured to relate real and 
ideal, or, to put it another way, theory and 
practice". (p. 56). 
And Brown, Henry et ale (1982): 
"Action-research is distinguished by its adherence 
to a collaborative ethic". (p. 4). 
In putting forward this "collaborative" principle, 
action-research explicitly adopts from Habermas a problem-
atic of concensus formation as a basis for truth 
(see discussion in chapter three, pp. below) and thereby 
opposes what Brian Fay (1975) describes as the "control" 
problematic of positivist social science. The quotation 
from Clarke (above) uses "control" in a methodological 
context, but Fay himself makes clear that he sees the 
political sense of "control" as a significant metaphor, 
even a systematic isomorphism between a conception of 
inquiry and a conception of political order (Fay, 
1975, p. 58). A similar line of argument is implicit 
when action-research denies the claims to cognitive privileg~ 
made by institutionalized "science", ranging from 
Midwinter's characterization of "University research" 
as "wishing to stop life in order to measure static, 
that is, unreal siutations" (Midwinter, 1972, p. 50) 
to Jon Nixon's presentation of his book A Teachers' Guide 
to Action-Research as "a radical alternative to the 
paternalism of traditional research" (Nixon, 1981a, p. 9). 
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In order to provide a theoretical basis for action-
research, therefore, the nature of the relation between 
research and action must also be analyzed as a social 
relation: how can the theoretical authority of a 
research stance be distinguished (in its relation to 
action) from the institutionalized power of research 
initiatives, in terms of political, economic, and 
ideological features? What forms of interpersonal 
collaboration could possibly address "the division of labour' 
between action and research as a problem? And there is 
a further question: Nixon's "radical alternative" is 
exemplified largely by cases where practitioners' 
research efforts take the form of self-evaluation; and so 
we must ask: what version of subjectivity could enable 
research and action to be carried out as a dialectic of 
self-transcendence by one person? 
Underlying all these questions is one question: how 
could "action" and "research" possibly be separate, and, 
conversely, how could they possibly NOT be separate? 
In asking the question, one is not seeking to arbitrate 
between two potential answers ("action and research ARE 
separate" versus "action and research ARE NOT separate"): 
rather the asking is an attempt to recover the complexities 
implicit in the possibility of the question itself. 
(See Heidegger: 1968, p. 159). 
To note action and research as a difference is to 
note that action proceeds on a basis which must always 
fall short of a theoretically conceivable certainty. 
The knowledge which guides action can always provisionally 
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be deemed to be sufficient for that course of action at 
that time, but it can also always be deemed insufficient, 
in the light of a notion of "greater understanding", which 
not-action-but-research could possibly create. The 
separation of action and research is thus one articulation 
of a faith in the possibility of change: action is con-
ceived as meshed (however loosely) into a social system, 
whereas research is the process whereby the self-perpetuat-
ing processes of that system might be interrupted. 
However, although the possibility of change is grounded 
in the distinction between action and research, it requires 
equally an intimate and principled linkage between the 
two, in order that the "findings" of research can be 
translatable back into the world of action: indeed the 
intelligibility of the metaphor of translation requires 
both difference and similarity. In this way action-
research's question is revealed as an insight into a 
complexity: a conception of the rational development 
of the social world and the possibility of inquiry into 
the nature of that rationality require that action and 
research be both distinct and mutually required. This 
mutual relationship between the two, as elements in a 
dialectical progression, is what is glimpsed in the 
action-research literature, but what is not recognized 
is the theoretical necessity of a reflexive conception 
of research's relation to action, so that their relation-
ship may be theorized in ways which (as action-research 
also urges) preserves the authenticity of both, ie. 
which preserves research's capacity for achieving a 
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critical distance from action AND preserves action's 
intelligibility, as a creative, rather than a causally 
determined response to social meanings.* 
Action-research thus renews a long-standing debate 
in sociology concerning the proper relationship between 
social action the Itbommon-sense:, 
) rationality" of mundane 
social action} and the "scientific rationality" of 
social investigation; and it renews its question in 
the light of a commitment to the possibility of rational 
procedures both for valid critique and for justifiable 
change. 
Action and Research - The Evaluative Relation 
One of action-research's central formulations of 
the unity and intelligibility of its project is that reeearcl 
can be the evaluation of action: "Action-research is ••. 
the study of a social situation with a view to improving 
the quality of action within it" (John Elliott: 1981, 
p. 1). In this respect, action-research is not different 
from other attempts by sociologists to formulate the 
link between research and action, for example Wilkins 
(1967, p. 109): "Social action ... should be evaluated 
* For example, R. Lees (1975) writes, concerning "The 
Action-Research relationship": 
"The Community Development Project anticipates an intimate 
and productive working relationship between administrators, 
field workers, research-oriented social scientists and 
local residents .•. The aim of promoting participation 
is in itself seen as a desirable goal... The research 
problem in this situation is to define participation •.. " 
(pp. 59 and 61). 
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and this means research". Thus a central question 
becomes: from which site might research be carried 
out from which it could claim to judge the "quality" of 
action? Many action-research theorists have been 
content to follow sociologists such as Wilkins and to 
answer: the objectivity of scientific method. Thus 
Alfred Clarke (1976) begins: "At the centre of action-
research lies the traditional scientific paradigm of 
experimental manipulation and observation of effects", (p. 1 
For this to be possible it must be assumed that the 
researcher is able to be both present to the action (in 
order to manipulate a phenomenon which really is the action 
under investigation) and absent from the action (in order 
to observe the action without affecting it). (The 
importance of the complexity underlying this proposal 
is brought out in Phillipson: 
and Language", 1981). 
"Sociological Practice 
This complexity is focussed by Clarke when he 
goes on to suggest that researchers and their subjects 
should "collaborate" in the formulation of "problems" 
( op. cit., P • 1). In this way, for Clarke and others, 
research's distance from action does not take the form 
of a different set of questions, and thus action-research 
appears to abandon one plausible way of formulating 
the site from which evaluation could be carried out; 
namely, that research has its own specific interests -
a formula which underpins much writing on social science. 
Norman Denzin for example defines the research act as 
"those endeavours of the sociologist that take him or 
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her from theory to the empirical world and back again" 
and he elaborates: 
"I assume that the only justification 
for an empirical observation is the refinement, develop-
ment, or refocussing of social theory" (Denzin, 1978, 
p. ix). In contrast, the "action-research act" would 
wish to be an endeavour leading from the empirical 
world to theory and back again: "The research needed 
for social practice can best be characterized as research 
for social management or social engineering. It is a 
type of action-research, a comparative research on the 
conditions and effects of various forms of social action, 
and research leading to social action". (Lewin, 
1946, p. 35). 
If, then, for action-research, research shares with 
action a cognitive interest in managing or constructing 
that same social world which is the arena of action, 
could it be that research's independence from that 
world rests in its methods of understanding, and if so, 
in what respect? Cory (1953) suggests that "the 
most important characteristic that differentiates action-
research from more casual inquiry is that evidence is 
systematically sought, recorded, and interpreted" 
( 26) But l.'n what sense could action be thought of p. . 
as based on "casual" evidence? Not, surely, that 
action is careless about its outcomes or its grounds. 
On the contrary, as Garfinkel's work has shown (Garfinkel, 
1967) action is always most care-ful to construct its 
rational basis. Garfinkel's theme is precisely that 
social actors seek, record, and interpret evidence in 
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ways which are elaborated, flexible, interrelated, & 
acceptabl 
coherent. In what sense could these procedures 
be identified as not "systematic"? Could it perhaps 
be suggested that action is systematic in its improvisa-
tion of methods in a particular case, whereas perhaps 
research (for Cory: action-research) wishes to specify 
the system of relations between evidence and action 
separately from and in advance of any particular case? 
But the impossibility of achieving this uncontexted 
version of "being systematic" has been argued at length 
by Cicourel (1964). For example: 
"The logic of everyday activities in which the 
social object under study is embedded must be 
related to the logic of the observer's theory 
(but) the transformations which relate one system 
to another and the language which describes each 
system taken separately and both systems taken 
together will never be perfect. There can be 
general congruence but not perfect correspondence". 
(p. 186). 
In other words, language's attempts to be "systematic" 
would become enmeshed in the inextricable embeddedness 
of its processes in the reflexive interpretive procedures 
by which alone it "means": even the modest sufficiency 
of "a general congruence" would have to be decided upon 
in each situation as "sufficiently congruent" for this 
here-and-now purpose. The theoretical impossibility 
of ever "being systematic" in an absolute sense only 
serves therefore to raise yet more sharply the question: 
why might research wish to claim such a possibility? 
And thus one returns to the basic concern of research 
to subject action to a form of judgement which, research 
claims, action itself avoids. 
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We have already seen that Lewin characterizes the 
aim of action-research as "social management": later 
in that paper he says that the evaluation of action 
programmes will Occur as a result of "fact finding" (Lewin, 
1946, p. 58). Elsewhere he states: "the aims of 
action research are to bring about certain changes under 
sufficiently controlled conditions in order to understand 
the laws which govern the nature of the phenomenon 
under study" (quoted in Foster, 1971, p. 3). In other 
words, the method of "controlling" variables will achieve 
the aim of creating the "factual" basis on which the 
effectiveness or otherwise of "social management" may be 
evaluated. In this way Lewin takes over, for action-
research, the evaluative site of natural science: research 
can treat action as behaviour, as phenomena which are 
governed by laws-of-nature and thus may be managed by 
being understood. The unacknowledged complexity of 
Lewin's version of the research / action relation is that 
which is noted by Brian Fay: the metaphor of "control"-
which evokes a critical stance towards the evidential 
basis of social actio~ but an acquiescent stance towards 
the purposes of social action. Analytically the problem 
is that Lewin does not address the ambiguity of presence / 
absence, of critique and acquiescence in the relationship 
between action and research as he himself formulates it. 
So we must ask: on what basis may research take action's 
purpose of social management as an unquestioned resource 
rather than as a topic for critical inquiry? And we 
can only answer: by failing to notice the reflexive basis 
of its own activities in those socially defined purposes. 
I 
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Further: on what basis may research formulate its 
difference from the presupposition of mutual inter-
subjectivity which governs social action by treating 
the actions of members as observable behaviour ("facts"), 
while not addressing the apparent consequence that (in 
order to be consistent) research's own activities would 
need to be treated in the same way - as behavioural data 
obeying interesting general laws? On this basis 
research's claim to have good grounds for distinguishing 
itself from other actions would seem to be annihilated 
by the very form of the claim, by the form of those 
grounds. 
In this way, Lewin's version of the research / action 
relation seems to embrace an ambiguity without analyzing 
its terms, and in this respect its analysis seems, if 
anything, weaker than the conventional "applied social 
science" action-research wishes to oppose. Wilkins 
(op. cit.) for example addresses in more detail both 
the unity and the difference of purpose which relate action 
and research. On the one hand, the unity of purpose 
which enables collaboration: 
"Those who wish to evaluate social action and 
test the effectiveness of social agencies want 
to do so for the very same reasons as those who 
plan the work of such agencies ... wish to do the 
action part. The work of social rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, preservation, and preventive 
action is a joint enterprise for action and 
research" (pp. 9 -10). 
On the other hand, the difference which requires 
collaboration: the world of social action is in 
principle conservative, muddled, and defensively obscure 
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(pp. 26-7) so that "scientific method" can operate as 
a "court of appeal" ( 2) p. 7, using "measurement" as 
its tool (p. 10), enabling knowledge to be tested, 
ignorance to be admitted, and "meaningful" questions 
to be asked (p. 27). Wilkins has two striking 
metaphors for the principled difference between action 
and research. The first is concrete: research is a 
"raiding opera tion" upon the world of action ~Ienemy 
territory") (pp. 108 ff.), which adds a dramatic dimension 
to Brian Fay's image of science as control, and casts an 
ironic light on the "joint enterprise" in which both 
raiders and raided are said to be engaged. The second 
is highly abstract: research and action, like ends and 
means, science and ethics, are related as "possibly 
orthogonal dimensions" (p. 25), suggesting a principle 
of unlimited independent variation between them. 
Nevertheless: 
"the scientist should be integrated into the 
system (ie. of action, of social administration - R.W.). 
Both social research and social action are concerned, 
for essentially the same reasons, with the same 
objectives ..• If we believe in democracy, then 
we should not seek to apply autocratic or dictator-
ship methods in the sub-world of social action, 
social policy, or social research" (p. 34). 
Here we can see once more the political metaphor 
underlying the epistemology: the liberal "separation 
of powers" in opposition to the "monolithic" social 
unity of dictatorship: only through its independence 
("orthogonality"), even to the point of a principled 
hostility to its environment ("raiding"), can research 
act as an incorruptible court of appeal for action, 
and thereby guarantee not (as Brian Fay would have us 
believe) an effectively controlled society, but a 
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democratically OPEn, progressive society, based on the 
possibiloty of effective evaluation, ie. the asking 
of "meaningful" questions in order to subject action's 
presumed knowledge to research's objective testing. 
We may agree with Wilkins in wishing to establish 
the possibility that research should have a site from 
which to subject action to critique, under the aegis of 
canons of Reason which are distinguishable from those 
of action; and that on such a possibility depends the 
notion of the democratic conduct of social affairs. 
What must be placed at issue, however, is whether Wilkins, 
and other sociologists invoking the quantifying rigour 
of "scientific method" have formulated adequately the 
basis for such a site. The following objections start 
from Wilkins's own formulations, but implicitly refer 
to the general stance, of which, in this respect he 
may be taken to be representative. 
First, in constructing "science" as a source of 
prescriptive social authority, Wilkins does not explain 
why science itself might not become yet another social 
institution characterized by the defensive conservatism 
which - he says - is typical of other institutions.* 
Secondly, Wilkins constructs the authority of science 
as a prescription precisely by ignoring the ambiguities 
implicit in the metaphorical basis of his formulation, 
metaphors whose inevitable ambiguity renders problematic 
the very authority Wilkins claims they assert. How 
can the difference between action and research, science 
* This is indeed the point urgently at issue between 
Kuhn and popper in their contributions to Musgrave 
Lakatos's volume: Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowl~dqe (1970). 
and 
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and ethics, be presented in terms of the geometric 
construction of a perpendicular ("orthogonal")? 
Only by the prior assumption of mathematics as a realm 
of simple essences which may be invoked to order the 
complexities of the social world. This is the myth of 
geometry, the aspiration of man towards a divine 
abstraction, the aspiration of knowledge to move from 
Garfinkel's obscure jury-room on to Plato's sunlit 
hillside; a poetic image which enacts the actual 
complexity, the hubristic risk, of analysis, while 
describing its apparent simplicity as a manageable 
technical accomplishment. (The nature of such contra-
dictions as the underlying structure of myth is of 
course Levi-Strauss's theme. (See Chapter Four, pp. 
Again: Wilkins elaborates at great length the imagery 
of wartime operations against an enemy in order to 
evoke the contribution of research to a consensually 
agreed project of "social rehabilitation, reconstruction", 
etc. : the metaphor both affirms and denies the taken-
for-grantedness of the social values at stake - it 
affirms the necessity for prior commitment, but denies 
that the shared commitment is shared: the researcher 
is both enemy and partner. Wilkins affirms science's 
independence and clarity of analysis while exemplifying 
the dependence of his own analysis of that clarity on 
,. 
complex ambiguities which he treats as not requiring 
analysis. 
Third, in the same way as he treats language as 
merely "conceptual" by denying its metaphoricity, he 
asserts the possibility of treating measurement as mere 
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quantification, by denying its indexicality - its 
reliance on those interpretive judgements by which 
phenomena are chosen to be counted - or not, as the 
case may be. Again, this ignores Cicourel's well-
known critique of measurement's claims to mechanical 
replicability, claims which Wilkins rehearses fully, 
by means of a "philosophy of measurement" derived from 
a model of language as the transmission of messages 
between coders and decoders (pp. 183-4). Again we 
have a highly evocative metaphor, which imposes the 
intelligibility of quantification upon language, as 
the myth of science's authoritative method, and which 
needs to be explicated through an analysis of the activity 
of language which would formulate the relation in language 
between acts of numerical awareness and acts of 
metaphorical generalization. 
Such versions of the possibility of research as 
the authoritative evaluation of action thus rest on 
a number of crucial simplifications and impositions 
concerning the research / action relationship, which 
result in a prescriptiveness of method and a restrict-
iveness of truth criteria which action-research wishes 
precisely to avoid: 
"Action-research is nothing if not eclectic. 
This eclecticism may prove to be a stumbling 
block to the reader who has too narrow a view 
of educational research. A conscious effort 
should be made to bracket any preconceived. 
ideas concerning the correctness or otherw1s~ of 
a particular research model. What matt~rs 1S 
the extent to which the model is appropr1ate; 
appropriate to the skills of the teacher, the 
constraints of the classroom, and the nature of 
the problem to be explored". (Nixon, 1981a, p. 7) 
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However, mere eclecticism opens up a whole range of 
crucial issues concerning criteria for validity (see 
Chapter Five), and is thus no remedy for the inadequacy 
of Lewin's attempt to preserve the framework of a 
positivist epistemology while minimizing the distinction 
between research and action on which such an epistemology 
depends. And we have also seen that, for example, 
Wilkins's more coherently positivist account of 
research's claim to possess evaluative authority over 
action also fails, in a number of ways, to address 
analytically the basis of that claim. My argument 
therefore turns to consider in detail those exponents 
of action-research who have attempted to free action-
research from its involvement with positivist versions 
of the evaluative relation between research and action. 
Action-Research: Beyond Evaluation? 
Both Halsey and Midwinter claim that positivist 
forms of evaluation necessitate the subjection of the 
creativity of action to research's authoritative constraint. 
Midwinter says, "University research wishes to stop 
life in order to measure static ... situations" (Midwinter, 
1972, p. 50). Halsey suggests that researchers' 
desire for "clear variables" tends to influence the 
naturally "exploratory" tendencies of administrators 
towards greater "conservatism" in the design of 
investigative strategies (Halsey, 1972, pp. 173, 177). 
Halsey implicitly agrees with Midwinter's claim that the 
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notion of studying static situations is "unreal" 
(Midwinter, 1972, p. 50) when he recognizes that research 
itself will have an impact on the action it researches 
(p. 175-6). More explicitly and elaborately, G. Smith 
(1975) admits that his action-research project had 
actually begun with a model of "discrete and self-
contained ... programmes of action" (p. 191), evaluated 
by researchers whose authority was guaranteed by their 
invisibility (p. 194), but that this hope had foundered 
in the "turbulence" (p. 193) of social arenas 
characterized by conflicting social interests (p. 195), 
in which action programmes had no clear boundaries and 
were thus always vulnerable to invasion by the "sudden 
effects" of massive social forces (p. 193), and where 
evaluation could thus be neither final nor non-
controversial. As an action-researche~ Smith thus 
accuses positivist evaluation of being "unrealistic" in 
its characterization of the social world and therefore 
inevitably ineffective: "The conventional weapons of 
research are cumbersome: heavy field-pieces dragged 
slowly into position - hardly suitable for the swift-
moving, rapidly changing targets of an action 
programme" (Smith: OPe cit., p. 194). 
Hence, rather than attempting to capture the swift-
moving target of action in order to subject it to 
controlled experimentation, action-research proposes 
to observe action's complex movements in its habitat: 
it will be through the analysis of the occurrence of 
change that action will be understood. Thus, whereas 
Smith (op. cit.) sees the absence of boundaries to 
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action as a problem for action-research, Halsey claims, 
optimistically, that action-research can resolve the 
longstanding disputes concerning holistic OR piecemeal 
approaches to reform by "adopting an open-minded approach 
to scale" (Halsey, 1972, pp. 4-5), and can thereby treat 
conventional institutional boundaries (such as that 
which separates the schoOl from its community) as a 
starting point for innovative action whose ramifications 
will be both a topic and a resource for research. 
Using a metaphor from economic theory, he explains: 
"Unlike the planning model, (action-research) seeks 
to use the social context of the project to increase its 
own effects ... The function of the research here will 
be largely a search for likely 'multiplier' effects 
and an attempt to identify the outcomes that occur" 
(p. 167). It is significant that here again the 
theoretic basis for social research is grounded in a 
metaphor (the "multiplier effect") which evokes authority -
the authority of a conceptually bounded system of 
assumptions concerning the motives of "economic man", a 
system in which variables are derived ( almost literally) 
from a "model" and given a mathematical value so that 
its outcomes can be calculated from its presuppositions. 
Halsey thus implies above all the ambiguity-of action-
research's ostensible willingness to fOlIo! action down 
the ramifications of a process of open-ended change: 
his metaphor suggests an action context whose parameters 
are defined in advance and which is therefore in 
principle predictable, even though Halsey's intention is 
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to evoke the un-predictability resulting from the number 
of variables at work. 
This ambiguity is indeed required by Halsey, since 
he also notes that the action project is from the outset 
conceived in "theoretical terms" (p. 172), which would 
suggest that research leads rather than follows action, 
although his list of "theoretical terms" ("disadvantage", 
"power", "context-bound operations") in fact raises 
once more the question as to whether such terms arise 
from action, from research, or from both, and thus 
reveals that the nature of the research / action 
relationship still remains unaddressed. 
Halsey's "multiplier" is a modification of a broadly 
experimental approach to' action-research (see Halsey, 
OPe cit., pp. 165-7); it does not address the problem 
of how to conceive of research's procedures when action 
is varying in accordance with other criteria than those 
of research's requirement, ie. when the principle for 
research is no longer a positivist epistemology relating 
to evaluation by experiment. The characteristic response 
of action-research exponents to this challenge is to 
assert that action-research cannot determine its process.es 
in advance, since it cannot know which direction action 
will take: thus Cory says: "the very nature of action-
research makes it highly improbable that the investigator 
or investigators will know definitely and in advance 
the exact pattern of the inquiry that will develop" (p. 13) 
and Elliott (1981) invokes a procedure of cyclical 
"shift" of the project as the successive phases of 
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action are evaluated. Midwinter describes the process 
as follows: 
"Action-research for us differed from research 
alone chiefly in its avoidance of the static, 
controlled, and contrived model and its emphasis 
on a fluent, on-going approach, one not afraid 
to attempt properly guarded assessments in 
unpropitious circumstances. Action-research 
differed from action alone mainly in the constant 
feeding back of evaluation and the effect this had 
on crucial shifts of direction in the action". (p. 52) 
This account immediately suggests a problem. 
If research is "assessing" action while action is still 
"on-going", this is indeed "unpropitious": it will 
not be clear what criteria might be appropriate, since 
in principle there are neither origins nor outcomes to 
be compared, and, unlike "social science research" (which 
has its own "theoretical problems" - see Denzin, quoted 
on p. , above) we have not yet found action-research 
making explicit any criteria of its own (beyond attempt-
ing to borrow the notion of "fact finding"). How 
therefore could action-research know that the evaluation 
it was "feeding back" to action was any different from 
action's own evaluations (of its effectiveness and 
appropriateness) which are action's perennial taken-for-
granted resources? How, then, can we attempt to provide 
an epistemology for the process in which action and 
research are united by being modified through their 
reciprocal relation? 
Lawrence Stenhouse (often cited as an authority in 
this respect by other writers) argues for "a particular 
kind of professionalism ... research-based teaching" 
(1975, p. 14) whereby research and action are both the 
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province of the practitioner, ensuring the relevance 
of research to action and the improvement of action 
by means of research. The theoretical framework 
invoked to support his wish to abandon "the separation 
of developer and evaluator ... in favour of integrated 
curriculum research" (op. cit., p. 121) is Popper's model 
of scientific rationality. Against the positivist 
argument that the evaluator needs to be "independent", 
Stenhouse proposes: 
"a more scientific procedure which builds action 
and criticism into an integrated whole. The 
dialectic between proposition and critique which 
is personified in the relation between artist 
and critic* is integrated in the scientific method. 
Conjectures and refutations (Popper, 1963) are 
woven into one logic". (p. 124) 
Hence the need for what Stenhouse calls "a Popperian 
view of policy" which means "treating current policies 
as only tentatively established, always open to change, 
admittedly imperfect, and thus necessarily in an important 
sense 'experimental'" (p. 125). Stenhouse is not 
alone in invoking Popper as a theoretic authority: 
Clarke (1976, p. 1) says: "Action-research ... follows 
Popper's idea (Open Society and its Enemies) that 
all social administration should be conducted as 
experimentation". 
However, the recurrence of the term "experiment" 
must alert us to the weaknesses in the claim that Popper's 
work could be the basis for a non-positivist version 
of science as dialectic and critique. Popper does 
indeed assert the primacy of "critical discussion" in 
* See Chapter Five, pp. below. 
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defining the nature of "science" (Popper, 1963, p. 127); 
he Opposes the positivist claim that knowledge can be 
"Positively" established (p. 29) and aligns himself 
instead with the Presocratic philosophers' stance 
that knowledge cannot arise from observation and must 
remain irremediably uncertain (p. 153). And yet, as 
Habermas observes (Habermas, 1974, p. 201), Popper 
suggests that conjectures are "refuted" by being shown 
to be "in contradiction with facts" (Popper 1963, p. 327) 
and thus knowledge appears after all to be not conjectural 
but positive. Consider also the implications of Popper's 
statement, "Only the falsity of a theory can be 
inferred from empirical evidence, and this inference 
is a purely deductive one" (op. cit., p. 55): this 
would leave Popper (and action-research) with a weak 
model indeed of critique, since validity would remain 
unaddressed, and falsity could not be shown either, 
since refutation would depend upon "deductive" inferences 
which, as suggested by Cicourel's arguments (see p. 
above), must themselves depend on interpretive judge-
ments which are, once more, in Popper's terms "conjectures". 
Hence, by not addressing the reflexivity by which alone 
the imputation of meaning is accomplished, Popper 
cannot prevent his "dialectic" lapsing into a circle: 
"refutations" become indistinguishable from the conjec-
tures for which they are supposed to legislate. 
Furthermore, in placing all his emphasis on the "testing" 
phase of his cyclical process of scientific method, 
Popper is content to formulate the nature of conjectures 
in whimsical, non-rational terms such as "jumping to 
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conclusions (p. 53) or "trial and error" ( 323) p. , 
in total contrast to the deductive rigour of "refuta-
tion" . Action-research's hope that Popper could 
provide a unified logic for inquiry is thus misplaced: 
he either returns action-research to the dualist terms 
of a planning evaluation cycle, or he provides no 
basis for the authoritative, "experimental" form of 
evaluation which Stenhouse and Clarke are seeking. 
The key to Stenhouse's misplaced hope lies in his 
use of the term "dialectic" to characterize the unified 
logic of action-research. Dialectic does indeed provide 
a mode of theorizing both unity and complexity, change 
without randomness, but this is precisely what Popper's 
epistemology lacks. For Popper, contradiction is a 
symptom (indeed the symptom) of error; for dialectics 
it is a condition of understanding: "The condition 
for the knowledge of all processes of the world in 
their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, 
in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity 
of opposites" (Lenin: "On the question of Dialectics", 
1972, p. 360). Although Stenhouse recommended the 
study of Mao Tse Tung's works for their illumination 
of action-research (personal communication, and see also 
Carr and Kemrnis, 1983, p. 185) and although Midwinter 
deemed Lenin to be "perhaps the master action-research 
officer of all time" (Midwinter, 1972, p. 57), 
action-research has invoked the rhetoric of dialectics' 
complex unity, but has - on the whole - not sought to 
base its activities on an epistemology actually derived 
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from dialectics.* 
However, the reason why Popper dismisses dialectics 
and uses contradiction as a simple procedure for 
diagnosing error returns us finally to the problem of 
evaluation and the relationship between the rational-
ities of action and those of research. 
Action and Research: Towards a Reflexive Dialectic 
For Popper the notion of contradiction is not a 
complexity in phenomena but a rule for the construction 
of valid propositions according to a canon of logic 
(Popper, 1963, p. 320). Contradiction offends against 
the rule of scientific method, and it is the subjection 
of social life to the rule of science which is the 
defence against tyranny (op. cit., p. 52). In other 
words, the technical method of sceince (social phenomena 
converted to empirical propositions and testable 
within a deductive system of logic) can be, indeed must 
be, politically, the evaluative criterion of social 
action. But Garfinkel observes ("The Rational Properties 
of Scientific and Common Sense ACtivities" (in 
Garfinkel, 1967) that for science to treat its own 
rationalities as direct criteria for the evaluation of 
social action is to prevent an understanding of the 
complex rationality which action itself actually displays, 
* A rare exception is the author's own article on 
"Dilemma Analysis" (Winter R, 1982). See Chapter 
Four for a discussion of its limitations. See 
also Carr and Kernrnis, loc. cit. 
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and also to prevent an understanding of the specificity 
of science's own procedures and assumptions; instead 
such arguments merely generate "ironic comparisons" 
between the ideal of science and the "distortions" and 
"inefficiency" of action processes, which are presumed 
to be understandable as defective realizations of that 
same ideal (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 280). 
For action-research operating with a problematic 
of "evaluation" this is a crucial problem. As we 
have already noted in this chapter, action-research 
wishes to install practitioners as researchers; 
it wishes to install the improvement of professional 
practice as a possible ideal for research, and scientific 
experimentation as a possible ideal for institutionalized 
action. Action-research thus would seem to be wholly 
undermined by Garfinkel's suggestion that the attempt 
to subject action to evaluation by science's ideal will 
lead only to an irremediable irony. Nevertheless I 
wish to argue that Garfinkel's argument does not disable 
action-research's project but rather - at last -
clarifies it. The "scientism" criticized by Garfinkel 
denies the authenticity of action by treating it as a 
deficient version of research, and thereby legitimates 
the hierarchical authority of research over action 
which action-research would wish specifically to oppose. 
But without a clear assertion of the difference between 
research and action, which Garfinkel enunciates, 
action-research cannot prevent research and action 
defining each other in an ironic circle: action will be 
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judged by the canons of "experiment" and will thus 
always be judged "unrigorous"; and research will be 
judged by the canons of "improving practice" and will 
thus always be judged as "impractical". If action-
research continues to unite action and research under 
one rule (the rule of "science") while dismantling 
the institutional and strategic separation between 
action and research which alone gives authority to the 
rule of science (the rule of experimental methodology), 
then action-research will merely be the disablement 
of both research and.action: action may become absorbed 
into research (whereby action-research becomes merely 
"applied research" of dubious "validity") or research 
may become absorbed into action (whereby action-research 
becomes merely a portentous rhetoric for management's 
planning procedures or the common-sense thoughtfulness 
of practitioners' decision-making). In contrast it 
would be by following Garfinkel (b~ asserting clearly 
the difference between research and action) that action-
research could then formulate the cOllaboration of 
action and research in the terms of that unified and 
constructive dialectic which action-research seeks, 
could abandon the model of the relation between 
research and action given by the scientific model of 
evaluation inherited from conventional social science, 
and could begin, finally, to formulate action-research's 
own ideal. 
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We may start this task by noting Garfinkel's 
list of the "rationalities" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 263) 
which guide the actions of "daily life". 
1) Categorizing and Comparing - the successful and 
frequent practice of and concern for seeing matters 
as "an instance of a type" 
2) Tolerable Error - close attention to the varying 
degrees of precision required between observations 
and types of account, the attention which sometimes 
provides for a "literary allusion" and sometimes 
for "a mathematical model" as appropriate 
3) Search for Means - the ability or inclination to 
review past actions in order to transfer successful 
procedures to current actions 
4) Analysis of Alternatives and Consequences - care and 
attention paid to "rehearsing in imagination" the 
alternatives which different possible actions 
might produce 
5) Strategy - the awareness that a number of alterna-
tive circumstances are hypothetically possible and 
that actions must be prepared "in case of" these 
hypothetical variations 
6) Concern for Timing - a definite sense of the restricted 
possibilities for the scheduling of future events 
7) Predictability - concern to restrict the unpredict-
ability of events 
8) Rules of Procedure - recognition that rules should 
be followed "without respect for persons" rather 
than in order to "respect ... certain interpersonal 
solidarities" 
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9) Choice - recognition that choices are actually 
possible 
10) Grounds of Choice - are rational to the extent that 
they: 
a) involve inferences from a scientific corpus 
of knowledge 
b) involve references from empirical laws 
c) involve the strategies of 5) above 
d) involve constructing an account of a past 
action in order to render it coherent or 
publicly acceptable. 
(In this summary of Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 263-7, I 
have made clear the element in Garfinkel's own account 
which stresses that "rationality" is a normative 
judgement, (see, in particular the rather anomalous 
statement at lOa) even though later (p. 270) Garfinkel 
is concerned to distinguish between rationality as "a 
stable property" and as "a sanctionable ideal"). 
Garfinkel then goes on to give an account of "the 
scientific rationalities" (pp. 267-8) as a further set 
of norms which govern the practices of "science" but 
specifically do not govern the practices of "daily 
life". 
11) Compatibility of ends-means relationships with 
principles of formal logic 
12) Semantic clarity and distinctness - as a criterion 
for practical judgements 
13) Clarity and distinctness "for its own sake" (as well 
as for the purpose which "clarity" is intended to 
serve 
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14) Compatibility of the definition of a situation 
with scientific knowledge. 
The first point about these two lists to which I 
wish to draw attention is that "daily life" (or "action" 
in the terms of the present discussion) possesses 
its own elaborate series (1 - 10) of norms for rationality 
norms which are always, for action itself "sanctionable 
ideals", such that whether or not they are "stable 
properties" will be a matter of interest to actors 
themselves, as well as to "scientists". Garfinkel has 
here provided a resource for the formulation of 
action's own grounds. 
Secondly, even though Garfinkel's argument stresses 
the separation of the two lists, such that the norms 
for daily life may not be assimilated to those of science, 
there is nevertheless an intimate relation between 
them as follows: each of the norms for scientific 
rationality (11 - 14) is constructed by taking one or 
more of the norms for the rationality of daily life 
and converting it into a topic, ie. by subjecting it 
to a further elaboration according to science's own 
norm. For example, Strategy (norm 5) and Search for 
Means (norm 3) would be scrutinized under the aegis of 
"formal logic" (norm 11) ~ Tolerable Error in the 
management of the appropriate precision of accounts (norm 
2) becomes subject to an abstract notion of "semantic 
clarity" (norm 12), and so on. This relation between 
the two lists appears at first sight to recreate (in 
spite of Garfinkel's declared purpose to the contrary) 
the subjection of common-sense to the rules of an 
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algorithmic version of rationality (unmotivated clarity, 
formal logic, a corpus of findings, etc., pp. 267-8). 
But this is to forget that Garfinkel is here listing 
norms: the thrust of Garfinkel's work is that norms 
are related to specific instances by means of procedures 
for the construction of intelligibility ("the inter-
changability of standpoints", "ad hoc", "etc.", etc.) 
which again common-sense takes as an available resource 
but "science" must treat as its topic. And this is 
where science must cease to be the authoritative 
revelation of "the truth" about common-sense. For 
in the same moment as it topicalizes the interpretive 
procedures by which common-sense invokes its norms of 
rationality, science utilizes those same interpretive 
procedures, to invoke its own norms of rationality in 
order to accomplish that topicalization; science itself 
is charged by its own insights with addressing its 
own irremediable reliance in its own activity AS science 
upon the interpretive procedures it makes explicit 
as features of common-sense intelligibility. (It is 
Garfinkel's failure to follow through this argument 
that Filmer notes in his article on Garfinkel (Filmer, 
1976; see Chapter One, p. 10 above) . 
At the end of his paper, Garfinkel poses two helpful 
and radical questions concerning the relation between 
action and theory (even though his tacit desire to 
exclude science from the rule of reflexivity which 
otherwise governs the practices of communication leads 
him to characterize the questions as "empirical"): 
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"Why are the rationalities of scientific 
theorizing disruptive of the continuities of 
action governed by the attitude of daily life? 
What is there about social arrangements that 
makes it impossible to transform the two 
"attitudes" into each other without severe 
disruption of the continuous activity governed 
by each"? (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 282) 
Research, we can answer Garfinkel in analytical terms 
I 
disrupts action's taken-for-granted reflexivity; 
and action disrupts research's endless seeking for the 
grounds of that reflexivity. Action-research's ideal 
and its challenge are that it seeks (and needs) to 
formulate the nature of the mutual "disruption" of 
research and action, so that this "disruptive" relation 
can be creatively trans formative of both action AND 
research, as conventionally conceived. 
How could this relation be formulated? We can 
make a preliminary statement as follows. The possibility 
of action being managed depends on its taking for 
granted the interpretive basis on which, without remedy, 
its intelligibility depends; action is thus never 
determined by the requirements of the situation: 
rather it constitutes those requirements as requirements. 
Hence "research" is always possible - as providing 
an account of action's reflexive basis - a showing of the 
conditions of its being produced as intelligible. 
But research must then address its own possibility 
- its own production as intelligible action. Action 
and research thus confront one another, but never finally. 
Whereas positivist evaluation suggests that action CAN 
in principle become experimental (only to lament action's 
continual failure to be sufficiently rigorous in this 
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respect, leading to the clashes of principle and 
personnel described by Halsey, Midwinter, and others) , 
research as reflexive analysis does not suggest that 
action can become reflexive, but that the moment of 
analytical reflexivity can clarify action's ultimately 
and necessarily ~reflexive process and research's 
intimate but ultimately and necessarily non-directive 
involvement with the understanding of that process. 
Research as reflexivity cannot prescribe reflexivity for 
action since it (reflexively) knows that its own 
attempts at showing the non-reflexivity of action must, 
in themselves, finally lapse into non-reflexivity. 
Reflexivity and non-reflexivity are moments in the 
dialectic of analysis, a form of analysis which allows 
action and research to be moments in the dialectic of 
investigation. 
But how might one specify the content of such a 
dialectic, so that it would be a "clarification" and a 
creative transformation, as well as a disruption? One 
approach would be to formulate action-research as a 
IIquestioning dialectic ll • This would be to see Garfinkel's 
work in terms of the ideas of Sartre and Hegel concerning 
the dialectics of consciousness and the "negativity" of 
thought and language, as noted in Chapter One. For 
example: 
liThe being of consciousness is a being such that 
in its being, its being is in question". 
(Sartre, 1969, p. 74, quoted on 
p. !, 0 above.) 
And it would link such arguments with Heidegger's 
t ' " "disrup lon of literal syntax and propositional 
meaning in What Is Called Thinking? 
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"To understand a thinker is to take up his quest 
and pursue to it the core of his thought's 
problematic ... a way of questioning in which 
the problematic alone is accepted as the unique 
habitat and locus of thinking" 
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 185). 
However, for action-research (and following Garfinkel) 
both actors and researchers are thinkers. Thus 
research questions action: research's concern is the 
irremediably question-able basis 
of action's intelligibility. Research will never cease 
questioning action, for its rule is the question which 
is always begged by action. But action also questions 
research: action questions the possibility, the 
intelligibility, and the need for questioning~ for 
action's rule is: for all practical purposes, this 
(here and now) MUST go un-questioned. And since 
research will question reflexively, it will indeed 
support the questioning of the question: action will 
thus find in research both an ally and an interrogator. 
This is the fundamental significance of Garfinkel's 
list of the rational norms of "daily life" and of the 
"interpretive procedures" by which they are applied. 
They constitute action's own ideal, being both theoretical 
and always located in a particular action context. 
"Reflexive research" is not a reminder to action that 
action's rationalities must be seen in the light of 
science's other rationalities; it would not question 
(for example) action's pragmatic assembly of strategies 
and means by asking (for example) how far they "measured 
up" to the canons of "formal logic". Rather, "research" 
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would disrupt the assembling and operating of strategies 
by posing the question: what are the reflexive 
judgements by which these strategies (and not others) 
are being assembled and operated as intelligible and 
normative decisions? "Questioning" here is calling 
upon actors to recover the grounds for action: the 
"sanctionable ideals" for the rationality of actions 
and the interpretive jUdgements whereby those ideals 
are invoked. Thus, although the ideal of research 
would indeed be theory-not-action, this would not be the 
"external" ideal of scientific-theory-in-the-light-of-
which-action-seems-to-be-non-rational, which Garfinkel 
rejects and which motivates the critical stance of 
action-research writers towards "academic" research. 
Instead the moment of research would be the moment 
when action is summoned to recall its own ideal, ie. 
when action's essential reflexivity is made explicit, 
as a delicate set of judgemental procedures which 
constitute an "acceptable" and situationally located 
relation between subjectivity, consciousness of the 
Other, and symbolized meaning. Research is the theore-
tical moment when action reviews its resources for 
meaning construction, and thereby recollects its 
unending question-ability, and in doing so recognizes 
that surrounding action's here-and-now choices are an 
array of possibilities, which so far have all been glossed 
but some of which could, now, be formulated as indeed 
possibilities. 
This presents us with research's moment as the 
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theoretic formulation of action's possibilities: 
"Theorizing consists of the methods for producing 
a possible society. A possible society is the 
theorist's methods for re-forming his knowledge 
of society. Since the theorist is engaged in 
re-forming his knowledge of society, he can be 
seen as re-forming his knowledge. One who is 
re-forming his knowledge is re-forminq his self: 
theorizing is then best described ... -as a self-
transforming operation, where what one operates 
upon is one's knowledge of the society as part 
of one's history, biography, and form of life". 
( Blum, 1 9 7 1, p. 3 13) . 
But for the present argument, theorizing is formulated 
as a moment in a dialectic between theory and action: 
Blum's weakness is that he formulates possibilities 
without formulating their analytically necessary limits. 
The cultural context for theorizing is not merely an 
initiating occasion for theorizing, but an ever-present 
set of practical influences and symbolic resources, 
which will always stand in an interesting sociological 
relationship with theorizing's attempts to re-formulate 
those influences and to re-order those resources (see 
further discussion in Chapter~"ce, p> J<i.e ) . Hence, 
although Blum's notion of "re-forminq" suggests how 
"research" questions action, we now need to consider the 
other moment in the dialectic, which Blum ignores: 
how action can question research. 
Firstly, it must be stressed that the notion of 
a dialectic between action and research is not intended 
in principle to characterize a relationship between 
personnel (as described by Halsey - see p. above) but 
the process of social inquiry. Hence we are not makinq 
an "optimistic" assumption about the "open-mindedness" of 
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individuals when we emphasize that the moment of 
research, as outlined above, anticipates its counter-
moment. Rather: this is analytically required, 
since the posing for action of the question of 
reflexive grounds may not, without a disabling self-
contradiction, forget that, in turn, reflexive grounds 
will also have to be given for the posing of the question, 
as itself an interesting action. This is why theory 
here is no longer prescriptive: analytically reflexive 
theory is in principle formulated as that form of speaking 
which makes explicit its own transience and limit, as 
a moment (only) in a trajectory between two points at 
which reflexivity must be taken for granted and meaning 
glossed as "sufficient". In providing for its own 
always unfinished status, theory provides for the 
recurrence of the moment of action, since theory 
itself once more becomes question-able concerning the 
point at which theory chooses to finish, and in that 
choice has to rely once more on the pragmatic rationalities 
which theory shares with action. 
For example, when action has been challenged by 
theory to ground a set of here-and-now strategies and 
meanings in a set of possibilities, and thus to re-formulate 
the knowledge on which the initial stragegies and meanings 
were selected, action thereby acquires resources for 
conducting a practical review of the decisions on which 
the strategies and meanings were based. Such a review, 
in the light of reformulated knowledge, may lead to 
amendment but this again will be a practical, here-and-
., th h f b th " h " d" " now declslon - ouq 0 course 0 ere an now 
are changed. Such practical decisions could not 
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conceivably be a direct carrying out of theory's 
injunction (as an "implementation"), nor is it condemned 
to be an ignoring of theory's request (as "irrelevant"). 
Rather, action's response to the moment of theory will 
be its own (practical) counter-question: which of 
these possibilities is a here-and-now-feasibility? 
Which of these reflexively elaborated rationalities 
and intersubjectively constituted meanings must once 
more be glossed and treated as "adequate-for-the-purpose-
at-hand) Action, after all, must "go on". But, of 
course, as soon as it does so, theory's reflexive question-
ing (now concerning "amended" strategies and meanings) 
will once more be become possible and necessary. 
This, then, would be the form which inquiry 
would take as a questioning dialectic between action 
and research. It is a dialectic in a strict sense. 
Both terms ("action" and "research") are enabled to 
interact by their own internal contradictions and inherent 
instability (see the quotation from Lenin on p. above) . 
The complexity of the process is embodied in the image 
of the dialectical "moment": in physics there is a 
moment of counteracting forces which constitutes for 
a given structure its temporary equilibrium, and the 
analytic necessity that this equilibrium is temporary 
and thus will change is given by the inevitability 
with which each "moment-in-time" will be succeeded 
by the next. Thus, on the one hand action is formulated 
as, of course, pragmatic, but also as constituted by 
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its own elaborate set of normative rational ideals 
and interpretive procedures, and thus as anticipating 
its own reasearchability; on the other hand research 
is formulated as, of course, theoretic, but also as 
constituted by its location in the procedural rules 
for mundane intelligibility, and thus as anticipating 
its own inevitable incompleteness, its reliance upon 
the recurrence of action for its own continuation. 
Such a dialectical formulation provides for action-
research's requirement of an intimate connection between 
action and research. It locates research in action's 
process and problematic, and it formulates a mode 
in which action could respond to research without that 
response being one of action's subjection to research's 
prescription, a subjection which of course could never 
be "sufficient" for action to gain recognition as 
"having put theory into practice". In this way, by 
reformulating (as a dialectic) action-research's 
proposal to "unite" action and research, we can formulate 
as intelligible action-research's fundamental aspiration, 
by enabling action-research to cast aside a model of 
"evaluation-by-experimentation" which presupposes 
precisely the methodological and hierarchical separation 
of research and action to which the very idea of 
h " . d "action-researc 1S oppose . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACTION-RESEARCH AND CRITICAL REFLECTION: THEORIZING 
AND THE SELF 
"Critical Reflection" 
In the previous chapter it was argued that action-research 
is founded upon an implicit challenge to positivism's 
version of the relation between theory and practice, and 
theoretic resources were presented for making that 
challenge explicit. The argument now becomes: that 
action-research's challenge to positivism rests upon a 
conception of the theoretic competence of the social actor, 
which action-research writers present as a process of 
"critical reflection". This chapter begins by collecting 
the questions raised by action-research writers' attempts 
to evoke the possibility of "critical reflection" and then 
presents theoretic resources for addressing these questions 
within an analytically rigorous conception of the relation 
between theorizing, cultural authority, and the self. 
It is the hubristic claim of positivist science that 
it possesses a methodology for inducing Nature "herself" 
to speak. In one version Nature's data are "collected" 
to provide grounds for the scientist's interpretation; 
in Popper's more sophisticated version Nature either 
refutes the scientist's conjectures, or - by not offerina 
a refutation when called upon to do so - provides a 
quasi-corroboration, of typical, Delphic ambiguity. 
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In both cases Nature is summoned by the power of 
methodical logic. Action-research, in contrast, has 
no such firmly articulated logic: its invocations of the 
logic of positivism are always ambivalent, and this is 
both a strength and a weakness. Its strength is that 
its ambiguity suggests the spuriousness of claims to 
speak with the voice of Nature: ie. there is an 
ambiguous recognition that investigators can only speak 
for themselves: their speech is not "findings" from 
Nature but "reflection upon" Nature, and indeed "critical 
reflection" . (For example: "To bring together theory 
and practice it is necessary to view educational theory 
as a 'critical and systematic reflection on practice'" -
Whitehead and Foster, 1984, p. 41). However, action-
research's weakness is that, still haunted by an illusion 
of Nature's own speech and thus of Nature's authority 
for speech, investigators note the need to speak 
independently of Nature but do not analyze their grounds 
for doing so, so that conditions for the possibility of 
"critical reflection" are ignored by being presupposed. 
For example, Brown et al. propose that the sequence 
of action-research is as follows: 
strategic planning --~~ Action -~) Observation --;) ... Reflection 
(1982, p. 2) together with the suggestion that "reflection" 
will lead back cyclically to further strategic planning. 
Similarly Elliott, (1981) presents the process as: 
Review ~ Diagnosis ) Planning ~ Implementation ) 
Monitoring effects (p. ii) and also goes on later to 
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suggest a continuous "spiral" (p. 2). But what is 
not addressed is how, in either version, the process 
manages to be developmental rather than merely repetitive. 
How does a "Vl' ew" b "'" h ecome a re-vlew, suc that "diagnosis" 
becomes more than a prelude to a repeat prescription? 
What sort of reflection upon observation will be, as 
Brown et al. go on to suggest, a "critique" leading to 
"self-renewal" (p. 3)? And how may the Self be 
envisaged such that its "renewal" is a transcendence rather 
than a reproduction? In both sequences of terms the 
possibility for an increase in understanding is silently 
inscribed in the space between the investigator and the 
world investigated. The emphasis on innovation means 
that, for action-research, it is not Nature who speaks, 
since Nature would merely reproduce itself; rather it is 
in that space between self and Nature that the investi-
gator can find resources for creative insight. 
But here precisely is the problem with such merely 
cyclical formulations of the cognitive process: in both 
formulations (above) the possibility of developing insight 
depends in principle upon their vagueness. The separate 
terms are merely evocations, and the process which 
links them has the vacuity of a dialectic without a 
thesis. Such formulations are a parody of positivism's 
formulations of its methods. As such they merely fail 
to enforce the prescriptivism of positivism, and they do 
not of course provide an alternative: having established, 
negatively, that Nature itself could not be the origin 
of action-research's innovative insights, we are left with 
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a mere question-mark as to how insight occurs. 
Clearly, more is required than a space. Rather, what is 
required is a formulation of the Self which can provide 
for the possibility of self-transcendent theorizing, 
and a formulation of culture which will provide for 
the limits of theorizing without falling into determin-
ism; a formulation, in other words, of "critical reflection" 
which is neither determined by the world nor assumes a 
freedom (from the world) which seems "spacious" only 
because it is empty. 
Action-research's attempts to formulate critical reflection 
Action-Research and Individual Self-reflection 
At its simplest, action-research seems to suggest 
that individual consciousness has a spontaneous and un-
problematic capacity for self-transcendence. Thus, 
Jon Nixon, in his introduction to A Teachers Guide to 
Action Research, says that the action-research practitioners 
whose work he is presenting "have started from their 
own skills and inclinations and from their own enthusiasms 
. . . 
from a simple desire to learn, and progressed, some-
times by hints and guesses, towards the development of 
a research style which suited their own particular needs 
and circumstances ... The single most important point 
to be taken from this book is the necessity of developing 
one's own unique way of looking" (Nixon, 1981a, p. 7). 
However, the word "necessity" suggests that the development 
of "uniqueness" may encounter resistances, and these 
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resistances are what Nixon ignores. Similarly, else-
where (Nixon J~ 1981b) Nixon cites Foucault as presenting 
an "optimistic" view of the possibilities for "specific" 
intellectuals working theoretically at their own 
professional contexts (p. 31), whereas the article 
which Nixon invokes (Foucault, 1977) emphasizes the 
political struggle of the intellectual against "the 
forms of hegemony (social, economic, and cultural) within 
which it operates" (p. 14). 
Admittedly, most formulations of the action-research 
process recognize the contribution of an Other to the 
subject's capacity for thorizing, and this will be noted 
in a later section (see p. '0,) . But the nature of 
this contribution is often left open. Thus, Brown, et 
ale (op. cit.) suggest that "practiti_oners ... may be 
emancipated from ... institutional assumptions and 
habitual ways of thinking ... through the processes of 
cOllaborative effort, rigorous critique, and self-
reflection" (p. 3). The point to be made here is 
simply that the list seems to identify separable processes, 
and thus the implication is that critique and self-
reflection are conceivably not dependent on any form 
of self-other dialectic. Similarly, the conference 
report "Action-research in schools - some guidelines" 
(Elliott, 1978), suggests baldly that "teacher / 
researchers" should "deepen" their understanding by 
"adopting a critical, questioning stance" (p. 2), 
as though such a "stance" might be the result of an 
individual decision. And it is significant that Elliot 
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entitles one of his papers: 
"Action-research, a frame-
work for self-evaluat1'on l'n schools" (Ell' tt 1981 10, - my 
emphasis) . 
Hence the question arises: what would be meant 
by a "critical" stance? What would differentiate 
"self-reflection" and "self-evaluation" as processes of 
creative cognition from the complex yet routine "practical 
reasoning" by which consciousness achieves its mundane 
purposes? Action-research certainly intends to address 
such questions, since much of the writing considered 
here aims at creating a "practical" methodology for 
individual innovation. However, the very concreteness 
of the practical suggestions presented seems to conceal 
the question of how particular activities could achieve 
the transcendental effect to which they aspire. The 
central quality of innovative thought, by which the 
whole project of practitioner action-research stands or 
falls, remains both merely a hope and merely a pre-
supposition, rather than an elaborated possibility 
grounded in a theoretical analysis of its possibility. 
Elliott clearly exemplifies the nature and scope 
of this inadequacy. He lists a number of "practical" 
procedures which an action-researcher may undertake -
making lists (of potential issues and methods) (1977, p. 8), 
keeping a diary, producing a "profile" (eg. of a.lesson), 
conducting a "shadow study", making a "running commentary" 
or a "document analysis" (198J., pp. 16-17) - and in 
each case the outcome is described in terms of creating 
, "or "facts". 
"informat1on But no explanation is given 
of how this process of constructing a factuality might 
" 
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make available new conceptions as opposed to merely 
documenting (and thus reinforcing) the basis of 
previously held interpretations. Elliott himself shows 
the need for such an explanation when he describes the 
procedure of writing "analytic memos" as follows: 
"Analytic memos contain one's systematic thinking 
about the evidence one has collected ... These 
memos may record such things as new ways of 
conceptualizing the situation under investigation 
which have emerged; hypotheses which have emerged 
... statements about emerging problems and issues". 
(1981, p. 10) 
The recurrent metaphor of "emergence" here encapsulates 
the central feature of innovative thought during the 
process of investigation: what was originally "hidden" 
gradually "comes out" and finally stands revealed. 
"Emergence" presents the difference between the beginning 
and the end of inquiry as a difference between ignorance 
and knowledge, between the dark cavern of illusion and 
the sunlit vista of truth. But the metaphor itself 
suggests the crucial questions which Elliott ignores: 
what was the nature of the concealment, and what induced 
the emergence from concealment? What are the differ-
ences which create the intelligibility of the metaphor, 
and what processes of thinking, acting, and writing 
wou ld enable '''profi les", "shadow studies" I "memos" 
and the rest to address analytically that difference 
which is embodied in their purpose of inducing knowledge 
to "emerge"? 
- 86 -
At one level such issues are perhaps implied. 
Each of the procedures suggests the possibility of 
constituting differently the central relation between 
experience and language in the process of 
"reflection" and "interpretation" (p. 16) whereby 
experience is routinely assimilated into current practices; 
documents once "analyzed" may be compared across the 
contexts which produced them; even lists and diaries 
make explicit and review-able what is normally implicit 
and irrecoverably transient. Indeed a strong argument 
could be made that it is the process of writing itself 
which in each of these procedures "interrupts" mundane 
intersubjectivity (cf. Silverman and Torode, 1980) 
and thus constitutes that differentiation which theorizing 
requires. Yet Elliott does not argue that the process 
of undertaking these procedures will be a process of 
theorizing, but that the product of the procedures will 
be "evidence". In this way Elliott shows how action-
research remains haunted by the voice of Nature as the 
auspices of inquiry. There is one interesting exception. 
Elliott observes that it is the transcription of tape-
recorded interaction which "enables (the researcher) to 
move backwards and forwards through an episode" (1981, 
p. 14), ie. to deconstruct the temporal dimension of 
language and experience, so that (to complete an argument 
that Elliott merely hints at) their elements and relation-
ships can be explored and reordered. 
In general then, action-research's proposal that 
inquiry could differentiate itself from mundane practical 
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reasoning as a process of "individual self-reflection" 
requires a theory which would permit multiple relation-
ships between experience and language, relationships 
(in other words) which would allow for exploration, 
play, ambiguity, and transformation. More concretely, 
as presented by Elliott's listing of practical procedures, 
one might perceive action-research as beginning to 
suggest a theory of writing as the central process in 
establishing between experience and language a critical 
and self-transcendental relation. 
Meanwhile it is clear that, without any explicit 
theory of language's inevitable distance from experience, 
investigation along the lines such as Elliott puts 
forward cannot articulate that theoretical space 
which it must presuppose; in the end it merely 
articulates a subjectivity determined by the "facts" 
of experience, and thus denies the possibility of that 
self-transformative innovation which it nevertheless 
wishes to urge as a practical programme. 
Action-research's notion of the Subject 
A subjectivity thus determined by its cognition of 
a factualized experience is a subject in a rationalized 
relation to its context, ie. a subject with no internal 
processes but only externally oriented relationships 
of perception; and indeed much action-research writing 
does seem to treat the subjectivity of the investigator 
as a taken-for-granted, instrumental rationality. (See 
Chapter 4). Underlying Elliott's emphasis on 
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investigation as "information gathering" (1981, p. ii) 
is Nixon's confidence that a research style can be 
grounded in practitioners' "unique way of looking", 
their "simple desire to learn", their "needs and 
circumstances" (1981a p 7) , . . 
However, questions concerning the limitations of 
this view of subjectivity are raised by other writers 
on action-research. For example, Lippett (1948) 
suggest~ that one of the problems for "action-research" 
(p. 6) is that "the backlog of knowledge about more 
effective skills of living and working" has not 
been "communicated into action" (p. 7) because of the 
specific resiE;?tance to change derived from our "ego-
investments in the present way of doing things" (p. 8). 
One of Lippett's co-workers on the Connecticut training 
programme he describes was Kurt Lewin, and although 
Lewin's best known article on action-research (1946) 
presents investigation as based upon "fact-finding" 
(p. 37), he presents a radically more problematic version 
in a slightly earlier article (Lewin and Grabbe, 1945), 
a version which casts doubt on the efficacy of fact-
finding by suggesting that changes in belief "cannot 
be merely a rational process" (p. 56). The authors 
continue: "As a rule the possessing of correct 
knowledge does not suffice to rectify false perception" 
(p. 57) • Rather, what is required is a change in the 
"culture" (p. 55) of the individual, which is alternatively 
formulated as "a change in social perception, namely the 
position in which we perceive ourselves and others within 
the total social setting" (p. 57), as "a change of 
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(the individual's) superego" (p. 59), and as a change 
in the individual's "system of values" (p. 60). 
Clearly, Lippett, Lewin, and Grabbe wish to draw 
attention to cultural and unconscious structures which 
pose the rationality of the subject as a problem. But 
how could one understand the problematic which leads 
them to align so crudely and without explanation the 
notions of values, perceptions, culture, and Freudian 
categories of the psyche? A suggestive starting 
point is the contradiction encapsulated in Lewin and 
Grabbe's use of the notion of "change". On the one 
hand they emphasize that individual change is difficult 
because individuals are determined by their culture/social 
perceptions/systems of values/superego; on the other 
hand they formulate as though it were unproblematic 
their intention (as action-researchers) to change just 
that - the individual's culture/social perceptions ... 
superego. In other words it seems that their account 
of the non-rational determination of the subject is not 
intended epistemologically as a general theory, since 
such a theory would necessarily apply to the investigators 
as well as to the investigated. Rather, their account 
draws attention to the technical problems in changinq 
the subjectivity of others, ie. the "trainees" enrolled 
in their "training programmes", whose imperviousness 
to the presentation of "correct knowledge" requires 
the manipulation of group pressures (p. 62) by those 
whose own possible determination by group pressures is 
ignored. The curious list of cultural and unconscious 
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determinations is thus not a theory of the subject 
but a pragmatic model of the manipulation process. 
In this respect it is likely thkt neither Lippett's 
reference to "ego-involvement" nor Lewin and Grabbe's 
reference to "superego" is intended to invoke the 
Freudian notion of the unconscious, but are merely grandiose 
terms for "emotions" and "beliefs". 
But Pandora's box is not so easily closed. Lippett, 
Lewin, and Grabbe have, for their own purposes, noted 
that the subject is constituted in a matrix of cultural 
and psychic forces, so that consciousness cannot be 
conceived simply as a retina upon which data impinge, 
nor as a container in which facts are gathered. 
To take this point seriously is to raise profound questions 
concerning the investigative process as a biographically 
located exploration of cultural resources, and as a 
necessarily reflexive analysis of the nature of those 
resources. And not all action-research writers are 
unaware of the seriousness of the issue of reflexivity. 
Nevitt Sanford {"Whatever happened to action-research?" 
(in ClarreA, 1976) provides a fitting comment on the 
pretensions of Lewin and Grabbe: as sociologists, we 
should, rather than "disseminating a monstrous image 
of researchable man ... demonstrate our willingness to 
study ourselves, which in turn would hlep to restore 
trus t in our competence to study others" (pp. 29, 31). 
But if this complex theme, of the relation between 
determination, rationality, and reflexivity, and between 
subjectivity and culture, is indeed a central issue for 
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action-research, it is essential that action-research 
should face the challenge posed by institutionalzed 
authority systems to the possibility of individual 
critical reflection, and thus the next section examines 
how far action-research writers have been aware of the 
scope of this challenge. 
Action-research, Reflection, and Institutionalized 
Authority Systems 
At the end of his article "Action-research and 
minority problems" (Lewin, 1946) Lewin notes the 
significance of "the relation between the local, the 
national, and the international scenes" and he goes on 
to state:"Intergroup relations in this country (ie. 
the USA) will be formed to a large degree by events on 
the international scene and particularly by the fate of 
the colonial peoples" (p. 45). But how would "relations" 
between local groups be "formed" by international "events"? 
Lewin's theme of course is racial prejudice, and his 
phrasing at this point seems to plead for a coherent 
formulation in terms of a linkage between societal 
authority and individual experience, ie. a theory of 
culture as the resource for the self-representation of 
the subject. And yet other passages demonstrate the 
incoherence of Lewin's approach to this issue: on 
the one hand he elaborates "the international scene" of 
race relations at the most general level of historical 
forces ("the policy of exploitation which has made 
colonial imperialism the most hated institution the world 
over" - p. 46); on the other hand he elaborates the 
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"local" problem of race in terms of a rationalized 
individual consciousness, namely the creation of "the 
same level" of "self-esteem" and "group loyalty" for 
members of different racial groups (p. 45). Thus 
Lewin's presentation of the need to relate history and 
biography, institutionalized authority and subjective 
experience, renders such a relationship un-thinkable: 
historical and political racism are constituted as a 
moralistic demonology, while the interpersonal experience 
of racism is constituted as an individualized phenomenon, 
presumably so that "levels" may be measured as collections 
of "facts". What is missing is an awareness of the 
embodiment of history and politics at the level of 
intersubjective relationships, either among the social 
actors whom Lewin wishes to study, or between such 
actors and Lewin himself, as a necessary reflexive 
dimension of the process of the study. 
Both of these dimensions are implicitly present in 
John Collier's study of the US Indian Administration 
(Collier, 1945), invoked by Lewin himself at the end of 
his 1946 article. Collier specifically criticises 
"the dead hand of an absolutist and unlearning bureau-
cracy" (p. 272) whose desire for control "atomized" 
the Indian by "destroying the tribal and community 
organizations" (p. 272). As a result the Indian 
service failed to understand Navajo culture, and Navajo 
culture had "no mechanism for translating ... insights 
and impulses into tribal decisions and actions" (pp. 288-9). 
Thus Collier's theme is precisely the relation between 
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knowledge and social authority, and the problematic 
for "action-research" (p. 294) is how understanding may 
transcend the effects of such authority relationships. 
In contrast to many writers on action-research, COllier's 
account of this is admirably complex. He articulates 
clearly action-research's central tenet that "research" 
requires the transformation of institutional relation-
ships, ie. by substituting "participation" for super-
ordination (pp. 276, 294). But he does not argue that 
understanding is determined by its social relationships, 
and thereby preserves the possibility of action-research's 
transformative effect. For example, he does not claim 
that the Indian's subordination to colonial power results 
in the destruction of the Indian's capacity for insight, 
only of the means for translating such insight into 
practice. And he suggests that if only the "unlearning" 
bureaucrat is "faithful to the spirit of science, to the 
spirit of that knowledge which he has not yet mastered" 
(p. 298), he will recognize that "what (the Indians) are 
must be known in relation to what they must become" 
(p. 297) and thus be able to "encounter (the Indian's) 
ample capacity to think" and their specific "sentiment 
of responsibility" (p. 289). Thus the bureaucrat may 
transcend his readiness to appropriate "thinking" 
and "responsibility" as his own prerogative, and come, 
finally, to "learn". 
What Collier presents here is a formulation of 
knowledge as inherently reflexive, of understanding as 
grounded in a sense of its own incompleteness and of its 
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developmental ideal, and thus in the possibility of 
critical reflection. He is clear that institutional 
authority relations leave intact the possibility for 
such critical reflection; but he is less clear about 
the specific inhibition of this possibility created by 
the hierarchical relationships he describes, and thus he 
does not address in detail the procedures by which such 
inhibitions might be removed. Hence his implication 
that the capacity for insight on the part of the dominated 
simply survives intact seems over-optimistic, if by 
"insight" more than "so;rne interpretation or other" is 
meant. And equally optimistic is his suggestion that 
the "bureaucrat" can achieve a reflexive understanding 
if he merely "goes quietly there, to the homes and 
little neighbourhoods (of the Navajo) and stays a while 
(p. 289) as though the state of truthful understanding 
were available as a sort of pastoral refuge away from the 
"noise" of institutionalized authority. But pastoral 
versions of truth are profoundly ambivalent, presenting 
a way of life as valid because of the apparent absence 
of the very sophistication by which in fact it achieves 
its expression. This disables Collier's ethnography. 
He emphasizes that the relationships and the possibilities 
for understanding between the bureaucrat and the Navajo 
are constituted within an authority relation: he cannot 
then propose that valid understanding could take the form 
of a pastoral absence, ie. a simple rejection or denial 
of the effect of the authority relationship by one or 
both of the parties to that relationship. What is 
needed, rather, is an account of the specific resources 
" 
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for meaning as these are constituted dialectically 
and reflexively within the authority relationship - as 
symbols and myths, as ambiguities and contradictions. 
Analogous with Collier's optimism concerning action-
research's capacity simply to "reject" institutionalized 
authority is that of Nixon. He presents action-research 
by teachers as an attempt "to reject the paternalism of 
traditional research", namely the sUbjection of 
practitioners' creative analytical potential to the 
prescriptiveness of "academic" methodologies (1981a, 
p. 9). We have already seen (p. a~, above) that Nixon's 
view of action-research rests precisely upon a libertarian 
principle. But this of course immediately undermines 
itself. If teachers are "free" to choose a research 
style in accordance with their "needs" or enthusiasms, 
they are quite likely to choose ("freely"?) to adopt a 
style derived from that "paternalist" tradition which 
strongly influences the awareness within which they 
make such a choice. And indeed a number of writers 
in Nixon's book proclaim their reliance on the theoretical 
perspectives and methods of conventional positivist 
social science (see for example pp. 17, 92, 155). 
This ambivalence in Nixon's work raises directly 
the question which so far has only been hinted at: 
how far forms of understanding themselves may be 
recognized as adequate (or inadequate) only within a 
cultural order which is structured by institutionalized 
authority relations. Nixon's argument is presented 
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more elaborately by Elliott (1982a). He begins by 
claiming that teachers do not see themselves as 
potentially competent theorists because of a "doctrine" 
which separates theory and practice, and makes truth 
a matter of having access to an "objective" reality 
"external to (people's) minds" (p. 3). This (widespread) 
epistemological position, whose conventional status 
is conveyed by the word "doctrine", leads to a set of 
perspectives on the part of teachers which Elliott 
sums up as professional practitioners' "assumption of 
intellectual dependence" on the personnel and practices 
of "the kind of higher education institutions which 
qualified them" (as professional practitioners) 
(pp. 2-3). In other words, positivist epistemology 
is institutionally embodied in a division of labour which 
segregates the clarification of ideals by "philosophers", 
the clarification of means-ends relationships by 
"scientists", and the "application" of the results 
of such work by practitioners who thus see themselves 
as "technologists" (pp. 4-5). (The hierarchical 
relationship here is dramatized and biographically 
located in the process of "qualification"). This 
general argument is derived, of course, from Habermas's 
criticism of the notions of science and technology as 
"ideology" (Habermas, 1971), as legitimated forms of 
knowledge expressing a political oppression, which 
requires, as a response, "the determination to take up 
the struggle against the stabilization of a nature-like 
social system over the heads of its citizens ... " 
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(the closing sentence of Legitimation Crisis, Habermas, 
1976) . For Elliott action-research is this struggle, 
a struggle to reunite theory and practice, action and 
research, which the cultural and occupational order of 
industrial society systematically strives to put 
asunder. 
However, there is a general irony surrounding the 
notion of "epistemological" ideology. If a way of 
conceptualizing knowledge is ideological in a determinist 
sense, then indeed one has an urgent sense of the cultural 
constraints upon understanding, but one then needs 
analytical grounds for differentiating an alternative 
form of cognition, in order that t~izing itself may 
be intelligible. Otherwise the theory of ideology 
is self-engulfing: all knowledge would beoome the outcome 
of an authority system, including of course the assertions 
of a theory of ideology; in this way theorizing would 
simultaneously say that theorizing is impossible and 
also say that it has no grounds for saying so. It 
would have grounds neither for speech nor for silence. 
Now Elliott's theory of positivism as an ideology is 
certainly phrased non-deterministically - as a "doctrine" 
(which therefore one might reject) and as an "assumption" 
(which therefore one might renounce) - and thus Elliott 
can go on to claim, in response to criticisms of action-
research by structuralist Marxism, that action-research 
"did not assume that the process of schooling was not 
constrained by its political and economic context, but 
did assume that teachers could become aware of such 
constraints, and in doing so increase their capacity 
to devise strategies for overcoming them" (p. 28). 
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But notice that at this pOint Elliott is no longer 
considering the epistemological level: having posed 
the question in terms of the ideological separation of 
theory and practice, means and values, a question which 
radically threatens the cognitive capacity of the 
individual, his answer is in terms of the determination 
of role relationships. A theory of ideology, of 
the relation between social authority and the investigative 
process, challenges action-research not by suggesting 
that (for example) the process of schooling is constrained 
by its cultural context, but that the process of understanding 
schooling is thus constrained. Hence, although Elliott 
is right to reject a determinist social theory, his 
formulation of the individual's response to institutional-
ized authDrity as merely "becoming aware" is apparently 
incompatible with his previous account of how that 
awareness is itself institutionally constructed and 
biographically effective. In order to remedy this 
dichotomous tendency, Elliott's theory requires a 
formulation both of consciousness and of social structure 
in terms of their mutually constitutive dialectical 
contradictions. 
In contrast to Elliott's argument, Moser (1978) 
formulates the issue of action-research's relation to 
the authority structures of its context by specifically 
denying that there can be any question of the practitioner-
as-researcher. The researcher and the researched are 
defined in terms of "different life-situations" which 
in turn means that the former has a theoretical competence 
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which the latter lacks (p. 141). Consequently problems 
are derived by the researcher, and he has the task of 
"convincing" participatory groups of \I I, relevance 
(p.148). It is thus the researcher's special 
capacity for analysis which enables him or her to show, 
"in concrete social situations ... that gap between 
claim and reality, between formulated democratic 
principles and real domination, in which we are 
constituted by late capitalism" (p. 78).* It is the 
researcher's analysis which explores contradictions, 
reveals mystifications, and:_Ieads first to "enlightenment" 
("AufkU!rung") and thence to "Praxis" (p. 78). 
But what Moser does not address is the grounds for the 
researcher's understanding, given the reality of 
"domination". Conversely, given the researcher's 
understanding, what are the grounds for the social 
actor's ignorance? Hence in his own final formulation 
of the possible achievement of action-research, Moser 
preserves precisely the hierarchical relation which 
Elliott, Nixon, and other action-research writers wish 
to subvert. On the one hand he envisages the creation 
of a form of consciousness "which can differentiate 
between being and appearance, essence and phenomenon, is 
and ought . . . which transcends the merely given 
situation and includes in discussion the overarching 
* ·';l\konkreten gesellschaftlichen Situationen .•. 
welche Kluft zwischen Anspruch and Realit!t, 
zwischen formulierten demokratischen Prinzipen und 
faktischer Herrschaft im Sp~apitalismus uns besteht". 
(All translations from Moser are by R. Winter) 
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set of relationships which determine that situation 
(p. 169) * (In other words we are given a determined 
context within which individuals can transcend those 
determinations only insofar as they can discuss them). 
On the other hand, in the next (and final) paragraph 
he suggests that action-research will enable "those 
concerned to take their destinies into their own 
hands" (p. 169) .** However, by this he explicitly 
means merely that social members ("Feldpersonen") 
who have been inVOlved in an action-research project 
will be able to pursue the aims of the project even 
after the scientists ("Wissenschaftler") have eventually 
withdrawn. Thus, in complete contrast to Elliott and 
Habermas, Moser envisages that the citizen will be 
freed from the internalization of societally enforced 
norms only at the price of internalizing the norms 
of the action-researcher. Whereas for Elliott 
intellectual dependency was the problem, for Moser it 
is the beginnings of a solution - a necessary prologue 
to liberation. Theory is envisaged in a prescriptive, 
rather than a dialectical relation to action, and thus 
critical reflection is constituted unreflexively, as 
* "Das Sein und Schein, Wesen und Erscheinung, Sein 
und Sollen unterscheiden kann •.. welche fiber die 
bloss vorgegebene Situation hinausgeht und den 
fibergreifenden Zusammenhang, welcher diese Siteation 
bestimmt, mit in die Diskussion nimmt". 
** "Die Betroffenen selbst ihr Schiksal in die Hand 
nehmen" . 
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an intellectual procedure which removes itself 
from the institutionalized relationships which are its 
object. Although this is a conventional position 
for critical theory, it denies the aims and the specific 
contribution of action-research, which Moser elsewhere 
urges as a necessary intervention in order to remedy 
critical theory's own inability to relate theory and 
practice (see Moser, p. 40). 
The question thus becomes: how can the relationship 
between the intellectual authority of theory be 
formulated as analytically different from the legitimating 
relationships of an institutional order, without falling 
back into that prescriptivism which action-research 
wishes particularly to avoid? What is required 
is the formulation of an analytical relation between 
ideology and reflexivity, such that a recognition of 
the challenge of ideology to valid understanding can be 
assimilated to action-research's dialectical relation 
between theory and practice. (see below, p.'~a ff.). 
Meanwhile, Moser has raised in an urgent form the question 
of the nature of the social relationships, between 
those involved in action-research investigation, which 
might facilitate the development of critical reflection. 
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Action-research, critical reflection, and the social 
relationships of the research process 
We have seen that for Moser the citizens' understand-
ing can only be emancipated from subjection to institution-
alized authority on condition that they apprentice 
themselves to the theorist: the theorist hopes in the 
end to be able to withdraw from the scene, his/her 
work completed, but the theorist's authority is presented 
as the necessary condition for the achievement by others 
of autonomy. This tension, between authority and 
liberation from authority, constituted in action-research's 
double aspiration that action may be both informed by 
"research" and yet remain free from determination by 
"theory", is central to the action-research problematic. 
It is perfectly expressed, for example, in the following 
passage from D. Krech and R. Crutchfield (1948), 
articulating Lippett's notion "the community or 
organizational self-survey" (Lippett, 1948, p. 2): 
"A community self-survey can be described as 
action research in which the members of the community 
themselves, under the expert guidance of applied 
social psychologists, are responsible for the 
collection and analysis of community data". 
(p. 524) (emphases in the original). 
Notice the specific stress on the "members of the community" 
in contrast to the tacit ambiguity with which their 
"responsibility" is undercut by the "expertise" of 
the scientist, and hence the crucial need for an 
explication of the contradictions within "guidance" as 
the mediating category. Krech and Crutchfield, however, 
avoid such issues. For them the principles of their 
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approach are 1) to obt.ain "the facts", 2) "facts thus 
uncovered by the citizens of the community will be 
more readily accepted by the community", and 
3) the process of carying out the survey will "have a 
powerful motivating effect" upon the citizen-surveyors. 
(pp. 524-5). In other words, the "expert social 
psychologists" are engaged in what the authors term 
"the educational process", which they define as "any 
measure designed to change the motivational structure 
or perception of an individual (through) manipulation 
of the person's environment for specific ends" (p. 519). 
There is a double authority here. Firstly, experts 
have "specific ends" in mind for the community, and 
"design" manipulative means to achieve them; secondly, 
community situations are constituted as "facts" which 
communities must be induced to "accept". The two 
bases for authority are linked: the unquestioned 
authority of the expert scientists may be presumed 
to rest on their unquestioned access to the authoritative 
facts of Nature. Once more, by failing to question 
a positivist epistemology, action-research presents 
theory as an unreflexive authority borrowed from the 
same scientific practices it wishes to oppose, and lapses 
into the manipulative devices of managerialism. And 
yet the original passage italicized the members of the 
community and wished to make them "responsible" 
A similar tension is expressed in the work of Cory 
(1953) . Cory stresses that studies of educational 
practice "must be undertaken by those who may have to 
change the way they do things as a result of the studies 
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Teachers, pupils, supervisors, administrators and 
school patrons (must) continuously examine what they 
are doing ... use their imaginations creatively and 
constructively ... etc. This is the process I call 
action-research". (p. viii) And yet on p. 18 we read 
that the reason why action-research must be a "co-
operative" activity is that, unless "interested" 
parties to the action become collaborators, they may 
well become an oppos~tion. Thus action-research gives 
autonomy to practitioners-as-researchers but only in 
order to subject them to the authority of the action-
research process, which itself creates auspices for 
cooperators and (by the same token) for opponents. 
But it is precisely these auspices which will 
always need to be theorized even, for example, when 
the social relations of the research process are 
formulated in accordance with the Habermasian "ideal 
speech community", in which, alone, the integration 
of concensus and emancipation enables freedom to be 
inscribed within authority itself. 
It is the Habermasian ideal of a speech situation, 
in which possibilities for initiative and critique are 
"symmetrically" distributed (Habermas J, 1970, 
p. 143~ which underlies the work of Elliott, and thus 
enables him to present the social relations of action-
research as in principle those of an anti-hierarchical 
collective. The ideal of "dialogue" in which 
"participants must have eq~al freedom" for interpretation 
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and criticism explicates "a procedure for determining 
the objectivity of practical judgements" (Elliott: 
1982a, p. 19) and this constitutes "Habermas's 
reconstruction of the interpretative model" for social 
science (ibid.). Elliott continues: "I . n my Vlew ••• 
educational action-research constitutes the concrete 
expression of a reconstructed interpretative paradigm 
with respect to the study of schooling". (p. 22). 
The ideal of a "symmetrical" discourse leads Elliott 
to describe the interaction between the participants 
of an action-research project very differently from 
the rhetoric of manipulative management discussed 
above. For example "interviewing" is presented as 
"a good way of finding out what the situation looks 
like from other points of view" (Elliott, 1981, p. 15); 
researchers are told to "use the experience of other 
teachers/researchers" and to seek "access to varying 
interpretations" (Elliott, 1978, p. 8). The symmetry 
of the interactional process is embodied in the idea 
of "triangulation", namely the comparing of different 
accounts in order to "mount discussions on points of 
disagreement between the various parties involved, 
preferably under the chairmanship of a 'neutral' party" 
(Elliott, 1981, p. 19). And in order to protect 
the symmetrical interaction of the investigative process 
from the hierarchical interactional norms of its 
institutional setting, it is necessary to negotiate an 
"ethical framework" concerning "confidentiality", in 
which participants retain "control" over information 
concerning their activities and opinions: "they have 
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the final say" (ibid. p. 9). 
For Elliott, then, action-research's possibilities 
for the development of understanding seem to rest 
upon an analytical difference between mundane inter-
action, beset by institutionalized role norms, and the 
symmetrical interaction of the investigative process, 
in which the Self-Other relationship is freed to become 
an explorative dialectic. "Theory" then would implicitly 
reside in such a difference. From this point of view 
the notion of a need for a "neutral" chairman and for 
a defensive framework of confidentiality embodies an 
awareness of the inevitable fragility of the Habermasian 
ideal. 
But there is a crucial problem here. Elliott does 
not say that action-research requires the implementation 
of a non-authoritarian dialogue. The article from 
which most of the above quotations are taken is subtitled 
"A Framework for Self-evaluation " And the other 
article cited, ("Action-research in schools, some 
guidelines") begins as fOllows: 
"Basically classroom action-research relates to 
any teacher who is concerned with his own teaching; 
the teacher who is prepared to question his own 
approach in order to improve its quality. 
Therefore the teacher is involved in looking at 
what is actually going on in the classroom ... 
This research may be extended to include other 
individuals". (1978, p. 1) (my emphasis) . 
The formulation of theorizing in terms of a symmetrical 
dialogue is thus only an option, depending on "the 
scope of the research" (ibid.). In the absence of 
such absence of such dialogic possibilities, action-research can 
still, apparently, rely on the individual's solitary capacity 
to "question" and to find access to a Natural world of facts -
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"what is actually gOing on". The central question of the 
analytical relation between the authority of theorizing 
and the authority of Nature remains unaddressed by 
this tacit juxtaposition, which reduces a principle 
to an option. Until it has been addressed, one can 
have no confidence that Elliott's "neutral" chairman 
will not burst out of his inverted commas and begin 
to adjudicate between interpretative differences in 
the name of Nature, rather than calling upon all 
interpretations to recollect their irremediable 
reflexivity. 
Whereas Elliott's use of Habermas is undermined by 
a residual empiricism, the work of Brown et ale seeks 
to assimilate Habermas to an activist epistemology. 
Thus, they invoke Habermas's notion of a "critical social 
science which is conditioned by the explicitly political 
emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interest" (p. 14) 
and continue immediately to describe it as "a science 
specifically oriented to the development of improvement 
and understanding through the strategic action of 
participants in social situations through action-
research" (ibid.). This contrasts strongly with 
Habermas's own statements that "the emancipatory 
cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of re£lection 
as such" (Habermas, 1978, p. 314) and that there is a 
inevitable disjuncture between self-reflection and 
strategy (Habermas, 1974, p. 39). Perhaps it is this 
attempt by Brown et ale to short-circuit Habermas's 
highly complex formulation of the theory-practice 
relation which leads them into an interesting ambiguity, 
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reminiscent of the problems in Heinz Moser's work. 
Firstly, Brown and his co-authors present a notion of 
"collaboration" among action-research participants 
which seems distantly to evoke the Habermasian ideal 
of self-reflection through symmetrical dialogue: 
"Action-research is distinguished by its adherence 
to a cOllaborative ethic. Action-research is a 
collaborative endeavour in which groups of 
practitioners work to~~ther to understand better 
their own practice, to increase their awareness 
of the effects of their practice, and of their 
control over the situation in which they work". 
(Brown et al., 1982, p. 4). 
But in practice, they go on to say, action-research by 
practitioners requires the "assistance" of "a facilitator 
from outside the immediate situation being studied" 
(ibid.) and it is towards the explication of the nature 
of this role, rather than the possibility of "colla-
boration" that they devote the remainder of their article. 
Their account of the role of the facilitator 
embodies many of the tensions which are the topic of 
this section. The facilitator is "a supportive 
friend providing a sympathetic ear in times of 
doubt" (p. 6), and a "group recorder", who, by circulating 
notes on meetings generates "a sense of group identity 
and history" (p. 6). In contrast, the facilitator 
provides "an outsider perspective", providing criticism 
and the challenge of "alternative" viewpoints, or acts 
as a "Devil' s advocate" (pp. 5-6). The tension 
between challenge and support embodies the facilitator's 
commitment both to the possibilities for transcendence 
and to those activities on the part of practitioners in 
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which such possibilities must (for action-research) be 
grounded. This is focussed in a complex notion of 
discourse: the arrival of the facilitator requires 
practitioners to "articulate their respective points of 
view", ie. to explain what has previously been "taken 
for granted", and thus to challenge the "history" of 
communication within the social situation (p. 4). 
This seems to suggest a notion of the facilitator as 
the Other of discourse, who precipitates a realization 
of the space between language and action and thus 
enables critical self-reflection (in Habermasian terms) 
to extricate itself as a moment of consciousness distinct 
from consciousness's otherwise inevitable commitment to 
mundane action. This, again, might be taken as a 
starting point for the formulation of the "authority" 
of theory as residing in its analytic difference from 
action, and as such to be enacted in a reflexive 
discourse between a practitioner and one-who-is-not-a-
practitioner: 
"By 'their own openness, sharing questions and 
doubts, facilitators seek to engender an environment 
where obstacles to progress can be frankly 
examined" (Brown et al., 1982, p. 4) 
But Brown et ale are not content to present such 
a model of authority: they ,also present the facilitator 
as "a teacher of action-research" (p. 5). As a· teacher, 
the facilitator "frames the principles" of the work and 
"clarifies the process". But, for strategic reasons, 
he does not "explain the entire rationale for each 
practical step" (p. 5). The facilitator is no longer 
the Other of self-reflective discourse but the one who 
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tells, who prescribes principles and defines clarity, 
who possesses (and decides when to provide) "a 
rationale". Rather than the analytic authority of 
theorizing as a moment in the dialectic between action 
and language, which must be action-research's underlying 
aspiration, we have here, once more, the social authority 
of the expert, whose procedure once more, seems to be 
a form of manipulation which profoundly contradicts 
the ideal of collaborative, reflexive discourse. 
Another familiar problem re-surfaces here, when we are 
told that the facilitator-as-teacher should possess 
expert knowledge concerning "data-gathering techniques", 
so that authority for inquiry is once more reinforced 
by the supposition of a methodological access to Nature 
on the part of a rationalized consciousness constituted 
by the factuality of its context. 
But Brown and his colleagues do hint at the limits 
of such a version of rationality when they refer to 
the facilitator's reliance upon and need to generate 
"an atmosphere of trust ... (among) a sympathetic 
audience" (p. 5) and indeed by the general suggestion 
that the facilitator should be "supportive". Such 
mundane comments in themselves of course hardly add to 
their account of the social relations of facilitation: 
rather they merely serve further to undermine its 
theoretical coherence. However, they do serve as 
reminders of an awareness among writers on action-research 
that the rationality of the subject is constituted 
within a complex psychic structure, and hence of the 
inherent fragility of self-reflection. 
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Within this perspective, Brown et al.'s 
fragmentary references may be seen in the light of 
Michael Foster's statement, in his article "An intro-
duction to the theory and practice of action-research 
in work organizations" (1971): 
"This brief review of early action-research 
thinking could not be complete without reference 
to the development of 'T-groups', which are often 
part of the repertoire of the change agent" (p. 7) 
Foster then goes on to quot.e various "streams of develop-
ment" which have characterized action-research, including 
"an integrative psycho-analytical approach" and a 
"group dynamics approach" (p. 8), and admits that 
there is a necessary debate concerning the relation-
ship within research between "interchange at the 
cognitive level" (p. 29) and "interpersonal feeling" 
(p. 30). Similarly Lippett (1948, p. 254 ff) works 
towards a triangular framework consisting of "action, 
research, and training", and Moser (p. 53) cites 
with approval Lewin's comparable association. By 
references such as these, action-research writers begin 
to acknowledge a possible contribution from psycho-
analysis in formulating the possibility of developing 
self-reflection through the dialectic of action and theory. 
And thus, in formulating the social relationship through 
which this might be achieved, an adequate theory for 
action-research's problematic would need to consider not 
only the nautre of "collaboration" and of "facilitation", 
but also of "therapy". 
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The notion of therapy makes explicit and central 
ideas which action-research writers like those I have 
discussed present merely as peripheral hints: that 
inquiry faces a challenge from the resistances created 
by its own interactional process; that rationality's 
problem is that it seems to be both an outcome and a 
presupposed resource for inquiry; that the authority 
for interpretation is precariously balanced between 
the investigator and the object of investigation, and 
that (indeed) perhaps this very distinction is itself 
questionable; that inquiry must enact its problematic 
in order to grasp its object: that the understanding 
of specific situations can only be grasped as inter-
sections of symbolic structures which ramify afar, both 
in time and place, both in culture and biography. 
It is interesting to note that Habermas, who inspires 
action-research's ideal of "collaboration", and who is 
invoked as an authority for "facilitation", explicitly 
raises the possibility of psycho-analysis as a formulation 
of the relation between authority, rationality, and 
discourse (Habermas, 1970, p. 116 ff.), and even more 
interesting that the action-research writers who cite 
Habermas ignore this aspect of his work while also 
citing other action-research writers whose pages refer 
to "changing people's superego's"~ Hence, even though 
the work of Freud is significantly ignored by action-
research, it will figure quite substantially in the 
following pages, in which I shall outline the 
theoretical resources necessitated by action-research's 
failure to articulate coherently its self-proclaimed 
problematic of "critical self-reflection". 
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Theoretical Resources for the Formulation of Critical 
Self-reflection 
Critical Self-reflection and Theories of the Self 
A version of the inquiring subject simply as a 
"rational" consciousness leaves action-research open 
to a charge of naive idealism, which would disable 
action-research's fundamental commitment to theorizing 
above all the links between theory and practice. 
On the other hand, a determinist version of the subject 
as a product of its action context would undermine 
action-research's need to formulate an innovative, 
theorizing subject which (through action-research) 
can transcend its context. How can this polarity be 
reformulated into a coherent complexity? 
Freud's work is often seen as exemplifying a 
crude determinism, at the level of biological drives 
("the Id"), neurological processes (the theory of memory 
in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud, 1976a, p. 687), 
and the "universal" Oedipus complex. However, in many 
ways Freud's work is ambiguous with respect to determinism. 
Certainly, he tends throughout his work to preserve 
an "instinctual" explanation of mental acts, which 
Habermas criticizes (Habermas, 1978, pp. 253-4): for 
example, Freud's analysis of jokes explains that 
"the comic" builds up "a surplus of psychic energy" 
which then needs to be "discharged" (Jokes and their 
Relation to the Unconscious, Freud, 1976b, pp. 254-6)* 
* From an analytical point of view, one would wish to 
see jokes as sudden reflexive twists, revealing both 
limitations of their own conditions andthe hitherto 
concealed possibilities which these conditions might 
otherwise facilitate or provoke. (See Chapter One, p. tl). 
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On the other hand he presents other accounts of mental 
life in terms of a cultural system structured like 
a language: there is a vocabulary of images, derived 
from "folklore, popular myths, legends, linguistic 
idioms, proverbial wisdom, and current jokes" (1976a, 
p. 468); and there is a syntactical process of 
condensation and displacement, which constitutes mental 
productions in a form which is representative in 
function, metaphorical in texture, and mythic in structure. 
(Even at the biological level Freud moved towards a 
dialectic based on the "dualistic" principle of mutually 
opposed instincts -(Freud, 1961, p. 47). And Freud's 
"linguistic" model of subjectivity does not have at 
its centre the determinism and fixity of a dictionary 
but the open horizon of words themselves, "which, since 
they are nodal points of numerous ideas, may be 
regarded as predestined to ambiguity" (1976a, p. 465). 
From this point of view, the Freudian unconscious 
with its web of symbolic metaphor and ambiguity is 
not simply an obstacle to rationality but rather 
rationality's own resource. conventional "philosophy 
of science" is embarrassed to admit that the instrumental 
model of rationality can explain only the post facto 
checking of theory; theoretical insight itself remains 
anecdotal and sentimentally mysterious - dreams or 
accidents, contingencies without principle, except 
, d f " . " as Fate s rewar or genlus . Hence the importance 
for my argument of works such as Koestler's The Act of 
Creation (Koestler, 1969) which argue systematically 
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for the metaphorical processes of unconscious mentality 
as the resources for theoretical work. In this way 
the simple polarity between Self and Rationality is 
mediated by the complexity of the symbol, as constitutive 
of both Self and Rationality. This, then, is the 
significance of Freud for the present argument: the 
unconscious not simply as a limitation upon the subject's 
capacity to respond "rationally" to its context (ie. 
as the origin of "neurosis"), but as the resource for the 
subject's capacity to respond "creatively", ie. not merely 
to respond, but to transform its context from an 
experiential given into a range of symbolic possibilities. 
The unconscious, in this view, adds to the logical 
constituents of mind, posited by Kant, both desire and 
metaphor, and thereby formulates for creative conscious-
ness both motives and pathways. 
Jung formulates this view of the unconscious as 
a resource quite directly: 
"The same psychic material which is the stuff of 
psychosis is the fund of unconscious images, 
which fatally confuse the mental patient but ... 
is also the matrix of a mythopoeic imagination 
which has vanished from our rational age". 
(Jung, 1967, p. 213 - my emphases) 
The rnythopoeic imagination has vanished because reason 
has abandoned the resources of the unconscious - the 
"archetypes" - in favour of various reductionist 
versions of thought, such as "concepts of averages" 
(Jung, op. ci t. : p. 17) or "systems of concepts" (p. 
154) . "Archetype" attempts directly to formulate 
thought as structured but not determined. Thus, when 
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Jung makes a parallel between the "mythological motif 
(of) the hostile brothers" for the human psyche and 
the "instinct" of nest-building in birds (Jung, 1977, 
p. 228) one can hear this as a riposte to Freud's 
reduction of psychic phenomena to "instincts": Freud is, 
as it were, implicitly accused of making a "category 
error": for man the instinctual IS the mythic. 
In other words, archetypes are an extension of 
arguments concerning the constitutive categories of 
thought. Kant presents consciousness as structured 
by the constitutive categories of perception (Space, 
Time, Subject, Object); Piaget makes a similar argument 
at a more specific level when he presents instrumental 
rationality as structured by the constitutive categories 
of purposeful action (relations of part/whole, cause/ 
effect) (see for example Piaget, 1977, p. 727); 
and Jung presents subjectivity as a whole as structured 
by constitutive categories of experience, structured, 
that is, at that level where the apparently physical 
("hunger, disease, old-age, death") is mediated as 
the cu I tura I ("war, the hero"), and thus structured 
above all in ambivalence (Jung, 1977, pp. 238, 443): 
"Symbols, by their very nature, can so unite 
the opposities that these no longer diverge or 
clash, but mutually supplement one another 
and give meaningful shape to life". 
(Jung, 1967, p. 370) 
In a curious way, then, the Jungian notion of archetype 
seems to take Levi-Strauss's mythic structures of 
metaphor and contradiction and install them alongside 
Garfinkel's procedures for "practical reasoning" - as 
the unnoticed conditions for intelligibility, communica-
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tion, and interpretation. To fOllow through this 
suggestion would be to show what a "mythopoeic 
imagination" might achieve as a current theoretic 
practice (rather than as an exotic reference). It 
would be tempting to "de-mythologize", as Barthes does 
(see Barthes, 1976) and to forget the requirement that 
such "mythopoeic" theorizing must, like any form of 
analysis, be reflexive: Garfinkel forgets that his own 
writings exemplify in practice "etc." and "ad hoc" (see 
Filmer, 1976); does Jung forget that "archetype" is an 
archetype? 
This is an important question. There is a real 
danger that one might attempt to collect archetypes as 
a "fund" or dictionary of "real" meanings prescribed 
with the authority of a universal unconscious. 
But Jung's emphasis is both on an archaic and universal 
inheritance (Jung, 1977, p. 228) and on the irremediable 
uniqueness of the personal: 
"Interpretation cannot be a method based on 
rules: it requires a study of the wholeness of 
the symbol-producing individual" 
(ibid., p. 250) 
The Self is not merely a repository of resources nor 
a product of their combination, but is "the principle 
and archetype of orientation and meaning ..• a personal 
myth" (Jung, 1967, p. 224). The individual Self can 
grasp the universal because it is not a simple component 
of a complex totality, but rather a complex microcosm 
of that totality. The reflexive self is thus inevitably 
a theorist of meaning in general, which again suggests 
that "meaning" is made possible not by the symbol as a 
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clarified label for an element in an external reality, 
but by the inherent metaphoricity of the symbol itself. 
The strength with which the Jungian version of myth 
hOlds both to the universal and to the personal can be 
related to Hegel's view of this aspect of symbolism 
in general (Hegel, 1977, p. 62). It is also profoundly 
significant for action-research's problem concerning how 
the individual instance can "achieve" generality. The 
question for theoretical adequacy ceases to be: how 
can the individual find an external pattern in which it 
can take its place as an element in a system (of 
objects), but rather: how can the individual grasp 
its own inherent complexity (as a symbolic structure)? 
At one level, the problematic is engaged by 
"ego-analysts" who preserve the complex dynamics 
of the Freudian psychic structure but remove the Freudian 
theme of a determining and relatively inaccessible 
unconscious, and thus envisage such procedures as 
"self-analysis" (Horney, 1962), "self-discovery" (Rogers, 
1983), and "transactional analysis" (Berne, 1967, Harris, 
1973) as intelligible (if lengthy and difficult) 
processes whereby the subject can achieve self-under-
standing, ie. achieve a measure of autonomy with regard 
to its own complexities. But these accounts would 
themselves need to be grounded in a theory of the relation-
ship between a self-reflective subjectivity and the 
symbolic order in which it is constituted as potentially 
self-reflective, rather than as determined. 
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This is Lacan's problematic. The self-representa-
tions of the subject may not be understood by tracing 
them to an experiential origin (which would of-course 
formulate consciousness as determined by its antecedents). 
Rather, the "signifying chain" pursued by an interpreter 
of the "meaning" of the subject is a sequence of 
symbolic substitutions (metaphor) and combinations 
(metonymy) (Lacan, 1977, p. 258). Hence (for example) 
Lacan re-formulates the Freudian phallus not as an 
objective feature of a traumatic experience, but as 
a "signifier" (ibid., p. 285). In emphasizing that 
the subject is constituted as a structure of symbols, 
rather than a structure of motives, Lacan's major theme 
becomes the "alienation" of the Self, following, in 
many ways, Sart.Ee's view of language as "negativity", 
and attempting to provide developmental grounds for this 
view. Thus, from the moment at which the infant 
finds a problematic image with which to unify its 
experience of its own body (a phase necessitated by 
the relative "prematurity" of the human neonate -
Lacan, 1977, p. 4), consciousness of self is mediated 
by the symbol, which embodies the dependence of the 
subject on the Other (p. 5) and thus converts primary 
narcissism into a sense of perennial threat, and hence 
into aggression (pp. 5-6), reconstituting all objects 
(including the self) in a "paranoid mode" (p. 17). 
Hence the game which the infant plays with its own 
identity, his baffling presence AND absence in its 
image and its name (Freud's "Fort ... da" game - see 
Freud, 1961, p. 9)- the game which is the "point of 
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insertion of a symbolic order that pre-exists the 
infantile subject, and in accordance with which he will 
have to structure himself" - (Lacan, OPe cit., p. 234) 
is fraught with an inescapable danger: the symbolic 
order is one in which "the Other is the locus of the 
deployment of speech" (p. 264), and thus the Self-Other 
dialectic of reflexive speech which constitutes 
consciousness (p. 86) is structured as the Hegelian 
struggle between Master and Slave (Lacan, OPe cit., pp. 80, 
305) . In this way, through its originary constitution 
in the symbolic, the subject is from the outset in 
a perpetual state of "discord with its own reality" (p.2). 
And it is through this "primordial" discord and self-
alienation that metaphor and metonymy, displacement and 
fictionalization are subjectivity's constitutive modes 
of being. 
In this way, Lacan argues for the "intellectual" 
potential of the self (p. 171) while maintaining a 
sense of its tragic limitations: its very creativity 
resides in a specific and irremediable fragility. 
Thus Lacan's theme can be added to those of Kant, Piaget, 
and Jung noted above (p." 6 ): he gives us language 
as a further constitutive structure of subjectivity, 
but language neither as a determining system of concepts 
and rules, nor as an available mechanism for uncon-
strained external reference: "language" here is the 
"parole" which Saussure neglected, that discursive 
reality in which the self is located, biographically 
and with Others (Lacan, 1977, p. 86), in which meaning 
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is continuously created, and yet (condemned to reflexivity 
by the instability of the Self-Other dialectic) 
continuGusly transformed. 
But there seems to be a discrepancy in Lacan's 
work precisely between versions of the self as constituted 
in the structures of reflexive discourse and of the self 
as structured in developmental phases, ego the "mirror 
phase", and the "Oedipal stage" (p. 282). In one we have 
a matrix of metaphoricity (as a theory of speech) and 
in the other we have a causal sequence (as a theory of 
biography) . Lacan does not address this tension as 
possibly inevitable, but rather attempts a radical 
fusion, for example in his theory of the phallus as the 
"signifier" of the Self-Other dialectic in general 
(p. 289) and of "the Name-of-the-father" as "the law of 
the signifier" (p. 217), of which the very least that 
can be said is that it suggests a reductionist and 
determined version of discourse, and one which would 
undermine Lacan's own emphasis on its ramifying 
metaphoricity. 
The question raised by this aspect of Lacan's work 
is crucial: if the self is indeed and inevitably 
structured in time as well as in language, how can these 
two be related so that a determining causal chronology 
does not threaten the explorative, innovative quality 
of self-reflection? The nature of the problem can 
be seen if we once more consider the ambiguities of 
Freud's work. On the one hand Freud seems to propose 
a precisely causal relationship between symbol and 
origin: the structure of the individual is a set of 
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repressions which conceal infantile traumas by preserving 
instead a symbolic "memory trace" (Freud, 1976a, p. 687). 
Hence to understand is a process of re-tracing a linear 
chronology of cause and effect. And in the therapeutic 
process, re-tracing is made possible by re-enactment. 
But "re-enactment" suggests a one-to-one relationship 
between symbol and experience - otherwise re-enactment 
could not be known to be a "genuine" re-enactment as 
distinct from, say, a distortion, a variation, or even 
an antithesis~ and hence therapy could not be a 
re-tracing. But, as we have seen (p.ll4-above) Freud 
is at pains to deny that symbols are unified labels 
that can be thus mechanically manipulated: symbols, 
for Freud, as for Jung and for Levi-Strauss, are 
inherently ambiguous, and it is precisely their ambiguity 
(in their relation to experience and to each other) 
that constitutes their effect as symbols. 
How, then,can the structure of symbolization be 
related to the structure of experience, such that the 
subject may, without self-contradiction or self-reduction, 
engage in theoretic reflection upon experience? 
This must be a central concern, since the subject's 
theorizing must be reflexive, ie. grounded in the 
processes of its experience, and (particularly) in 
the processes whereby experience is conceived as available 
to interpretation. For example: theorizing may not 
"make use of" symbolic structures as though they were 
"equipment" with which an external reality might be 
(accurately) "described" (see Heidegger, 1968). 
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It is Derrida's work which is helpful at this point. 
Derrida observes: 
There are two interpretations of interpretation, 
of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks 
to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth 
or an origin which escapes play and the order of 
the sign, and which lives the necessity of 
interpretation as an exile ... (and thus) 
throughout (its) entire history has dreamed of 
full presence, the reassuring foundations, the 
origin and the end of play... The other ... 
no longer turned towards the origin, affirms play 
... " (Derrida, 1978, p. 292) 
"History" here is the history of western culture, 
which has constructed for itself "linear" self-
representations (in terms of "origins" and "foundations"} 
as "enigmatic models" in such various forms as "scientific 
economy ... technics, . . ... ideology ... hierarchy 
graphic phoneticism (in writing) ... and the mundane 
concept of temporality", each of which depends in 
different ways on "the repression of pluri-dimensional 
symbolic thought" (Derrida, 1976, p. 86). 
The link between these two passages from Derrida 
is as follows: it is the linear model of thought 
which creates the notion of truth as a re-tracable 
origin and the mundane model of temporality as a linear 
chronology which suggests that investigation can, by 
"reversing" chronology, re-enter the presence of a 
past cause of a current effect. But linear thought 
knows that it is only a model, that it operates by 
denying the pluri-dimensionality (the metaphoricity) 
of the symbols it claims to reduce to its own linearity, 
and hence that the "full presence" of truth is always 
only a dream: linear thought is thus condemned to 
approximate interpretations which it cannot theorize 
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except as always lamentable failures (in "exile"). 
In terms of the original question, then: linear thought 
(the ideal of logic, of positivism) cannot be reflexive, 
since it does not correspond to the structure of 
experience nor.to the structure of reflective thought. 
It is within this general orientation that Derrida 
wishes to liberate Freud from the linear model of the 
symbol as a translation from an original experience, 
by quoting Freud's own awareness of the "pluri-dimension-
ality" of the symbol: symbols "frequently have more 
than one or even several meanings, and, as with Chinese 
script, the correct interpretation can only be arrived 
at on each occasion from the context" (Derrida, 1978, 
p. 209, quoting Freud). In Derrida's revision of 
Freud there is no "origin", only a plurality of symbolic 
structures: "The unconscious text is already a weave 
of pure traces, everything begins with reproduction" 
(Derrida, 1978, p. 211). Hence the process of 
repression is no longer the "forgetting" of an experience 
but the creation of the meaning of experience through 
the "deferral" of its interpretation. Indeed, only 
"deferral" makes interpretation possible. "Differance 
is originary and indeed it is the essence of life" 
(ibid., p. 203). 
This argument is thus not merely a revision of Freud 
but a aeneral theory of meaning. How might its generality 
..J 
be grasped? If metaphoricity is the essence of the 
symbol, then it must be conceived in terms of an 
essential Difference. (Without Difference a symbol 
lapses into the mere unity of a label). But the symbols 
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in which the subject represents experience to itself 
partake of the temporal dimension of experience and 
of subjectivity, since the subject is analytically 
formulated (for Lacan quite explicitly) as discursively 
constituted in the Self-Other dialectic (rather than in 
the a-temporal moment, of individual perception or 
intuition - see Heidegger's critique of Kant in 
Being ~nd Time (Heidegger, 1962, p. 410). Derrida's 
"Diff~rance/Diff~rence" thus evokes the dialectical 
structure of consciousness as temporal as well as 
analytical: indeed his double formulation is intended 
to cancel precisely such a distinction* in order to 
express the conditions, the possibility, and the 
effectivity of consciousness as a symbolic process. 
Without Difference the symbol loses its metaphoricity 
and thus its interpretive effect. Without Deferral 
("differance") experience loses its biographical 
structure and thus its meaning. Hence we can remedy 
Lacan's failure (see p. above): difference and 
deferral together make up the dialectical conditions 
for the possibility of discourse - both the discursive 
consciousness in which subjective experience is 
constituted as intelligible, and the discourse of 
theorizing by means of which subjects can formulate 
their Being and re-formulate reflexively the possibility 
of their so doing. 
For Derrida this is particularly the case with 
writing. (See Derrida, 1976, p. 9). Through the 
* by reminding us of an earlier etymological unity. 
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pluridimensionality of writing, and through the playful, 
critical interpretation of writing's pluridimensional 
text, the "ideologies" of linear expression, linear 
thought, and linear time may be "deconstructed" and 
hence transcended. Such arguments have important 
analogies with dialectics. Lenin indeed observed 
that "rectilinearity" of thought was a feature of 
"obscurantism" (Lenin, 1972, p. 363). From this point 
of view, dialectical thought is characterized by not 
having an origin or a final truth "at the end of the 
line" - but rather the endless "play" of contradiction, 
the ceaseless deferral of difference, by which each 
synthesis becomes the thesis for further antithetical 
questioning. "Writing bears within itself the necessity 
of its own critique" (Deridda, 1978, p. 284). The 
"play" of dialectic allows for the possibility of the 
development of a discursive subject and of the theoretical, 
critical comprehension of its development. 
With such considerations we may formulate intelligi-
bility for action-research's desire to disrupt the 
linearity of positivism. Action-research requires 
the possibility of a self-transcendent subject and the 
possibility of inquiry founded in interaction and in 
a non-determined dialectic between action_and interpreta-
tion, ie. , a form of inquiry located in biographical 
experience and hence in time, but not based on a 
determinist chronology in which a naturalized factuality 
provides a warrant for observation as "having-been 
t u accura e . It was earlier pointed out (in the 
- 127 -
introduction to this chapter) that action-research , 
finding no coherent alternative to such a chronology, 
lodged its hopes in its "spaces", which we may now 
interpret as action-research's awareness of positivism's 
"exiled" status. This section has tried to provide 
theoretic grounds for action-research (in this respect) 
through a notion of dialectical play, which constitutes 
both Self and Theory, Action and Re~earch, and thus 
can articulate their possible mutuality as well as 
their difference. 
However, although the rejection of determinism 
is a necessary beginning to the formulation of a 
competent theoretic subject, there are other important 
stages in the argument. It is disquieting to read: 
"The domain of play ... of signification henceforth 
has no limit" (Derrida, 1978, p. 281), since such a 
lack of "limit" seems to imply a theoretic subject 
without a context and thus without cultural resources: 
a symbolic order is indeed an "arena" for "play", but 
an arena is defined £y its limits - hence the value of 
the contributions of Freud and Jung to the foregoing 
discussion. Indeed action-research is particularly 
concerned to theorize contextually, and thus part of 
its central problematic is the relation between the 
possibility of theory and the institutional context 
(and above all the professional practices) to which 
theory addresses its possibilities ~ possibilities. 
Action-research could have no interest in a form of 
theorizing in which "play" is taken not merely as the 
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openness of the dialectic but, concretely, as "a 
positive affirmation of a world without fault, without 
truth, without origin" (Derrida, 1979, p. 292) since 
action-research is defined by its need to address the 
limits of its institutional possibilities. In this, 
action-research is wiser than Derrida, whose play-
fulness fails to be reflexive when it ignores its 
relationship with the linear culture whose resources 
it is forced to use at one level even while opposing 
it at another. Derridean play risks being either 
intimidated, when it transgresses limits whose existence 
it denies, or being issued with a license to affirm 
the faultlessness of a world whose reasons for issuing 
such a license are of the deepest sociological interest. 
In other words, theorizing as a social practice 
must, in order to be reflexive, address the relation 
between the authority of theory itself and the distribu-
tion of institutionalized authority among different 
social practices. 
"ideology". 
We need, then, a theory of 
Reflexivity and Theories of Ideology 
The problem with the notion of ideology (already 
noted on p.Ql above) is that it articulates theory 
within the contingencies of cultural authority; in 
order to accomplish this, however, the theory of 
ideology must articulate itself as not subject to such 
contingencies. This leads to two further problems. 
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Firstly the theory of ideology demands from itself an 
account of its own possibility (as non-ideological) _ 
this is the general problem of reflexivity. Secondly, 
if the theory of ideology were able to differentiate 
itself in principle from its cultural contingencies 
it would have at its disposal an absolute and thus 
a prescriptive science of human action, which would be 
a resource for positivism, not for action-research, 
since action-research bases its claim for a necessarily 
unending dialectic of action and research upon the 
presumed failure of positivism in this respect. 
Hence the aim of this section will be to question the 
claims of "science" to prescribe remedies for "ideology", 
and to consider how theorizing might recognize its 
institutional context in ways which are both reflexive 
and self-consistent. 
Self-consistency is an issue which Althusser 
explicitly raises for himself. Having presented 
as his "central thesis" that "ideology constitutes 
individuals as subjects" ("Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses", in Althusser, 1971, p. 160), he then 
admits: 
"Both he who is writing these lines and the 
reader who reads them are ... ideological 
subjects" 
(ibid., p. 160) 
and also that: 
"The author, insofar as he writes the lines of 
discourse which claims to be scientific is 
completely absent as a 'subject' from 'his' 
scientific discourse (for all scientific 
discourse is by definition a subject-less discourse 
(ibid. ) 
" 
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Another irony is added when he says: 
II (this) is a 
different question which I shall leave on one side for 
the moment" (ibid.), without specifying whether the 
"I" who does the leaving on one side is the ideological 
subject who is writing the text, or whether the phrase 
"I leave on one side" could claim to be part of a 
scientific discourse and thus "subject-less". If so, 
then what theoretic status can be attributed to a 
decision to leave aside the question of whether a text 
concerning the relation between ideology and science 
itself exemplifies ideology Q£ science?) The questions 
could be multiplied at this pOint: they would all 
focus on the issue of Althusser's reflexive awareness 
as a theorist; on the unaddressed issue of the relation 
between what the text asserts ("subjectless-ness") and 
what the possibility of writing the text requires (an 
"1") . 
There is a further irony. Two years later Althusser 
wrote his Elements d'autocritigue (Althusser, 1974), in 
which the author confesses as an error (not as a superceded 
moment in a dialectical development) his "theoreticist 
tendency"* (p. 50) and withdrew important propositions, 
including his treatment of the notion of error (p. 42) 
and his "theory of the difference between science 
and ideology in general" ** (pp. 50-1), original emphasis). 
,. 
* "rna tendence theoriciste" (translations from Elements 
d'Autocritig~ by R. Winter) 
** "theorie de la diff~rence entre lascience et 
1.' ideologie en general". 
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How is this to be understood? One starting pOint 
would be to consider Althusser as writing within a 
problematic of functionalism, so that all elements 
are explained by their necessary contribution to a 
material totality. Hence, for Althusser, ideology is 
a set of "practices" and not. a set of ideas (AI thusser, 
1971, p. 159-60), and the framework within which these 
ideological practices are presented is the "reproduction 
of the relations of production" (ibid., p. 141) through 
the medium of "ideological state apparatuses". Now: 
"there is no ideology except by the subject and for 
subjects" (ibid., p. 159). Indeed there is a "double 
constitution" where by "the category of the subject is 
constitutive of all ideology" and at the same time "all 
ideology has the function (which defines it) of 
'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects" (ibid., 
p. 160). Hence "there is no practice except by and in 
an ideology" and the various cultural formations become 
"apparatuses" whereby the state determines subjectivity. 
The general argument is thus one in which Parsons's 
monolithic integration of institutions and role 
expectations is extended to the level of consciousness 
itself. This is accomplished, according to Ernesto 
Laclau (1979, p. 100) by Althusser's reading of Lacan's 
formulation of the "Mirror phase" in the development of 
the subject's self-representation. 
Now, functionalism integrates all social actors 
by installing Society-in-general in each one, and 
Althusser is no exception: every subject is 
"interpellated" by a Subject ("Unique, Absolute" -
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Althusser, 1971, p. 166) and this Subject is (in 
various "ideological" guises) the state. Althusser's 
problem then is clear: he cannot be a subject, because 
all subjects are determined by the state, whereas in 
Althusser's writing the state, precisely, is his object. 
And yet he cannot not be a subject, because all subjects 
are determined by the state! Only through the 
"scientificity" of his writing could he be free of 
ideology (and hence of this dilemma) since "scientific 
writing" is the only practice which is not ideological. 
He must thus insist on his authorship (which is indeed 
continuously asserted by a marked professorial tone) 
while denying the subjectivity of his authorship, thereby 
illustrating perfectly the contradictions of "logo-
centric" language as noted by Derrida (1976, p. 4, p. 12). 
(Clearly action-research's purposes are in no way served 
by a professorial, prescriptive science, nor by a 
reproductionist theory of consciousness: indeed it is 
precisely against such notions that much of Elliott's 
writing is directed, see Elliott, 1982a, p. 2, p. 25 ff.) 
,,-
But Althusser himself, in his Elements d'autocritique, 
thematizes the instability of the functionalist argument 
in ways which are relevant to action-research's needs. 
First of all he admits and regrets "the absence of 
contradiction" in his theory of ideology (pp. 81-2), 
which had led him into a regrettable "entanglement" with 
structuralism* (p. 53), which he rejects as "mechanistic" 
(p. 61): 
* "Ie jeune chiot du structuralisme nous a fil~ entre 
les jambes" 
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"Marxism is not a form of structuralism, not 
because it affirms the primacy of process over 
structure, but because it affirms the primacy 
of contradiction over process". (ibid., p. 64) * 
Indeed, Althusser elsewhere presents a theory of 
"the materialist dialectic" in terms of "overdetermined 
contradiction" (Althusser, 1977, p. 113) derived from his 
reading of Freud and Lacan on the nature of symbolization 
as a process of "displacement and condensation" (Althusser 
1971, p. 191). And at both levels (the psycho-analytic 
and the historical) Althusser is arguing against a 
simplistic notion of determinism, either by "the economic 
level" or by "the unconscious". Althusser wishes to 
speak on behalf of the "metonymy and metaphor of language" 
(ibid., p. 191) and the "dislocation of discourse" 
(p. 192), and on behalf of philosophical thought as the 
play of difference between metaphors (1974, pp. 18-19, 
footnote) . Each point here, however, would undermine 
his own attempt at the literal description of a reproductive 
apparatus for consciousness in his theory of ideology, 
and thus weaken the challenge that such a theory 
would pose for action-research. 
Secondly, Althusser is concerned to remedy his former 
"theoreticism" (1974, p. 13) by arguing that the practice 
" tIt th level of theory" of philosophy is class s rugg e a e 
(ibid., p. 86)**, and thus he asserts "the primacy of 
* "Le marxisme n'est pas un structuralisme, non 
.... pas parce qu'il affirme Ie primat du proces sur la 
structure, mais parce qu'il affirme Ie primat de 
la contradiction sur Ie proc~s". 
d h '" " ** "La lutte des classes ans la t eorle . 
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the practical function over the theoretical function 
in philosophy itself" (p. 88).* Hence "the particular 
dialectic which is at work in the practice of philosophy" 
(p. 86)** returns us once more to a formulation consonant 
, 
with action-research's dialectic of theory and practice, 
since it is in both cases _(as a dialectic) a formulation 
concerned with the theorizing of change, whereas 
functionalism (without a notion of contradiction or of 
dialectic) cannot articulate change except through "deviance". 
(see Talcott Parsons, 1951, p. 321) - ie. a failure of 
functionalism's own theoretical framework. Hence the 
paradox of a Marxist functionalism, and hence the 
inevitability of Althusser's recantation. 
What remains after the recantation, is presented in 
the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. Within 
a theory of ideologizing of "the subject" they present 
a theory of "articulations" (Laclau, 1979, p. 7 and 
Mouffe, 1981, p. 174), which denies that the "elements" 
of thought and cultural practice serve specific class 
interests, even where specific combinations of these 
elements do so. Thus ideological systems may be 
"disarticulated" into their elements, so that these 
elements may then be re-grouped ("re-articulated") so 
as to transcend the class interests served by the 
original combination. Instead of "ideology" as a 
unified structure imposed upon thought in general, we have 
a level of "ideological struggle" as a process of 
* "Le primat de la fonction pratique sur la fonction 
theorique dans la philosophie m~me" 
** "La dialectique tres particuli~re qui est a l'oeuvre 
dans la pratique de la philosophie". 
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contested dis-articulation / re-articulation, in which 
social classes struggle for the appropriation of "the 
fundamental elements of a given society its 'social 
imagery'" (Mouffe 00 op . t 175) • Cl ., p. . In particular 
there is a continuous contest between social classes 
for an articulation of its class interests with the idea 
of "The People" in general (Laclau, OPe cit., p. 109). 
This emphasis has points of contact with Foucault's 
suggestion (cited with approval by Heinz Moser (Moser, 
1978, p. 96) that although "knowledge" and "power" 
are intimately conjoined, this does not imply a 
structure of centralized imposition, but rather that 
power is a ubiquitous and immanent feature of the 
relationships within which knowledge is constituted 
(Foucault, 1981, pp. 91-8-9). 
HOW, then, might these various suggestions find 
a place within the previous arguments concerning the 
nature of the theoretic self and its theoretic 
resources? 
The first step is to note th~ link between the 
ideological and the mythic. Paul Ricoeur (1981) seems 
to open up this possibility by his description of the 
features of ideology within a: 
"fundamental thesis ... that ideology is an 
unsurpassable phenomenon of social existence 
insofar as social reality always has a symbolic 
constitution and incorporates an interpretation, 
in images and representations, of the social 
bond itself". (p. 231) 
According to Ricoeur, ideology presents "the social 
bond itself" in terms of justifying and rationalizing 
the originary basis (the "founding act" - p. 225) of 
- 136 -
the particular social group; its tendencies are thus to 
simplify and to reduce to a taken-for-granted orthodoxy, 
to justify the authority which pervades and preserves 
the group, and to treat its own symbolic representa-
tion not as a representation but as reality itself 
(pp. 225-31). The crucial point for Ricoeur is 
that ideology does not thematize (p. 227) 
But, if ideology does not thematize the social bond, 
why does ideology continue? Why cannot a taken-for-granted 
social bond simply be taken for granted? If ideology 
justifies authority, why is authority not simply accepted? 
Whence, in other words, the apparently auto-destructive 
quality of "justification"? The point is, that a 
formulation of ideology needs to recognize ideology's 
own fragility as a justification, in order to explain 
ideology's necessity, as a widespread and endlessly 
repeated feature of the cultural process. This is perhaps 
the final irony for Althusser's functionalist theory: 
the notion of a successful imposition of an ideologized 
consciousness explains the reproduction of social relations 
but fails to address the reproduction of ideology 
itself. Conversely, only an ideological effort whose 
effectiveness was always in question would "explain" 
in functionalist terms) the necessity for a continuous 
ideological process, and would also explain why social 
relations are not simply reproduced but (slowly) develop. 
Which is, after all, what Marxism would wish to argue. 
Now, Ricoeur suggests that the Other of ideology 
is thematization, leading to his general proposal of 
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"science" as critique (p. 235), but a simple opposition 
of this type would lead to a confrontation which could 
be resolved only by a capitulation - and one typical 
outcome would then be the prescription of "critical 
science" for a defeated "ideology" newly revealed as 
error. But Ricoeur wishes, on the contrary, to 
establish "an intimately dialectical relation between 
science and ideology" (p. 224), and for this (I would 
argue) it is necessary to establish the possibilities 
for thematization within ideology, as an "intimate" and 
inherent contradiction which would sustain Ricoeur's 
dialectic. And this is where the notion of mythic 
thought, as founded in contradiction, becomes crucial. 
Thus, Levi-Strauss argues: 
"For a myth to be engendered by thought and for 
it to turn to engender other myths, it is necessary 
and sufficient that an initial opposition should 
be injected into experience ... This inherent 
disparity of the world sets mythic thought in 
motion, but it does so because ... it conditions 
the existence of every object of thought". 
( 1981, pp. 603 - 4) . 
Elsewhere he says: 
"The purpose of myth is to provide a logical 
model capable of overcoming a contradiction ..• 
it therefore grows spiral-wise until the intell-
ectual impulse which produced it is exhausted" 
(1972, p. 229). 
It is for this reason that Levi-Strauss IS analyses of 
m~th work towards structures of "binary opposites" 
(1981, pp. 559, 692). Hence, for example, myth does 
not present a hero as heroic except in a dynamic, 
dangerous, and problematic relation with a force for 
villainy (a dragon or a "traitor"). Myth is indeed 
the exciting story of their struggle. Myth justifies 
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the original social bond but always at the "political" 
cost, as it were, of thematizing it, by showing it 
to be endangered. 
My argument, then, is that ideology is not opposed 
to thematization. Rather, there is an inevitable 
tension within ideology, as part of ideology's process: 
any elaborated justification implicitly thematizes the 
questionability of the justification, the possibility of 
alternatives. (Hence the possibility of critical 
readings of even children's fairy stories) * However, 
it is not possible to thematize everything at the same 
time (Ricoeur, OPe cit., p. 227). Thus, on the one 
hand science can never find a position where it could 
stand "apart" (as "pure" thematization) and criticize 
ideology; and on the other hand ideology always evokes 
the possibility of science at the very moment that it 
denies science's accomplishment. This is the 
dialectical relation desired by Ricoeur, a relation 
founded ultimately on the reflexivity of consciousness 
and on the "negativity" of language's relation to the 
reality it speaks: to utter "justification" is to 
recollect the possibility of non-justification. 
Ideology and science thus constitute a mythic pairing; 
hero and villain, locked in a necessary, mutually 
constitutive, and unending combat, rehearsing the possibi-
lity but also the fragility of self-knowledge on the part 
* This ambiguity inherent in justification underlies 
Habermas's thesis of the current "legitimation 
crisis" of the modern state. 
(Habermas, 1976, p. 71) 
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of the social group, and, by the dialectical progress 
of their struggle, transforming the parameters of 
that self-knowledge. 
Such a framework can accommodate the proposal, 
by Laclau and Mouffe, of ideology as a political 
struggle for a particular articulation of social 
imagery, and also Althusser's suggestion that the 
practice of philosophy is "class struggle within 
theory" . Both proposals can be seen as evoking the 
"interests" of knowledge (cf. Habermas, 1972) within 
a dialectical formulation both of political power and 
of the understanding of that power, ie. a dialectics 
of "interest" and a dialectics of knowledge. 
In this way, the theory of myth-as-contradiction 
can help to formulate dialectical and reflexive 
possibilities for ideology. Can ideology perhaps help 
to reformulate myth? Levi-Strauss's argument concerning 
myth is that an "inherent disparity of the world (which) 
conditions the existence of every object of thought ... 
sets mythic thought in motion", and he gives examples 
such as the "disparity ... between the high and the 
low, the sky and the earth, land and water, the near 
and the far, left and right, male and female, etc." (1981, 
p. 603). For Levi-Strauss the universalization of 
mythic themes was an important project, but for the 
argument here the generality of his examples is a 
limitation, if myth is to be considered as a resource 
for theory in an industrialized society. In other 
words, we need to consider the concrete binary operations 
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of the "social imagery" (cf. Mouffe, loco cit.) with 
which the members of an industrial society represent 
to themselves the "social bond" (cf. Ricoeur) in which 
specifically they are constituted. 
Durkheim argues precisely the point that in 
industrial society the articulation of the social bona 
is analytically different in nature from that which 
characterizes the type of "primitive" society 
observed by Levi-Strauss, and the same argument poses 
a problem concerning the relevance of the Jungian 
"archetypes", which pOint always towards the archaic 
as the resource whereby modern society might recover 
its "mythopoeic imagination". Hence also the 
"pastoral" theme which underlies Jung's view of non-
industrial cultures, so that he refers, for example, 
to "arab culture" as "the paradise of childhood" 
(1967, p. 272). In a sense Jung seems to view 
primitive man as the unconscious for the European, but 
not to envisage the possibility that the European 
could embody the unconscious for a primitive civilisa-
tion, as in "cargo cults". The "mythopoeic imagination" 
seems to be not so much a formulation of the process 
whereby the members of a modern society might recover an 
intelligible sense of self-reflection (which is the 
problematic for this study) but a nostalgic invocation 
of direct access to a concensual social meaning, which 
(Durkheim would argue) the differentiating structures 
of industrialization have for ever banished. 
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This, then, is what "ideology" could contribute 
to myth-ology: the social imagery of a society structured 
by hierarchical difference and contested power relations, 
including, therefore, the imagery of class, bureaucracy, 
and the state. As a resource, therefore, ideology 
as it were "updates" the vocabulary of myth. (See 
Barthes, 1976). This "updating" is, I would argue, 
a necessary process, given the complex relationship 
in industrialized societies between their past and 
their present, as mythic locations for their ideals. 
While still haunted, as was the Greece of Homer and 
Sophocles, by the imagery of past "golden ages" 
inhabited by gods and heroes, we also glamorize the 
contemporary, as part of the myth / ideology of 
industrialization's progressive achievement: thus, 
alongside the mythic images of Helen of Troy and Mary 
Queen-of-Scots, we also install "Princess Di" and, 
in capitalism's own dynastic Olympus: Joan Collins. 
And in the institutional context of the educational 
action-research worker, symbolic possibilities are also 
articulated in terms of mythic figures both from the 
past (Socrates - "the thinker", Archimedes - "practical 
innovation", Einstein - "genius") and also in the present 
(A.S. Neill - "creative freedom", Keith Joseph - "restrictive 
power") • Even without being personalized, the imagery 
of the institutional forces which make up the educational 
context (the DES, the MSC, the LEA, the NUT, "the 
school") do not form a unified and self-legitimating 
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system of norms which determine our comprehension of 
them, any more than, at the political level itself, 
they form a stable, static, and integrated set of 
practices. If, on the contrary, the institutional 
context is seen as structured by political conflict 
(rather than as a pacified "system") then our thinking 
of that context can also, without inconsistency, be 
characterized, not as a determined reflection of that 
context, but as a dialectical process, both within the 
oppositions of ideological imagery and within the 
reflexive dialectic between ideology and theoretic 
analysis. 
To sum up, then: in this section I have argued 
that action-research's ideal of critical reflection 
upon its institutional context is not to be undermined 
by a theory of ideology: on the contrary, theories 
which would assimilate reflection ot its context are 
themselves undermined by the overwhelming irony of 
their non-reflexivity. Rather, I would argue that 
a dialectical formulation of institutional processes 
and of ideological processes preserves the possibility 
of critical theorizing and gives precision to its 
aspirations. At the same time, the unending dialectic 
between ideology and theory is another formulation of 
action-research's grounds for proposing the specific 
intimacy of theory and practice, of research and action. 
However, the characterization of analysis as a dialectical 
process returns us to its basis in the Self-Other 
relation and thus to the question of the form of the 
social interaction within which theorizing may be 
constituted. 
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The Social Relationships of Theoretic Reflection 
Having established that theory is not necessarily 
encapsulated by a merely institutionalized authority (see 
previous section), the question becomes: wherein 
lies the authority for theorizing itself, or indeed: 
what is the relationship between theory and authority 
in a relationship constituted in a search for enlighten-
ment? It has already been argued that for action-
reseaIththis question has a specific urgency, since 
action-research wishes to refuse the theoretic authority 
of Nature, as uttered by a would-be oracular positivism. 
In wishing to locate theory within the domain of 
practitioners, to locate research as action-research, 
action-research must reject a simple polarized authority 
relation between the theorist who knows and the actor 
who is known. Otherwise, if it tries to theorize 
itself within such a relationship - as, indeed (as 
we have seen) it often does - action-research would be 
assimilated either to a ramshackle format for applied 
social science or to the apologetics for a sophisticated 
version of management theory - as indeed (as we have 
seen) it often is. For this reason this section 
will only be concerned with theory's authority 
within relationships where this authority is already 
rendered problematic by the axiomatic counter-authority 
of the knowledge available to the object of theory, 
the "social actor". Only a genuinely "balanced" 
opposition of this type (in which the problematic of 
action-research is constituted) could originate a 
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sustainable dialectic between its two aspects, ie. an 
unending, because self-sustaining dialectics of theoriz-
ing, which would not rapidly "come to a standstill" at 
one pole or other: "factual truth revealed, for ever" or 
(alternatively) "pragmatic strategy agreed, for now". 
This necessary and poised ambiguity, which action-research 
writers have presented, for example, through the notion 
of the "facilitation" (of actors £y theorists) will be 
approached by comparing it on the one hand with "therapy" 
(for actors Qy theorists) and on the other hand with 
"emancipation" (of actors into theorists). It is for 
this reason that I begin once more with Freud, and with 
Habermas's criticism of Freud. 
Although Freud's theory of the object of inquiry 
(the patient) aspires always to a determinism based 
on causal origins which are positively known within 
the structure of a general descriptive theory, these 
causes and origins are manifested in wasy which are 
irremediably personal. It is for this reason that 
the "training" of an analyst must take the form of the 
psycho-analysis of the would-be therapist (see "The 
Question of Lay Analysis" Freud, 1962, p. 109). 
Hence the ambiguity of the process of inquiry into 
those causes and origins: inquiry cannot be "a causal 
therapy in the literal sense" - that a cause identified 
by the therapist thereby becomes available to remedy 
by the therapist (Freud, 1952, p. 443). Rather, the 
therapy depends on the contribution of the patient 
(the "resistance", ibid., p. 445), and indeed the process 
of inquiry becomes its own object (the "transference" 
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-pp. 449, 452), ie. inquiry is forced to become 
inherently reflexive. Hence: 
"The labour of overcoming resistance is the 
essential achievement of the analytic treatment: 
the patient has to accomplish it, and the 
physician makes it possible for him to do so by 
suggestions which are in the nature of an 
education .•. Psycho-analytic treatment is a 
kind of re-education". (ibid., p. 459, my emphases) 
But in this passage we have a statement of the basic 
ambiguity at the level which Freud did not address: 
the accomplishment is the patient's, but the terms 
of that accomplishment are "suggested" by one in the 
role of "physician"; the accomplishment is thus the 
acceptance of a re-education, whose content is conceived 
by Freud in terms of a biologically based causal theory. 
It is precisely to this contradiction that Habermas 
pOints, in a chapter called "The scientistic self-
misunderstanding of metapsychology" (Habermas, 1978, 
p. 246 ff.). Habermas's basic argument is that Freud 
confuses the different epistemological bases underlying 
respectively a natural, empirical science, with its 
knowledge created by experimentation, and a hermeneutic 
science "embedded in the context of self-reflection", 
namely a dialogue "involving both partners, doctor and 
patient" (ibid., p. 2.52-3). Freud, says Habermas, 
wishes to claim that his science is simultaneously both, 
"because he considered the analytic situation of 
dialogue quasi-experimental in character" (ibid., p. 253), 
while Habermas emphasizes the incompatibility between 
"the controlled observation of predicted results" 
and "the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" 
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(ibid. ) . For Habermas, and for my argument here, it 
is important to disentangle from Freud's "scientistic" 
claim a formulation of analysis in which the authority 
for "enlightenment" arising "intersubjectively" is 
not obscured by the prescription of a supposedly prior 
scientific expertise. This would of course entail 
questioning the basis of a relationship based on the 
role of "the physician", whose "training", once it 
is "completed" allows him to "re-educate" others. 
Jung's criticisms of Freud are helpful at this 
juncture in the argument. Jung emphasizes that there 
is no set of "rules for interpretation" which a therapist 
can bring to particular cases: he claims to abandon 
what he terms "so-called 'methods'" and "theoretical 
assumptions" (Jung, 1967, p. 153) and instead locates 
the authority of the therapist in a rigorously pursued 
self-understanding which (more unambiguously than for 
Freud) is not the acquiring of .~'a set of concepts" 
but learning "to know (one's) own psyche and to take 
it serious ly" (ibid., p. 154). Further, this 
"seriousness" is not the familiar "scientific" 
seriousness of "systematic rigour": quite the contrary 
(see Jung, ibid., p. 153). Rather, in more Heideggerian 
terms it is a willingness to make a commitment to the 
situation. Therapists must bring their whole 
personality "into play" along with that of the patient. 
They cannot "cloak themselves in authority"; they are 
"part of the drama" (ibid., p. 154). The seriousness 
of the therapist is thus not a defence, but on the 
contrary a specifically recollected vulnerability: the 
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"play" of the drama is its unpredictability; uncloaked, 
the therapist is at risk; he is, indeed tleffective only 
when he himself is affected. 'Only the wounded healer 
heals'." (ibid., p. 155). And - the final reflexive 
twist of the argument - "the healer heals himself" 
(ibid., p. 242). The condition of the therapeutic 
relationship, then, ceases to be the resistance of 
patients (Freud's version of reflexivity) but therapists' 
lack of resistance to their own sense of need. 
Jung thus introduces the notion of a "counter-trans-
ference", whereby not only the patient but the therapist 
also focusses unconscious themes into the interaction 
(see Fordham, F, 1978, p. 80 ff.)*. 
Underlying this radical abandonment of a cognitive 
authority are two important strands in Jung's thought. 
One is his emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual: 
"Interpretation ... requires a study of the whole 
symbol-producing individual" (Jung, 1977, p. 250). 
Each case requires "a new language", the grasping of 
a separate "personal myth" (1967, pp. 153, 224). 
Secondly, the sense of the unique individual is in 
turn grounded in what might be termed a theological 
epistemology, in which a radical protestantism - the 
direct access of the individual psyche to the divine -
is constituted in an equally radical deism - the divine 
manifested in both nature and culture - hence Jung's 
interest in both alchemy and archetypes, as points of 
* For this last point I am indebted to my colleague 
Steve Decker. 
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intersection between the apparent availability of 
human symbolism and the numinous mystery of the grounds 
of that symbolism. For Jung, therefore, there is a 
ready and potent analogy between the therapist as a 
wounded healer and Christ as "the suffering servant 
of God" ( 1967, p. 243). But is it possible to 
interpret these ideas within the analytical limits 
of social inquiry itself, to "bracket out", as it were, 
the theological problematic in which indeed inquiry 
might be seen in terms of "the care of souls" (ibid., 
p. 242) and to understand in analytical terms what 
Jung seems to present as the necessary vulnerability 
of the would-be theorist? 
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
Durkheim says: "The exceptional authority of 
Reason" is "the very authority of society ... trans-
ferring itself to a certain manner of thought which is 
the indispensable condition of all common action" 
(Durkheim, 1915, p. 17). Arid in "The Determination of 
Moral Facts" (in Durkheim, 1974) he says that he is 
"indifferent" as to whether the basic formulation of 
"collective being" is taken to be God or Society, 
since he sees "in the Divinity only society transfigured 
and symbolically expressed". (p. 52). Durkheim's 
sociological "indifference" in this respect permits 
the following analogy: the prophet of the divine 
"serves God" by recollecting the basis of the relation-
ship between the divine and the earthly; the prophet 
is condemned to call for the sacrifice of earthly 
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advantage, as a manifestation of the seriousness of 
its grounds in the divine. Such a sacrifice cannot 
merely be preached - it must be exemplified: the 
prophet's destiny is martyrdom, an earthly death 
signifying the life of the divine. Similarly, the 
social theorist "serves Society" by recollecting the 
basis of the relationship between the theoretic 
and the pragmatic~ the theorist is condemned to call 
for the sacrifice (the "interruption") of the pragmatic 
as a manifestation of the seriousness of its grounds 
in the theoretic. Such a recollection of the theoretic 
grounds for social action cannot merely be preached 
to others, but must be exemplified: the theorist must 
suffer the demonstration that his/her own social action 
(of providing theoretic grounds for others) is grounded 
in the same theoretic basis. The theorist's destiny 
is the unremitting recollection of reflexivity, a 
pragmatic death, signifying the life of theory. 
There is however, a further important step to 
the analogy. For the conventional religious 
"believer" (such as Jung's father, whose views he 
rejected - see Jung, 1967) the martyrdom of the prophet 
is not so much a tragic irony as a triumph. Similarly, 
conventional social science proclaims theory as a 
triumph - not a wound but a weapon, not an awareness but 
a method. In contrast, the analytical reflexivity 
of the theorist-as-wounded-healer is not a theory-of-
action, but a meta-theory - a theory, that is, of the 
relationship between theory and action, of their 
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mutual neediness within a constitutive dialectic. 
The recollection of the "life" of theory does not, then, 
signify the final "death" of pragmatic action; rather, 
both are moments in an unending cycle, that cycle of 
theory and action to which action-research aspires. 
The theoretic "authority" of the meta-theoretical 
analysis of reflexivity does not create a relationship 
whereby the theorist-as-physician provides diagnosis 
and prescription for the social practitioner: rather, 
it is a continuously self-cancelling, self-questioning 
authority which constitutes a mutual dependence between 
practitioner and theorist, as a "questioning dialectic" 
(see previous chapter, final section). 
A further way of grasping the mutuality of theory 
and research, of theorist and practitioner, is in 
terms of Kirkegaardian irony. 
"Constantly engaged in leading the phenomenon 
up to the Idea (the dialectical activity) the 
individual is thrust back, or rather flees back 
into actuality. But actuality itself has no 
other validity than to be the constant occasion 
for wanting to go beyond actuality - except that 
this never occurs. Whereupon the individual 
draws these exertions of subjectivity back into 
himself, terminates them in himself in personal 
satisfaction. Such is the standpoint of Irony". 
(Kirkegaard, 1966, The Concept 
of Irony, p. 183). 
Irony itself therefore is the apparent triumph of 
analytical reflexivity over action. But Kirkegaard 
continues: 
"Only insofar as irony is mastered ... does 
irony acquire its proper significance and true 
validity" (ibid., p. 338). 
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"Irony as a mastered moment ... teaches us to 
actualize actuality... Actuality acquires 
its validity ... as a history wherein consciousness 
successively outlives itself ... actuality 
acquires its validity through action". 
(ibid., pp. 340-1) 
In other words, although irony "establishes the disparity 
between Idea and actuality ... and between possibility 
and actuality" (ibid., p. 302), mastered irony does 
not allow this disparity to be formulated as an 
infinite negativity, which would not only ironize 
action, at a distance, but would itself in turn be 
rendered helplessly ironic by action, precisely in 
terms of that distance. Instead, the mastery of the 
ironic moment formulates the disparity as a constitutive 
relationship - between Idea and actuality, between 
theory and practice. This relationship would always 
subject action to the irony of theory, but would also 
ceaselessly challenge theory to transcend its negativity, 
to "outlive itself" by formulating its necessary 
relation to action. Thus, through submission to irony, 
the irony of the "healer" can itself (temporarily) 
be "healed". 
These lines of argument enable us to make two 
vital points concerning action-research. Firstly, 
that action-research's desire to reject the prescriptive 
theory of positivism makes a meta-theoretical framework 
absolutely essential. Moser (1978, p. 140) dismisses 
meta-theory,arguing that since discourse is a 
"practice in the life-world" ("Lebenspraxis") questions 
of validity can be settled only within a given discourse 
and therefore not II in general II • On the contrary, 
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I have argued that unless discourse is rigorously 
formulated in meta-theoretical terms, ie. within an 
analytically reflexive dialectic between action and 
theory, then action-research's epistemology will be 
engulfed by positivism, and action-research's investi-
gative relationships will be cast once more in the 
authoritarian mould of the expert and the client, 
the physician and the patient. 
Secondly, we can challenge action-researchers 
who suggest that they can act as "catalytic agents" 
(Halsey, 1972, p. 198). The catalyst is a metaphor for 
an "unchanged agent of change". Hence both Halsey 
(op. cit., p. 58) and Moser (op. cit., p. 169) 
anticipate a situation where action-research personnel 
transform social actors, by endowing them with previously 
absent qualities (theoretic autonomy), and then withdraw -
themselves apparently untransformed. Similarly, 
Brown, et ale (1972) list the one-way traffic of 
facilitation between "facilitator" and "participants", 
but do not consider what might be facilitated in and for 
the facilitator. The facilitator is a teacher, but 
he/she is not taught. But, from Marx onwards, a 
question for all sociology of educational processes 
must be: how is the educator educated? ( "Theses 
on Feuerbach", III, Marx, 1970) and it is this issue 
which has been reformulated in this section: the 
dialectic of analytical reflexivity challenges the 
theorist along with the practitioner, and denies 
the direct authority of one over the other by submitting 
both to the necessity of commitment and irony, and 
providing a set of meta-theoretical auspices under 
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which "change agency" and "facilitation" are mutually 
transformative processes. Hence: what remains 
unchanged by the process of inquiry is neither the 
theories nor the practices of either theorist or 
practitioner, but rather the auspices of reflexivity 
and commitment, dialectical question and play, 
under which the interaction of the inquiry proceeds. 
We have thus reformulated the problem of the relation 
between authority and inquiry. Inquiry's desire for 
critical enlightenment contests the authority given 
by institutional roles (and the previous section 
attempted to provide for the analytic possibility of 
this contestation). Similarly inquiry (in the form 
required by action-research) denies the authority 
derived from specific corpuses of knowledge located 
externally to the situation under inquiry. (This has 
been the theme of this section). The relationships 
of inquiry thus exclude "scientists" and "catalysts", 
and include only "participants-at-risk". 
But authority is now embodied in the auspices 
whereby inquiry requires, precisely, risk. What form 
of authority could sustain these auspices? 
Habermas presents an answer at the requisite 
level - that of the meta-theory of discourse - and 
one that has appealed to action-research's aspiration 
to formulate the relationships of inquiry as a non-
hierarchical "collaboration". In a paper first 
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published in 1981* I presented Habermas's argument as 
follows: 
"In his paper "Towards a Theory of Communicative 
Competence" (1970), Habermas presents "the 
dialogue constitutive universals ... of the ideal 
speech situation" as a symmetrical distribution 
of control by dialogue participants of the 
following dimensions of discourse: 
1) The personal pronoun system: 
2) The system of logical expressions of space, 
time, identity, and causality: 
3) The system of speech acts concerning speech 
itself, eg. questions, answers, forms of 
introduction and closure; 
4) The system of speech acts concerning truth 
and value, ie. 
(a) being and appearance (claims and disputes) 
(b) being and essence (revelations and 
concealments) 
(c) being and ought to be (prescriptions 
and refusals) 
Habermas summarizes the significance of these as 
fOllows: 
'Pure intersubjectivity is determined by 
a symmetrical relation between I and You 
(We and You), I and He (We and They) . 
An unlimited interchangeability of dialogue 
roles demands that no side be privileged 
in the performance of these roles: pure 
intersubjectivity exists only when there is 
complete symmetry in the distribution of 
assertion and disputation, revelation and 
hiding, prescription and following among the 
partners of a communication'. (p. 143) 
Only under the conditions of such "pure inter-
subjectivity" can there be a discourse about 
* "Social Research as Emancipatory Discourse", in 
P. Holly and D. Whitehead (eds): Action-Research in 
Schools, Cambridge Institute of Education, 1984; 
first published as Occasional Paper No.1, Essex 
Institute of Higher Education, 1981. 
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truth in which all can share who are affected, 
in which the absence of constraint allows only 
genuinely cornmon interests to be agreed, in 
which there is no deception because each individual's 
interpretation is subjected to scrutiny, and in 
which no force except that of the better argument 
is used. (Habermas, 1976, pp. 108-110)" 
~he paper continues by arguing directly from this accoUhf 
of Habermas to the possibility of "emancipatory" 
dialogue and collaboration as the essential format for 
inquiry) . 
Now, if the ideal of speech is taken to be the 
"unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles", 
then it is possible to say, as Habermas does: "With 
the very first sentence the intention of a general 
and voluntary concensus is unmistakably enunciated" 
(Habermas, 1974, p. 17). Hence the ideal of 
"dialogue" provides the authoritative auspices for the 
search for enlightenment, since it provides analytically 
for agreement that the outcome of dialogue is enlighten-
ment, and it also provides auspices for the necessary 
relationships, ie. egalitarian mutuality. Hence 
Habermas's appeal for action-research writers . 
. 
But this argument moves through a series of un-
reflexive abstractions. To begin with, language is 
equated on the one hand with the form of utterances 
("pronoun system") and on the other hand with its social 
function ("speech acts") and thus ignores the reflexive 
processes by which utterances and social interactions 
are mutually constitutive - the processes described, 
for example, by Lacan and Garfinkel. Then, having 
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thus dismantled the complexity of symbolization into 
its notional "components", Habermas can then reassemble 
them back into an "intersubjectiVity" whose "purity" 
seems to represent the final cessation of dialectic, 
and is postulated precisely so that it will offer 
no ressitance to "concensus", as a static moment of 
changeless unity. Finally, the invocation of "logic" 
in terms of Kantian universals is significant: an 
unproblematically valid "logic" would indeed prescribe 
the "better" argument and thereby endow it with "force". 
My argument against Habermas here parallels Heidegger's 
criticism of Kant's abstraction of the cognitive 
subject and of the a-temporal moment of "intuition" 
from the dialectics of Being (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 
366-8, p. 410 - see Chapter One, p. 33 above) . 
Habermas's argument is "utopian": the auspices for 
theorizing which it proposes are illusory: it provides 
a theory of language which cannot enter into relation-
ship with the practice of language, but remains as 
a disabling irony. Unlike Kirkegaardian irony it 
does not ironize itself with an awareness of its own 
self-contradiction: for Kirkegaard, irony itself 
must, as it were, be seen ironically, and hence provide 
for the mastery of its own moment. The inert unity 
of Habermas's ideal of speech simply "makes a mockery" 
of actual speech, just as the ideal of science, says 
Garfinkel, mocks the actual practices of comprehension. 
And yet this discursive ideal rendered inert by 
the purity of its intersubjectivity and the finality of 
its concensus is far from what Habermas himself requires. 
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On the contrary, he wishes to formulate a "universal 
pragmatics of speech" as an ideal which can guide the 
adjudication of validity claims in practical life 
(Habermas, 1979, pp. 2-5). Elsewhere he states that 
he rejects "pure theory" in order to urge that knowledge 
and interest are related in a "dialectic" (1978, 
pp. 314-5) and that "it is not unconstrained inter-
subjectivity itself that we call dialectic, but the 
history of its repression and reestablishment" (ibid., 
p. 59). 
A meta-theory of the auspices for a reflexive 
dialectics of inquiry, then, must provide for its own 
history, of which concensual intersubjectivity would be 
an evanescent and self-cancelling moment, rather than 
a teleology or a prescription. The relationship 
whereby these auspices might be maintained remain 
problematic: my argument against Habermas is that 
auspices for theorizing cannot be equated with an 
egalitarian dialogue formulated as the "interchangeability 
of roles". As Habermas himself says, enlightenment 
could only be equated with agreement (among those whose 
roles have ceased to be differentiated) in a society 
which was "already emancipated" (Habermas, 1978, 
p. 315), and where, in consequence, inquiry's own 
interest and necessity would seem to be in question. 
But does not the requirement of a reflexive 
dialectic also imply a symmetrical distribution of 
initiative and responsibility in a sense which 
preserves implicitly at least something of Habermas's 
egalitarian ideal? Are not all at risk? Are not 
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all to be transformed? Certainly, analytical reflexivity 
is not a corpus of knowledge which one might authoritatively 
possess and transmit; rather it would be exemplified, 
and its exemplification would begin with a question 
addressed to its own possibility. Can anything be 
said concerning the distribution, symmetrical or other-
wise, of the initiatives for such questioning among 
the participants of inquiry? Are we perhaps even 
talking of a theoretic practice which requires a 
specific prior "education" and thus reconstitutes a 
hierarchical relation between "theorists", for whom 
the reflexive dialectic is a familiar risk, and 
"practitioners", to whom its challenges must be 
unfamiliar, and whose attempts at reflexive analysis 
will be, initially at least, "unskilful"? Our 
question has thus become: the relationship between 
the mundane reflexivity of interaction and the 
analytic reflexivity of theory. 
At this point we must consider more carefully 
the familiar dichotomy between hierarchy and equality. 
At the level of role relationships hierarchy and 
equality are related in a dimension of power, and 
present their Difference in the form of a question: 
what might be the legitimate grounds for a difference 
in power? In contrast, the difference between theory 
and action is not a question but a necessity: to 
abandon their Difference is to annihilate both (see 
previous Chapter). However this Difference does not 
. a power dimension except within the positivist organlze 
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version of theory, which presumes to dictate its 
interpretations and explanations as the real IInature ll 
of action. Thus, analytic reflexivity is related 
to mundane reflexivity as an irremediable Difference, 
yet not within a power relation, but as an analytic 
necessity. Indeed, the very problematic of this 
section - what is the appropriate social relation for 
an investigative enterprise? - must be queried, since 
it presupposes the possibility that a theoretic 
stance could be equated with a social relationship, 
which is indeed Habermas's suggestion, but which previous 
arguments enable us now to reject in principle. This 
in turn helps to justify action-research's claim that 
investigation can be an individual process of self-
transcendence, that cOllaboration or facilitation are 
"helpful ll , but not necessary. Within a Habermasian 
frame of reference this is not intelligible. 
There are two main dimensions to the suggestion 
that there is no power dimension constructed by the 
Difference with which analytical reflexivity confronts 
the mundane reflexivity of action as the auspices of 
theoretic work. First, as we have noted previously 
in this section, it is a challenge to its ~ grounds 
as well as to the grounds of action. Secondly, this 
very Difference is constructed within a particular 
intimacy between analytic and mundane reflexivity. 
Analytical reflexivity always has as its occasion and 
potential starting point social members' implicit 
grasp (within a dialectic of consciousness and action) 
- 160 -
of the ambiguities and contradictions which characterize 
the symbolic processes of familiar cultural forms (see 
Chapter One, p. The most vivid examples of this 
would be in the realm of the aesthetic: jokes, 
advertisements, soap operas, films, novels: all play 
with the crucial meanings which structure collective 
self-representation) and thereby constitute their massive 
appeal, as "entertainment". Often, their "play" is 
explicitly quite "risky": only "in the end" do they 
turn aside from their subversive course and gloss 
their own challenges as within the realm of mundane order. 
At one level, mundane reflexivity is, as Garfinkel 
says, "uninteresting": what is, on the contrary, 
of absorbing interest (and thus "entertaining"), 
is to play with the limits of mundane reflexivity - to 
move "thrillingly" close to an analytic rupture. 
The Difference of analytic reflexivity, however, is that 
its auspices are actually to make that rupture, to suffer 
the fall from the high wire, to plunge into symbolization's 
own reflexive abyss. (Earlier in the discussion - of 
ideology as "justification" - I noted the inherent 
link between play and risk at the level of language 
itself, see p. 118 above). My argument, then, is 
that although only theorists do it, everyone could do 
it, because everyone can envisage it, and does so, all 
the time. 
In other words, the resources for analytic reflexivity 
are provided for as possibilities in the ambiguous 
meaning structures of culture itself, ie. in their 
mythic, metaphorical, dialectical, and ideological 
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features. As Blum and McHugh would say: everyone 
can be a theorist; any experience can be the occasion 
for theorizing (see McHugh et al., 1974, Introduction). 
It is this tension between the familiar and the 
different, between playas entertainment and playas 
critical analysis, that the auspices of, analytical 
reflexivity can provide for a dialectic between theorist 
and practitioner which calls upon the contribution of 
both - a dialectic which formulates an epistemological 
relationship quite precisely, but which has no 
necessary implications for the institutionalized 
interaction in which it might be embodied. 
In this way, then, "critical reflection" may be 
formulated as a possible stance: it may be established, 
as action-research requires, independently of specific 
role-relationships and independently of specific 
corpuses of academic knowledge; in other words, it 
establishes Subjectivity in a resource-ful, rather than 
a determined, relation to the symbolizing processes of 
both psyche and culture. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ACTION-RESEARCH AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE 
"Improving Professional Practice" 
So far we have pursued action-research's aspirations 
down two avenues: the intelligible unification of 
theory and practice (Chapter Two) and the theoretic 
competence, resources, and independence of the reflective 
individual (Chapter Three) . This chapter is concerned 
with a further theme which is widely invoked as a basis 
for action-research investigation - both as a defining 
characteristic and even as an implicit criterion of 
adequacy - and which thus serves to provide a further 
elaboration of action-research's inherent problematic:-
action-research, it is almost universally claimed, 
is founded upon "the improvement of professional 
practice". 
The initial problem is illustrated by the following 
statement by Brown, et ale (1982, p. 2): 
"Action-research ... has as its central feature 
the use of changes in practice as a way of 
inducing improvement in the practice itself, the 
situation in which it occurs, the rationale for 
the work, and in the understanding of all these. 
Action-research uses strategic action as a probe 
for improvement and understanding. In fact 
the action-researcher selects a particular 
variation of practice with these two criteria 
uppermost" . 
The argument of the passage enacts a crucial ambiguity: 
on the one hand it seems as though "changes" in 
practice will, by "probing" a situation, disclose 
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hitherto concealed possibilities, and thereby lead 
(in an open-ended sense) to an improved understanding 
of the situation; on the other hand such changes 
are presented as "strategic", ie. as planned with a 
clearly envisaged end in view, so that improvement in 
both understanding and in practice will be induced, 
as though the range of outcomes were predictable. 
Hence the direct question becomes: will any changes 
in practice lead to an improved understanding, or 
only a special type of change? The answer suggested 
(only those changes which lead to an "improvement" 
in practice) begs the question: how are criteria for 
practice grounded, such that those leading to 
"improvement" may be distinguished from those leading 
to "deterioration"? Unless this question is addressed, 
the recommendation that "improved practice" can generate 
"understanding" becomes a form of unexplicated 
prescription: whereas positivist evaluation failed 
(inevitably) to explicate its grounds for prescribing 
methods for investigation (see Chapter Two), action-research 
(in this formulation) threatens to allow the methods 
and outcomes of investigation to remain open merely 
at the cost of failing to give grounds for its prescrip-
tion of methods for professional practice. Thus the 
relationship between Brown et al.'s "two criteria" 
("improvement" of practice and "understanding" practice) 
becomes a central issue, one which their juxtaposition 
above tacitly avoids. 
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The difficulty is not lack of elaboration of the 
relationship, as may be seen by a summary of the argument 
which the writers present: practices, they argue, can 
only be understood in conjunction with their rationale, 
and thus they are open to critical self-reflection. 
This in turn requires collaboration with other practi-
tioners, who may otherwise stand in a hierarchical 
relation to each other, and such relationships must 
be "suspended" so that an "unconstrained" critical 
self-reflection can take place. Action-research 
is thus an expression of Habermas's "emancipatory 
knowledge-constitutive interest", a form of "critical 
theory", and "fundamentally concerned with democratic 
values as these are expressed in the idea of a self-
reflective community" (Brown et al., Ope cit., p. 3). 
In this way the development of understanding and the 
development of social practices are encapsulated within 
a notion of "emancipation" (see final section of 
Chapter Three, above). 
At one level this line of argument may be seen 
as the justificatory invocation of a rhetorical 
tradition, mobilizing well-known notions in a heroic 
scenario: rational action, critical theory, self-
reflection, collaboration, democracy, emancipation, 
autonomy, and community triumph together over 
"hierarchy" and "the constraints of habit, tradition, 
" and institutional intransigence (Brown et al., Ope cit., 
p. 14); and one important way of analyzing it would 
be to "deconstruct" the various elements into their 
constitutive metaphors, ambiguities, and contradictions, 
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as Levi-Strauss and Marx analyze the structure of other 
heroic scenarios. 
However, a more direct problem with the argument 
as presented is its central lacuna: changes in practice 
are envisaged in terms of teachers' professional work, 
but the scenario of "emancipation" concerns only the 
teachers' freedom to reflect and to innovate; it is 
not seen as constituting the nature of the work 
itself, namely the practice of teaching. The question 
therefore becomes: on what basis is such a boundary 
for the principle of "emancipation" constructed? 
In other words, the problem concerns the relationship 
between authority and emancipation in the research 
activity and that same tension in the professional 
practices which the research activity claims to be 
able to use both as a topic and as a resource. It is 
this relationship on which Brown et ale are silent. 
Suppose, for example, that a group of teachers 
(including a head of department and a scale I staff 
member) reflected upon their "habitual and traditional" 
practices, and determined to liberate themselves from 
the "constraints" imposed upon their work by a taken-
for-granted professional ideology of active contributions 
to lessons by pupils, and decided instead - mounting 
a thorough critique of institutional policy - to 
translate an area of the curriculum into predetermined 
behavioural objectives for which massive and carefully 
planned practice~uld be given, reinforced by a 
calculated system of symbolic rewards and punishments, 
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in order that the curriculum should be "more effectively 
learned" . Such an example would exploit the lacuna 
in the argument, since the hypothetical case describes 
the liberation from "constraint" of a group of teachers 
(as a Habermasian "speech community") in order to 
enable them to increase the constraints upon the learners 
within their classrooms. Thus: the innovative 
discourse would deconstruct the hierarchical relation 
between the Head of Department and the Scale I teacher, 
freeing them to interact on the basis only of "the 
better argument" and of their "common interests" 
(Habermas, 1976, p. 108), but as a result, the hierarchi-
cal relationship of the classroom would be intensified 
by an increased didacticism: a more erescriptive 
curriculum backed up by a more intensive application 
of external sanctions, which would reduce the opportunity 
for pupils to present "arguments" concerning the 
curriculum and would necessitate that pupils' "interests" 
be defined by teachers (cf. Brown et al.'s quotation 
from Haberrnas above). So the question is: upon 
what grounds is staff discourse to be considered in 
relation to the Habermasian ideal, but not classroom 
discourse? 
Certainly, this exclusion is not explicitly 
intended by action-research writers. For example 
Holly (1984) indicates the "emancipatory" thrust 
of action-research by means of the following diagram: 
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The Institution 
Hierarchical; vertical 
relationships 
Divided; compartmental-
ized (subject-based) 
Bureaucratic; "Top-down" 
management style 
Closed 
Formal (teacher-pupil 
relationships) 
Action-research 
Horizontal relationships 
Unified; cOllaborative 
across subject boundaries 
Democratic; "Bottom-up" 
management style 
Open 
Informal 
Holly's argument is that action-research generates 
relationships among staff which are incompatible 
with the requirements of the school as a societally 
determined institution. His vocabulary suggests 
a clear debt to Bernstein (Bernstein, 1971a, 1971b) and 
hence, indirectly, to Durkheimian arguments concerning 
social order in general, the wider implications of 
which will be explored in more detail later (see p. to~H. 
below) . This echo makes it clear that for Holly 
action-research will challenge institutional structures 
inside the classroom as well as outside, so that, for 
example, "informal" teacher-pupil relationships may 
be thought of as "horizontal", and as a "democratic" 
style of classroom management. 
But these are of course metaphors for a supposedly 
dichotomous mutual exclusion which itself evokes 
one of the central difficulties of an "emancipatory" 
problematic for action-research: if the opposition 
between action-research and its institutional setting 
is of the categorical nature suggested by such pairings 
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as vertical/horizontal, open/closed etc., then it 
becomes difficult to see in what sense Holly recommends 
"cautl'on" (0 't 100) p. Cl ., p. : is he suggesting that 
by means of "caution" action-research might conceivably 
succeed in "overthrowing" institutions into a diametrically 
opposite form? If so, how could this be understood? 
In fact Holly's pairs of terms are schematic, evoking 
rather than analyzing the sense of the contrast they 
present: "open" and "closed", for example, are the 
most crudely ideological formulation for the issue of 
"democratic" relationships, begging every question of 
their meaning, and every student of "organizational 
theory" knows that a "formal" structure generates an 
"informal" structure as part of the inevitable texture 
of institutional life (see Selznick, 1964). 
Heinz Moser (1978) argues even more explicitly 
than Holly for the intimate relation between the 
processes of investigation and the aims and criteria 
for professional practices, by making clear that for him 
the notion of a critical social science of education 
must also in principle inform pedagogical practices, 
ie. he explicitly does not make the separation which 
is so problematic in the work of Brown et ale Indeed, 
he says: " .•. Pedagogy, in the sense of a critical 
theory of education, is taken to be a theory of society". 
(p. 12)* This "critical theory of education" is 
* "pidagogik wird ... im Sinne einer kritischen 
Erziehungswissenschaft als Gesellschaftwissenschaft 
verstanden". (Translations from Moser by R. Winter). 
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conceived as requiring the autonomy of youth and as 
tending to render the educational relation itself 
superfluous (p. 14), and it is therefore also in this 
sense that Moser claims, "A science of education which 
is not devoted to the maintenance of the status quo 
but which includes in its programme this process of 
substantial liberation must therefore identify with the 
emancipatory interest which characterizes science 
as the enablement of a liberating praxis". (p. 13)* 
In other words, for Moser, a theory of research which 
liberates the teacher is inseparable from a theory 
of teaching which liberates the learner. Hence Moser 
contrasts education for the progressive liberation 
of youth from education into autonomy, with education 
as the instrumental practice of the educating Subject 
upon the child Object (p. 14), and generalizes from 
this: "Education therefore becomes the sine qua non 
of any (social) scientific programme, which must 
first of all 'create' self-reflective Subjects" (p. 19)** 
However, this argument - although more sophisticated 
than Holly's diagram - by its abstract and programmatic 
form seems to neglect action-research's specific 
concern: the creation of a principled relation between 
* "Erziehungswissenschaft, die sich nicht dem bestehenden 
status quo verpflichtet, sondern jenem Prozess 
substantieller Befreiung in ihr Programm aufnimmt, 
hat sich deshalb jenes emanzipatorische Interesse 
zu eigen zu machen, dass Wissenschaft als 
Erm<5glichung befreiender Praxis charakterisiert". 
** "Erziehung wird daP1it sine qua non fur eine 
Wissenschaftsprogrammatik, welche die sie (sic. 
"sich"? - RW) anerkennenden Subjekte erst 'schaffen' 
muss" . 
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theory and practice, between research and professional 
work within an institutional context. 
In contrast, Elliott (1975) is much more specific 
about what he envisages as action-research's programme 
for improving professional practices. His Ford 
Teaching Project is an action-research investigation 
devoted to the implementation of "Inquiry/Discovery 
Learning" in the classroom, ie. to a specific pedagogy 
which is explicitly described as the removal by 
teachers of the "constraints" upon their teaching method 
fostered by their own institutionalized authority, 
such as their general tendencies to impose "preconceived 
problems", to reformulate problems in their own words, 
(op. cit., p. 7) to impose changes in the direction 
of discussion, to probe "too deeply" into pupils· 
personal lives (ibid., p. 12), etc. In each case "the 
principles of Inquiry / Discovery Learning" involve 
recommending to teachers "constraint removing strategies" 
(ibid., p. 6). The generality of the principle of 
"constraint removal" in the classroom is shown in one 
of Elliott's recent papers (Elliott, 1982a) where he 
suggests that Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project, 
in which the teacher's role is reformulated as that of 
the "neutral chairman", was an attempt to set up in 
the classroom a Habermasian "ideal speech situation" 
(op. cit., p. 22), and Elliott describes his own work 
as located within a similar problematic (ibid., p. 23). 
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For Elliott also, then, "emancipation" provides 
a criterion which guides both the relationships of 
the action-research investigative process and the 
professional/client relationships of the "practice" 
which forms both a topic and a resource for action-
research. What Elliott fails to consider, however, 
is the irony implicit in proposals to realize "ideals" 
in practical situations. This is a version of 
Garfinkel's issue (see Chapter Two, pp.~4~): a 
presentation of practical "failures" to realize ideals 
merely directs attention from actual processes. 
Thus, given that teachers cannot simply "remove 
constraints" without abandoning the fundamental 
parameters of their institutionalized roles, we are 
left wondering what sort of judgements action-researching 
teachers actually make: action-research must formulate 
(as the essence of its proposal to unify theory and 
practice) what "emancipation" could mean as a form of 
action within an institutional context. 
Elliott structures his argument around two suggest-
ive pairs of terms: a contrast between Habermas's 
"ideal speech situation" and "Bureaucracy" (Elliott, 
1982a, pp. 22-4), and between "ethical" and "technical" 
theories of teaching (Elliott, 1982b, p. 20) where 
he argues that criteria for the "validity" of an 
educational process reside in the values guiding the activi-
ty rather than in measurable qualities of the outcome. 
But the work of this latter project makes clear the 
nature of the problem when action-research attempts 
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to enact its "emancipatory" aspiration. The first 
aim of the project is defined as: 
"To help teachers monitor the extent to which 
the higher level understanding tasks they plan 
for pupils ... qualitatively differ from those 
which pupils actually come to work on in class-
room settings" (op. cit., p. 12) 
Later Elliott writes: 
"I would claim that the idea of 'teaching for 
understanding' is entailed by educational action-
research. The latter has as its general focus 
educational action, but what makes action 
educational is not the production of extrinsic 
end states but the intrinsic qualities expressed 
in the manner of its performance ... The general 
idea of teaching for understanding simply 
specifies a quality of educational action, and as 
such guides, rather than directs, teacher 
deliberations about how to improve the educational 
quality of their teaching" (op. cit., pp. 21-1). 
Elliott's argument is that "understanding" is entailed 
as a pragmatic consequence of the educational enter-
prise; hence to be engaged in educational action-research 
is ipse facto to be engaged in teaching for understanding 
and thus in "improving the quality" of educational 
practice. But this is merely to take for granted the 
conventional normative form of the term "education", 
in the same way as "the philosophy of education" used 
to justify current practices by unexplicated appeals to 
normative linguistic usage, a form of philosophic 
practice whose theoretic weaknesses are cogently 
analyzed by Ernest Gellner in Words and Things (Gellner, 
1968) • Elliott wishes to attenuate the prescriptive-
ness of his appeal to usage ("guides rather than directs") 
in accordance with action-research's desire to preserve 
practitioners' autonomy, but the residual prescriptive-
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ness remains unaddressed. "Education" is taken as a 
unitary meaning which can be insisted upon, rather 
than as a moment in a dialectic, whose contradictions 
(say: authority and autonomy) can be explored but 
not resolved: the educational practitioner as reflexive 
theorist would need to pose the nature of "education" 
as a question, rather than utilize it as an authoritative 
usage. 
The notion of "levels of understanding" seems 
to be an even more concrete instance of taking for 
granted precisely what should be an issue (the question-
able relationship between the rationalities of teachers' 
plans on the one hand and of pupils' "work" on the 
other) in order to invoke a cognitive hierarchy quite 
at variance with action-research's proclaimed desire 
to ground criteria for action in an ideal of 
emancipation. 
Elliott's paper is programmatic for the "TIQL" 
(Teacher-Pupil Interaction and the Quality of Learning) 
project. When one turns to some of the reports 
produced by the teachers involved, one finds even 
clearer examples of the failure to address the grounds 
of the professional practices which have been 
"researched" or the grounds of the research process 
itself. Thus Ingham (1984) reports: 
"I very soon became aware through my observation 
that children often return to lower order concepts 
when acquiring those of a higher order, if they 
consider it relevant to the situation. I was 
able to show that if there is a deficiency in 
the lower order network, then it will be 
difficult for pupils to attain a higher level 
until this has been made good". (pp. 5-6) 
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The claims to observe IIhigherll and IIlowerll orders of 
conceptualization represents an unreflexive prescriptive-
ness towards pupils' meanings which demonstrates quite 
dramatically the dangers of action-researcher's failure 
to articulate an alternative to positivism: Ingham 
here comes close to exemplifying the hypothetical 
siutation described on p. J ('5 above: her own research 
stance is accomplished by assuming the lIinstrumental ll 
stance of lithe educating Subject upon the child Object ll 
which, as Moser suggests (p.Jb~above), is the antithesis 
of the desire on the part of action-research and of a 
critical social science to found their practices upon 
the constitutive possibility of IIself-reflective Subjects". 
Not surprizingly, Ingham does not point to the 
system of unexplicated norms in the following recommenda-
tions which she quotes from another professional 
practitioner / action-researcher in the project: 
liThe desire of children to re-negotiate and 
simplify tasks is widespread. Children will 
frequently go against given instructions if 
they can see a short-cut to the answer. 
Work should be scrutinized when set to avoid 
leaving these short-cuts open" 
( In g ham, op. cit., p. 7). 
Only by questioning the notions of higher and lower 
"levels of understanding" would Ingham have been able 
to consider what children as well as teachers see as 
reelvant as rational features of a situation which 
children will inevitably be formulating for themselves. 
Classroom practices are constituted in a mutual 
difference between teacher and taught which action-
research aspires to address as a problematic inter-
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subjectivity between "reflective Subjects": if educational 
practice is conceived as the setting of a task and as 
a requirement of the answer, this Difference will be 
glossed by an authoritarian imposition, presented 
nevertheless as that concensus which (as Elliott implies 
above, p.111) education's norm of autonomous rationality 
always necessarily invokes. In other words, criteria 
for the "improvement" of practice must be theorized 
independently of the institutional authority by which 
practices are routinely evaluated, namely ideologies 
of higher and lower levels of understanding, and of 
obedience to instructions which gloss their constitutive 
contradictions. Otherwise action-research lapses 
into a managerial rhetoric \vhich takes for granted 
precisely the judgements it should be questioning. 
However, Ingham's paper, though significant, is 
exceptional: on the whole action-research work has 
indeed been concerned to formulate the improvement of 
practice by questioning its prescriptive version. 
Thus, Michael Armstrong says, at the beginning of the 
article which Nixon uses to open his collection of 
action-research writing (Nixon, 1981a): 
"Part of the art of teaching consists ... in 
asking children questions, discussing their ideas, 
exchanging experiences with them... There is a 
self-consciousness implicit in this aspect of 
a teacher's activity that makes those teachers who 
manage it successfully - however fitful and 
fragmentary their success - students of those 
they teach as well as their teachers". 
(Armstrong M., 1981, p. 15). 
Even more explicitly, Stephen Rowland says: 
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"It is only by committing ourselves to ... a 
process of self-education that we can fully 
appreciate the endeavours of the children we 
teach as they strive to make sense of their world" 
(Rowland S., 1983, Introduction) 
This may be construed as a specific denial of the 
authoritative separation of teacher and taught, of 
professional and client: the educator's resource for 
a reflexively conceived educational enterprise is not 
a realization of his or her knowledge and of the children's 
ignorance, but rather of his or her own ignorance and of 
the children's understanding. In general terms: a 
reflexive analysis of professionalism would render 
problematic a series of normative definitions and their 
attendant systems of authoritative decision-making: 
a reflexive social-work profession would problematize its 
basis for distinguishing between and responding to 
"deviant" and "normal" ways of life, a reflexive medical 
profession would question its conceptions of health 
and treatment, and reflexive journalism its conceptions 
of newsworthiness and reportage. 
A concrete example of how an action-research 
project might begin to work towards such an awareness 
of the problematic nature of professional practice is 
given in John Crookes's paper (Crookes J., 1983) in 
Stephen Rowland's collection. Crookes tape-recorded 
a conversation during a science lesson with two 15 
year old pupils concerning why crystals grow, and what 
relationship there might be between the growth of 
crystals and the growth of human beings. He observes: 
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"My early reactions on transcribing the tape 
were confused, as I had expected the conversation 
to turn largely on the differing mechanisms 
each boy employed to explain growth" (p. 9) 
In fact the two boys kept "digressing" onto the topic of 
destiny and hence to their own identities and futures. 
He analyzes his sense of confusion as follows: 
"The importance of the learner's own knowledge 
in the growth of understanding .•. can be viewed 
as largely one-way... The teacher encourages 
the learner to tell of what he knows already 
(so that) the learner's own knowledge is a resource 
to be used by the teacher. (But) the learner's 
knowledge cannot be circumscribed in this fashion ... 
For as well as using his own knowledge to interpret 
and understand new events, the learner also uses 
these phenomena as vehicles for the interpretation 
and understanding of his own preoccupations and 
concerns ... (Hence) one of the reasons for 
my initial confusion was an inability to see 
Anthony's using the crystal as a starting point to 
re-explore an issue that continued to perplex him" 
(p. 10) 
The first step in Crookes's analysis, then, is 
his recognition that what an educational practice is 
about (ie. "the curriculum") is constituted as problematic 
within that practice: the teacher's definition of the 
nature of his professional practice ("a lesson about 
crystals") is challenged by pupils to be simultaneously 
intelligible as a discussion about their own destinies. 
The second step is to recognize that the problematic 
nature of this intersubjectivity, its "digressiveness" 
is not an inadequate realization of a normative "pure" 
intersubjectivity (as Habermas might argue - see Chapter 
Three, p.' 54), in which an "improvement" might be 
to avoid such "digressions", but on the contrary a 
condition of the creative process of understanding. 
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To this end, Crookes cites the "digressions" in the work 
of Kepler, with its "analogies from every phase of life ... 
exhortations .•. textual quibbles ... personal anecdotes 
delighted exclamations" (p. 10) and observes that 
Rob and Anthony "stand in an analogous position to an 
early scientist" and that "their interest and concerns 
spread more widely and deeply than the usual mundane 
events of the classroom". (p. 11) In this way Crookes 
questions his own teacherly authority by providing as 
it were a counter-authority for Rob and Anthony to 
play an autonomous role in the constitution of their 
education: education itself becomes no longer a 
professional practice "carried out" .Qy teachers but the 
achievement (between teachers and pupils) of an imaginative 
intersubjectivity which enables the exploration of the 
metaphors ("growth" in this instance) whereby such 
intersubjectivity accomplishes its communicative 
process. 
However, a pointer to an interesting limitation 
in Crookes's paper is contained in his reference to 
Kepler as an "early" scientist. Elsewhere he develops 
a contrasting account of the procedures of "modern" 
science in highly normative terms. This suggests the 
difficulty of adopting a reflexive stance towards one's 
professional authority. Crookes seems to have succeeded 
in retreating from his conventional authority as a 
teacher by taking up a defensive position behind his 
authority as a scientist! Nevertheless Crookes's 
analysis of this "science lesson" does suggest how a 
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reflexively conceived professionalism might begin to 
point beyond what Crookes himself refers to as the "mundane" 
realizations of its practices to its own inherent 
possibilities, without having recourse to a normative 
ideal for those practices which would render such 
possibilities "only theoretical". 
What Crookes fails to do, however, is to consider 
how such insights could be related back to the institution-
alized practice of education. In a sense he illustrates 
only the theoretical moment in the dialectic articulated 
at the end of Chapter Two. Thus, in a different way, 
like the other writers discussed so far, he evokes 
but does not address the issue of how the improvement 
of professional practice within an institution is related 
to action-research's problematic. We have seen how 
this relationship is generally enacted as the adoption 
of a consciously "progressive" stance on such questions 
as ethical v. technical rationality, instrumentality 
v. the self-reflective Subject, and teachers' v. pupils' 
versions of relevance. In other words we have seen 
how action-research writers have tended to present 
these various issues in terms of an overarching 
"liberationist" dichotomy: ideal speech v. bureaucracy, 
emancipation v. constraint, democracy v. hierarchy. 
Such formulations evoke rhetorically and metaphorically 
action-research's challenge to its institutional context, 
the general dimension on which professional improvement 
is sought, but it fails to formulate action-research's 
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possibility except as a challenge, ie. as an "idealistic" 
aspiration whose practicability is always potentially 
undermined by the unaddressed ironic relation between 
ideal and actuality, between the individual and the 
'I" C)r-cJ e.r 
institution. To do otherwise,~to formulate action-
research's constructive relation between theory and 
practice, the inert ironies of the dichotomies presented 
so far must be reformulated in dialectical terms, in 
order to provide analytically not only for opposition 
but also for resolution, transformation, and thus for 
change. It is to this task that the argument now 
turns, by considering the nature of professional 
practices and the sense in which they themselves offer 
opportunities for the improvements which action-research 
seeks. 
Professionalism and Bureaucracy: Myths of Normative 
Rationality 
Professionalism is presented by Talcott Parsons 
as the hi.storically achieved resolution of the principles 
of rationality and morality, the application of objective 
science to everyday experience (Parsons, 1954). Hence 
the institutional power of the professional over the 
client is immediately legitimated by the form it takes, 
namely expertise, authority derived from scientific 
knowledge and structured by Weberian notions of bureau-
cratic form: functional specificity, systematic 
disinterest, and the universalistic rules.* The enormous 
* What Parsons's presentation fails to address, of 
course, is the gap between action and explanation, 
between description and rationalization, between 
actualitv and ideal type. 
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mythic appeal of this fusion of science and morality 
into an ~xiomatically authoritative rationalism may 
be seen in the genre of professional-as-hero Radio and 
TV series, films, novels, etc., which endorses simultaneously 
the righteousness and the expertise of such professions 
as the doctor, the nurse, the vet., the pathologist, 
the solicitor, the journalist, and (most of all) the 
policeman, and the detective. Where there was error 
and hence injustice, there shall be truth and justice. 
But mythic structures are created by contradictions: 
Levi-Strauss says (1981, p. 604): "For a myth to be 
engendered by thought and for it in turn to engender 
other myths, it is necessary and sufficient that an 
initial opposition should be injected into experience ll • 
And (on p. 603): "This inherent disparity of the world 
sets mythic thought in motion, but it does so because ... 
it conditions the existence of every object of thought". 
The "initial oppositions" within professional work 
may be thought of as those between individualized 
authority and universalized truth, and between science 
and morality. Both oppositions are mythically resolved 
in the figure of the hero, who reveals the objective 
error of other professionals, whose expertise is 
axiomatically on the side of the Good, and whose version 
of "the case" is thus by definition "the Truth". The 
Good of the hero is both highly idiosyncratic (hence 
the emotionalism of Quincy, the rudeness of Kojak, 
the vanity of Poirot, the privacy of Sherlock Holmes) and 
universal (scientifically expert) • 
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Perhaps it is an echo of the myth of the professional-
as-hero which enables Brown et ale to see the emancipation 
of the professional from bureaucratic authority as a 
sufficient formulation of "improvement": the forces 
of error against whom her()-professionals score their 
triumphs are very often their own professional superiors. 
And in this element also we have as it were a mythic 
treatment of the contradictions of a cultural form: 
the Weberian bureaucracy and:the Parsonian profession 
both express the progressive rationalization of 
institutionalized action, the rationalized format for 
authority. Yet this authority is in contradiction with 
itself: bureaucracy creates a hierarchy of jurisdictions 
in which practitioners at each level can decide the 
means but not the ends of action; whereas the status 
of "professional" gives the practitioner precisely 
that principled autonomy which bureaucracy withholds, 
ie. the autonomy which comes from possessing a moral as 
well as a technical jurisdiction. Since professional 
practitioners are also members of more or less bureau-
cratized institutions, the authority by which they 
practise is enmeshed in ambiguity; and this ambiguity 
is mythically opened out into a confrontation between 
apparently dichotomous principles (autonomy / constraint; 
professional / bureaucrat~ "red-tape" / Jlwhat justice 
demands") which is worked out in the adventurous 
confrontations of the professional as Rebel . 
.J 
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But a myth reveals its fragility at the same 
time as it asserts its possibility - hence the need 
for continual repetition, hence, indeed its "appeal": 
the hero only just triumphs, by means of the "arduous 
journey" (Levi-Strauss, 1981, p. 659) through the series 
of "dangerous" confrontations (on the street, in court, 
in the lab.) with the forces of error or injustice 
by which professional work is always threatened. That 
professional work will always sense this threat is 
guaranteed by its origin in the ambiguity, the instability, 
of professionalism's own auspices: the rationality 
by which it claims authoritative jurisdiction is the 
same authority by which, in the name of bureaucracy, 
such jurisdiction is circumscribed. Hence the powerful 
appeal of the figure of the action-researching 
professional, who is continuously aware that his or her 
authority possibly might not correspond with the practice 
of justice and truth, while sensing a general requirement 
that it should. 
But although this version of professionalism shows 
the inherent possibilities for action-research's 
"heroic" calls for "improvement", there is a sense in 
which action-research merely subscribes to the myth 
which it should be examining, namely the struggle for 
the emancipation of the authority of the individual 
professional against the constraints upon that authority 
provided by his or her institutional context. We need 
therefore to look more closely at the contradictions 
which constitute the form of professional life, to 
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establish an analytic rather than a mythic formulation 
of "improvement". We may begin by considering the crucial 
role of the notion of "rationality" in Parsons's 
presentation of professionalism, as the point at which 
the unproblematic authority of the professional is 
established. 
Weber' s "Zweckrationalit~t" and "Wertrationalitc~lt" 
were originally conceived as analytical devices, so 
that for Weber the formulation of an instrumental 
rationality was not descriptive but was rather constituted 
analytically in contrast to "the great bulk of everyday 
action" which approximates to tradition-orientated 
"almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli" which 
"lie very close to the borderline of what can justifiably 
be called meaningfully oriented action" (Weber M., 
1971, p. 139). However, it is this contrast between 
rationality as an analytic norm and as an empirical 
norm which Parsons often seems to lose: "The starting 
point, both historical and logical (my emphasis - RW) 
is the conception of the intrinsic rationality of action 
The rationality of action ... is measured by the conformity 
of choice of means" (Parsons, 1968, p. 698-9). When 
the historical and the logical are thus elided, we have 
a metaphysics of instrumentality, in which action's 
rationality is "intrinsic" and axiomatic because it is 
merely the rule of subjective purpose. Thus for 
Parsons a "system of action" is a "set of variable 
relationships "between an organism" and its "objects" 
(Parsons et al., 1962, p. 6). But such a conception of 
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the subjective instrumental rationality of action makes 
it difficult to conceive of everyday interaction except 
as either authoritative, in which the Other is success-
fully manipulated (as an object) or as irrational, in 
which the Other (as an obstinate subject) undermines the 
possibility of reliable control or prediction, and thus 
leads to Weber's concession that the ideal of instrumental 
rationality relegates everyday action to the borderline 
of the meaningless. Hence the authoritative option, 
the subject/object model, reminiscent of Hegel's primal 
Master / Slave relation, cannot be challenged by any 
thoroughly intersubjective articulation of rational 
action. 
At this point in the argument the metaphor of 
social action as the selection of an appropriate 
instrument for a subjective purpose jOins the myth of 
the professional-as-hero. Professional practices are 
conceived as fusing the moral authority of Society 
with the technical authority of Science: the professional 
as Subject thus possesses a knowledge of the client, 
as an Object of science, of expertise, to which the 
client's own life-world offers no challenge, since it 
appears to have no theoretic resources, being indeed 
merely an "almost automatic reaction to habitual 
stimuli". Hence the cultural mandate for action-
research's unreflexive call for the improvement of 
professional practice in terms of greater diagnostic 
or therapeutic discretion for the professional over 
the client, in terms of emancipation from bureaucratic 
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constraint or from the residues of "unscientific" 
common-sense. The authoritative stance of the professional 
towards the client's life-world is thus closely linked 
to the social scientist's deficit theory of the common-
sense social actor: we have frequently noted Garfinkel's 
critique of this, his assertion of the rational properties 
of the life-world, and the need to theorize the nature 
of science's Difference, rather than (by positing 
only one form of rationality - the instrumental) imposing 
science upon the life-world as an unproblematic authority. 
In other words, in "professionalism", in "bureau-
cracy" and in "instrumental rationality" we have normative 
principles which gloss the conditions for their production 
as norms. But to explicate the requirements of practice 
in terms of normative ideals is to present concensus 
as what can theoretically be envisaged but never 
achieved at the level of practice. Normative usages (of 
"education" or "understanding", of "bureaucracy" or 
"professional practice") attempt to prescribe for action 
but cannot provide for the processes whereby their own 
prescriptions could possibly be acted upon. To speak 
for a normative version of concensus is immediately 
to enact its opposite: in any actual situation such 
speaking makes a prescription which is inevitably 
open to contestation on an unpredictable variety of 
dimensions. What the action-research writers reviewed 
in the early part of this chapter have done is to embrace 
the norm of professionalism and to contest the norm of 
bureaucracy without realizing the intimate relation 
between the two, constituted by the normative version 
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of rationality which underlies both. The analysis so 
far shows how both action-research's embrace and its 
contestation represent mythic responses to a set of 
contradictions surrounding all three concepts. The 
final argument in this chapter will be a consideration 
of how these contradictions may be addressed in terms 
which sidestep the invitation to mythic identification 
with a "maverick" professional, since this threatens to 
lead action-research into an "idealistic" confrontation 
with its institutional context, and this in turn under-
mines action-research's aspiration to be a form of 
investigation which can unite a theoretical stance 
with practitioner activity. Meanwhile it is important 
to look (at last) in detail at Habermas's theory of 
emancipatory discourse, which authorizes the self-
mythologizing stance adopted by so many writers on 
educational action-research when they attempt to make 
a "critical" move against their positivist inheritance 
(see Carr and Kemmis, 1983, for the most elaborated 
version) . 
Habermas and the Theory of Emancipation 
The appeal of Habermas's work for action-research 
in an educational context lies perhaps in that it 
addresses directly one of action-research's central 
concerns-the problematic relationship between emancipation 
and authori ty- while the proposed solution, in terms of 
an ideal fusion of Reason, Truth, and communicative 
participation, articulates one of the deepest ideals and 
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hopes of the professional educator. A further 
"attractive" feature of Habermas's ideal is that it 
appears to relate both to theory and to action; it 
combines a communicative possibility (rational discourse) 
and a political possibility (interaction freed from 
contingent power relations) : 
"Only in an emancipated society, whose members' 
autonomy and responsibility had been realized, 
would communication have developed into the 
non-authoritarian and universally practised 
dialogue from which both our model of recipro-
cally constituted ego-identity and our idea of 
true concensus are always implicitly derived. 
To this extent the truth of statements is based 
on anticipating the realization of the good 
life". (Habermas, 1978, p. 314). 
Only in such an emancipat.ed society would an "ideal 
speech situation" allOW "an actually attained concensus 
the claim of a rational concensus" and constitute 
"a critical standard against which every actually 
realized concensus can be called into question and 
tested" (Habermas, 1976, p. xviii). Thus, by means of 
the perfectly free and symmetrical procedures of 
Critical Reason, interaction could be both emancipated 
(from any constraint other than its own constitutive 
features ("Reason")) and authoritative (grounded in 
concensus) . 
At one level this is a restatement of the liberal 
concept of the constitutive relationship between freedom, 
reason, and truth, which sterns from Kant and J.S. Mill: 
and: 
"Reason has no dictatorial authority; its 
verdict is always the agreement of free citizens". 
(Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, 
1933, p. 593). 
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"Compl~t~ lib~rty of contradicting and disproving 
our op1n1on, 1S the very condition which justifies 
us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; 
and on no other terms can (we) have any rational 
assurance of being right". 
(J.S. Mill, "On Liberty", 
1961, p. 271). 
But Habermas's argument also derives a particular 
strength from its specification at the level of language 
(Habermas, 1970, p. 141-3) and also from a commitment 
to an intersubjective conception of consciousness and 
of the constitution of knowledge: 
"The subject of the process of inquiry forms 
itself on the foundation of intersubjectivity ... 
Every dialogue develops on (the) basis •.. of 
the reciprocal recognition of subjects ... (and 
thus) investigators are always already situated 
on the ground of intersubjectivity". 
(Habermas, 1978, pp. 137-9). 
An ideal for inquiry is thus formulated as an ideal for 
d-ialogue: 
"Pure intersubjectivity is determined by a 
symmetrical relation between I and You (We and 
You), I and He (We and They) • An unlimited 
interchangeability of dialogue roles demands 
that no side be privileged in the performance 
of these roles: pure intersubjectivity exists 
only when there is complete symmetry in the 
distribution of assertion and disputation, 
revelation and hiding, prescription and follow-
ing among the partners of communication". 
(Habermas, J, 1970, p. 143). 
It is this ideal which action-research wishes to 
interpret in directly practical terms as the formulation 
of a feasible mode of interaction between investigator 
and investigated, and between educator and educated. 
Now, Habermas is indeed concerned with the practical: 
his whole argument in Legitimation Crisis (Habermas, 1976) 
of 
is that the increasing dependenceAsocial authority 
upon the technical rationality of "science", by removing 
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the choice of goals from the citizen, presents a 
political choice between submitting to the imposition 
of values through contingent power relations and developing 
universal discursive forms for testing the validity 
claims of moral norms (p. 105). The "ideal speech 
situation" in other words is an ideal which can guide 
action. But it is precisely the relation between an 
"ideal" and any practice which it might "guide" which 
is so problematic. Weber's concept of the ideal is 
explicitly analytic: actual phenomena may be understood 
in terms of their variable distance from a Illogically 
deduced ll ideal type of that phenomenon. But the 
possibility of such a deduction rests on a restricted, 
instrumental view of rationality. Habermas's ideal, 
in contrast, is presented as a development of a Kantian 
imperative: from the constituent conditions for the 
possibility of consciousness and inquiry arise the 
political ideals of pure intersubjectivity, emancipated 
speech, and hence the critical analysis of social norms. 
The political arises directly from the analytic: to 
question the possibility of the Habermasian ideal is 
self-contradictory, since the question itself 
presupposes and expresses the necessity of the ideal 
whose necessity it purports to deny. Hence "the 
transcendental character of ordinary language ll 
(Haberrnas, 1976, p. 110): 
IIIn taking up a practical discourse, we un-
avoidably suppose an ideal speech situation that, 
on the strength of its formal properties, 
allows concensus only through generalizable 
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interests. A linguistic ethics has no need 
of principles. It is based only on fundamental 
forms of rational speech that we must always 
presuppose if we discourse at all". 
But does this normative ideal of emancipatory 
reason arise from engaging in the reflexive practices 
of theorizing or from the unreflexive communicative 
practices of the life-WOrld? This is a crucial question 
for exponents of action-research, who make the latter 
interpretation and thus claim that Habermas's ideal, 
though unattainable, provides a criterion and a direct 
ambition for the improvement of mundane professional 
practices: 
"In the real world, discourse is to some extent 
distorted or biassed by assyrnetrical power 
relations between participants. But one can 
make progress towards the ideal situation by 
identifying and coping with negative instances 
of distorted discourse". 
(Elliott, 1982a, p. 19). 
If this is the relation between ideal and actuality, 
between theory and practice, if theoretical ideals 
are posited as states of affairs which one can intelligibly 
but always unsuccessfully "progress towards", then social 
action is forever condemned to lamentable deficiency: 
theory will be conceived as normative, ideal types 
will be treated as moral aspirations (cf. Parsons on 
professionalism, see above, p. leo), and ironies 
in the inevitable Difference between the theoretic 
and the actual will not be "mastered ll as an analytic 
resource for grasping the contradictions of experience 
(see Chapter Three, p. lSI) but bemoaned as lapses 
of experience. 
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The intrinsic weaknesses of Habermas's argument 
have already been presented (see Chapter Three, p. ISS). 
The point to be made here, rather, is that the widespread 
invocation of Habermas by action-research writers rests 
on a misunderstanding. Habermas does ~ derive his 
ideal from everyday communicative practices among 
practitioners; when he uses the term "discourse", 
he specifies that he means the specific modes of talk 
in which the "naive" assumptions of everyday speech 
are critically topicalized (Habermas, 1974, p. 18). 
Thus, Habermas is concerned to articulate the emancipatory 
possibilities of critical analysis at the level of 
theory, which involves for example the recovery of 
unconscious determinants of (the) self-formative 
process" and the making explicit of general rule systems 
(Habermas, 1974, p. 22-3). Indeed he is explicitly 
dismissive of "the fashionable demand for a type of 
action-research" (ibid., p. 11). In other words, 
Habermas, unlike Elliott (see quotation on previous 
page) does not forget that symmetrical discourse is an 
ideal - in a Weberian sense - and thus a theoretical 
principle rather than an intelligible practical goal. 
It is because of this implication in Habermas's 
work that Heinz Moser, wishing to argue that action-
research makes a necessary contribution to "critical 
theory", is (apparently alone among writers on action-
research) strongly critical of Habermas. For Moser, 
Habermas's notion of emancipated discourse rests on a 
rationalized notion of consciousness (Moser, 1978, p. 99) 
and of history (p. 95) and on an over-optimistic view 
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of the possibilities for unforced concensus and 
individual autonomy (p. 100). Moser urges, rather, 
that "in discourse itself, power is still at work, 
compelling us without our noticing". (p. 97*) 
Hence, the discursive recognition of the "validity" of 
norms may either conceal "overpowering and irrational 
motives" or simply calculative tactics ( 99) p. . 
Further: 
"If one considers ... how humanity is actually 
enmeshed by the coercive relationships of 
society, and the individual devalued ••• it 
seems that Haberrnasian discourse overestimates 
itself. It sees itself as a counter-force 
to the concrete power relations of late capitalist 
society, and thereby forgets that, by restricting 
itself to a mere willingness to cooperate, it 
yields up all possibility for building opposition 
For this reason, discourse itself needs criteria 
which might prevent those taking part in discourse 
from introducing the ideological arguments of 
false consciousness" (p. 100)** 
* "1m Diskurs (ist) selbst noch Gewalt am Werk, 
die uns aufzwingt, ohne dass wir es bemerken". 
** Bedenkt man •.• die reale Verstrickung des 
Menschen in die gesellschaftlichen Zwangszusarnrnenhange 
und die Entwertung des Individuums ••• so scheint 
sich der Haberrnassche (sic) Diskurs selbst zu 
fibersch~tzen. Er betrachtet sich als Gegenmacht 
gegen die faktischen Herrschaftsverhaltnisse in 
der sp~tkapitalistischen Gesellschaft und fibersieht 
dabei, dass er selbst durch sein Beharren auf 
blosser Kooperationsbereitschaft, aIle M6glichkeiten 
zum Aufbau eines Widerparts aus der Hand gibt .•• 
Aus diesem Grunde braucht der Diskurs selbst Kriterien, 
welche verhindern, dass die Diskursteilnehrner 
ideologische Argumente des falschen Bewusstseins 
in den Diskurs aufnehmen". 
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Moser would thus not be surprised to find Elliott 
unable to put into practice the Habermasian ideal , 
and indeed he is critical of his own earlier attempts 
to list practical procedures for inquiry (p. 131). 
However, there are powerful ambiguities in Moser's 
formulation, of which he hardly seems aware. His 
presentation of individuals as "enmeshed" and "coerced" 
by "concrete power relations" makes it difficult to 
see how "ideology" could be avoided merely by framing 
discourse criteria. And, conversely, if ideology 
and false consciousness are embodied merely in 
"arguments", which might be recognized and excluded 
from discourse, then what possible meaning can be attached 
to "coercion" and "power"? It seems as if Moser's 
account rests upon precisely the purely rational 
notion of historical and psychic processes he criticises 
in Habermas. The explication of this ambivalence 
takes us back once more to the ever-present irony of 
determinist theories of the subjection of consciousness 
to its politico-cultural context: Moser, like so many 
other writers, wishes to present a strong version of 
the cultural determination of the mundane social actor 
and yet to exempt from this determination the social 
theorist (see Chapter Three, p. J '3 ~ ) • 
The constructive relevance of Habermas's work 
for action-research, I would argue, is that it presents 
a metatheory of investigation. His arguments concern-
ing language, intersubjectivity, rationality, and. the 
unconscious present the theoretical possibility of theory 
- 195 -
and of the autonomy of the theorizing Subject, which (as 
was argued in Chapter Three) is indeed an analytical 
requirement for action-research. Unlike the argument 
of the present work, however, Habermas is neither 
concerned with nor sympathetic to action-research's 
project. When action-research writers attempt to 
treat Habermas's metatheory as though it were (or 
could be) directly programmatic for action-research 
as a social practice, they are using Habermas's vocabulary 
of emancipation and dialogue as metaphors while claiming 
that such a vocabulary can, for action-research, be 
literal. Hence they fall into claims (for action-
research's "emancipatory" process, for example) which 
seem both idealistic boncerning the possibility of 
action-research's institutionalizability) and rationalistic 
(in relation to the complexity of the psyche (see 
Chapter Three, p. \\0 ) . It is this misuse of 
Habermasian arguments concerning ideals of speech, 
role relationships, and rationality which frequently 
leads action-research to oversimplify all three - to 
treat speech as literally relatable to facts (rather 
than as essentially reflexive and metaphoric), to 
treat symmetrical role relationships as a necessary 
concomitant of the process of theorizing (cf. Chapter 
Three, p.154-S)J and to treat "critical" rationality as 
instrumental and prescriptive (rather than as dialectical 
and playful - see Chapter Three, p.\~~). In short, 
by taking Habermas's theoretic ideal as a practical 
goal, action-research creates a mythic scenario for 
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emancipation rather than an analytic theory of 
investigation.* Hence "the improvement of professional 
practice", as an essential dimension of action-research's 
format for investigation, is itself presented in 
mythic terms - as the "removal of constraints" imposed 
by bureaucraticized roles, for instance - and thus it is 
to an analytical account of professionalism and its 
relation to bureaucracy that the argument now turns. 
Professional and Bureaucratic Practices: Dialectical 
Possibilities 
How can professionalism be understood as a potentially 
self-transformative set of dialectically related contra-
dictions, rather than as the inert and unitary ideal 
evoked by Parsons? Following on from the contradictions 
noted earlier (p. above) it is important to notice 
that professionalism regularly invokes not one but at 
least two "opposites". Firstly, professional work is 
not "trade": professionals are not supposed to be 
motivated by profit (but by service); they may not 
advertise for customers nor operate competitive pricing. 
Hence the professional's proclaimed commitment to the 
good of the client: the professional is the servant of 
the client's interests; their interaction is 
* This is the limitation of the work of Carr and 
Kernrnis (1983): their reliance on"" the general 
Habermasian framework pushes their version of 
"critical theory" towards an unreflexive political 
rhetoric whose grounds could easily be contested 
analytically by anyone who - unlike myself -
found its conclusions unwelcome (see pp. 180-4). 
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confidential: the professional is trusted to protect 
the client from investigation by police, tax-collector, 
life-insurance company, or even (controversially) by 
parent. Secondly - and in marked contrast - the 
professionals are not "amateurs"; they may accept and 
will indeed require payment for making an appearance; 
they have a skill and a living to make; they are 
committed, in the sense of serious: they are not 
"half-heartedly" amateurish, and can thus be relied upon 
to do an expert and effective job under difficult 
conditions. Hence a professional relationship is not 
concerned with persons but techniques: amateurs will 
perform for (or give services to) friends and relations 
for free: professionals will refuse to do so on 
principle: their expertise is only available to anyone 
who will pay. 
Thus, even without recourse to the Marxian critique 
of professionalism as an ideological disguise for the 
construction and exploitation of a cultural monopoly 
(see Larson, 1977, pp. 220-244) we have two very different 
versions of the professional authority (as an ethic 
or as an expertise) and of the professional relationship 
(as a commitment or as a technical service). This 
contrast is not one which needs to be denied (by the 
heroic stances described earlier in this chapter); 
nor, evidently, does it prevent the accomplishment of 
professional work with sufficient coherence for its 
mundane purposes. The argument is rather that to note 
the contradictions within the conventional auspices 
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of a mundane practice (given here as examples, with no 
pretension to exhaustiveness) is to note the opportunity 
for a questioning of the grounds of practice, ie. for 
the instigation of the type of questioning dialectic 
proposed at the end of Chapter Two as a general format 
for action-research's process. Such a process (as 
was made clear, see p. '1~) will not confront professional 
practices with their errors, nor will it prescribe 
an improvement on the basis of either an ethic or a 
technical authority: rather it will install within 
professional work a moment which topicalizes the 
reflexivity by which alone the complexities of professional 
judgements are handled. 
Focussing specifically on the contradictions within 
which professional judgements are carried out serves 
to make explicit that the normative forms in which 
judgements are presented as mundane accomplishments 
cannot be taken as literally descriptive of the practice 
of those judgements; judgements such as "higher" and 
"lower" orders of conceptualization (see p. \1£,. above) 
would be recast as problematic by the elaboration of 
the contradictory versions of the authority, and the 
relationships in which they are grounded. Similarly, 
given the grounding of communicative competences in 
the Self-Other dialectic (see Chapter One, p.1J) 
the elaboration of the reflexivity of professional 
judgements would render problematic a series of normative 
definitions and their attendant systems of authoritative 
decision-making, since the client's rationality would 
be recognized as a constitutive element in the 
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formulation of adequate practice. In this sense 
"the improvement of practice" would be bound up with 
an explicit grasp of the reflexive grounds for practice. 
This would not be the proposal of a move from "constraint" 
to "emancipation" (as Elliott would have it - see p. \10), 
but rather the recollection that practices are in 
principle grounded (as the condition of their intelligibi-
lity) in the intersubjective dialectic between self 
and other, between professional and client. This 
recollection would be a moment in the dialectic between 
theory and practice, action and research (see Chapter 
Two) and equally a moment in the dialectic between 
ideology and theory (see Chapter Three): in both 
cases the reflexivity of each moment provides for a 
dialectical self-transcendence, and thus prevents 
"crit.ique" becoming merely the assertion of an ideal 
against practice. 
Furthermore, we may recollect (from Chapter Two) 
that practice itself is intrinsically guided by a 
complex set of criteria for rationality and by a further 
complex set of interpretive procedures for the enactment 
of those criteria. If this is true analytically of 
action in general, then we will expect that professional 
practice (as a set of actions whose discursive elaboration 
is relatively accessible and widespread among practitioners) 
will certainly have available its' own resources for 
"improving upon" the literal invocation of its general 
rules ("higher" and "lower" concepts): such resources 
are mundanely presented by professionals as the 
"discretionary" quality of their practice, whereby 
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professionalism denies that a normative rule can exhaust 
the rational properties of professional work, but 
rather welcomes the recognition of the complexities 
which are glossed by such rules. More concretely, 
professionals deny that a single prescriptive rule 
can exhause the technical properties of the individual 
case, which thus always remains in need of specific 
diagnosis by the professional worker, within the 
complexities of a) the dialectical contradictions 
between different rules, and b) the reflexive process 
by which any rule or combination of rules is applied. 
(At this point we may note once more the significance 
for arguments about the improvability of practice of 
the analyses in Chapter Three concerning the Self, the 
possibility of theorizing, and the intersubjectivity 
of the therapeutic relationship). 
However, in emphasizing at this point the 
discretionary quality of professional work, as action's 
own auspices for analysis, we are perhaps in danger 
once more of formulating a "heroic" opposition between 
the action-researching professional and his or her 
"bureaucratic" role definition. It is thus important 
to emphasize now that bureaucratic roles, like professional 
practices, may be formulated in terms of a set of 
dialectical contradictions rather than as a unitary 
ideal type. 
Clearly, for Weber, bureaucracy represents the 
evolved institutional form for the ordering of social 
decision-making according to the canons of reason, 
justice, and authenticated knowledge. But Weber also 
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presents bureaucracy historically as the enforcement 
of centralized control: 
"The triumph of princely power and the 
expropriation of particular prerogatives (ie. of 
local feudal "estates") has everywhere signified 
at least the possibility, and often the actual 
introduction, of a rational administration". 
(Weber, 1964a, p. 133) 
Hence Weber emphasizes "a firmly ordered system of super-
and subordination in which there is a supervision of 
the lower offices by the higher ones" (Weber, 1964b, 
p. 465), and this is made possible because "the management 
of the office follows general rules, which are more or 
less stable, more or less exhaustive" (Weber, 1964b, 
p. 467). This does indeed emphasize the oppressive 
nature of institutional order, and in the end Weber 
seems to forget his own principle of the analytic 
status of ideal types, and finds himself in "despair" 
at the vision of combined "timidity" and "mechanization" 
in social affairs (Weber, 1964c, p. 473) which his own 
theory conjures up, not merely as a heuristic device 
but, apparently, as a description. 
But Garfinkel would have comforted Weber by 
reminding him that even if general rules are "stable" 
in themselves, they can never be "exhaustive" of the 
cases to which they purport to refer, and thus in 
principle bureaucrats cannot be "timid" because their 
work is not "mechanized": rather, they always require 
a specific confidence in their capacity for improvising 
the application of rules to cases. It is this sort 
of awareness which leads, for example, Selznick to 
argue that "Every organization creates an informal 
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structure" in which "professed goals" b t . are su s antlally 
"modified" by the "operational goals" of groups of 
workers within the organization (Selznick, 1964, 
pp. 477 -9) . 
However, this line of argument only serves to 
ameliorate the sense of bureaucracy as "constraint". 
In order to find an argument which establishes a clear 
contrast of principle, so that we may formulate 
bureaucracy itself in strictly dialectical terms, we 
can turn to Durkheim. Durkheim interprets the same 
historical processes of rationalization and industrializa-
tion which for Weber are the origin of "bureaucracy", 
as leading to the division of labour and thus to the 
development of "organic" social solidarity. For 
Durkheim this is the opposite of a historical move 
towards the subjugation of the individual to a centralized 
rule system: on the contrary, it represents the relative 
decline of the collective consciousness which a 
centralized rule system implies: under organic 
solidarity: 
Hence: 
"It is necessary- ... that the 'conscience 
collective' leaves open a part of the individual 
consciousness in order that special functions 
may be established there, functions which it 
cannot regulate" 
(Durkheim, 1972, p. 140 - my 
emphasis) . 
"The 'conscience cOllective' ... comes to consist 
of very general and indeterminate ways of thought 
and sentiment, which leaves room open for a 
growing variety of individual differences". 
(Durkheim, 1972, p. 145) 
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In a sense Durkheim's theory of organic 
solidarity itself presents a dialectic between individual-
ization and social coordination, in which interaction 
becomes necessarily more intense as its basis becomes 
more problematic. This in turn provides an interpretation 
of bureaucratic organizations as institutions where 
opportunities for discretionary judgement are increased 
by the specialization of functions, and thus where the 
integration of such functions becomes necessarily more 
and more a focus of concern as it becomes more questionable. 
Hence, bureaucracy's principle of hierarchical juris-
dictions is in a dialectical contradiction with its 
other principle of expertly qualified officials, 
especially if expertise (as "knowledge") is no longer 
taken to be a law-like corpus of warranted propositions 
but rather as a capacity for and experience of essentially 
reflexive interpretation. If rationality is, as 
Garfinkel argues, an inherently pluralistic set of 
possible interpretations, then the very notion of 
"legal-rational" authority immediately expounds a 
contradiction, since social rationality denies the 
possibility of general laws and thereby renders authority 
subject to a continuous process of individual inter-
pretation. 
In conclusion then, as with professionalism, 
bureaucracy is not a monolithic format for authority-as-
oppression, with which action-research's project of 
transformational development must needs do battle, but 
rather a context with its own developmental dialectic, 
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which thus offers to action-research its own inherent 
opportunity for the devolution of decision-making. 
Now, all this is not new: Bernstein's well-known 
work on education is explicitly presented as an inter-
pretation of largely bureaucratized institutions 
according to Durkheim's problematic of organic solidarity; 
and Bernstein ends the first of his papers on this theme 
by emphasizing that he is not contrasting "order" 
with "flux" nor lamenting "the weakening of authority" 
but rather exploring "changes in the forms of social 
integration" (Bernstein, 1971a, p. 169). It is in 
this spirit that Bernstein presents a change in the 
institutional order of the school from "closed" to 
"open" (Bernstein, 1971a, p. 169), from subject-based 
to across-subject teaching roles (ibid., p. 167), 
from vertical to horizontal relationships between 
teachers (Bernstein, 1971b, p. 62) and towards "increased 
discretion of the pupils" (ibid., p. 60). 
For Bernstein, following Durkheim, institutional 
order itself has become a problematic pattern of inter-
action, not a hierarchy of prescriptions. How ironic, 
then, that Peter Holly, in his diagrammatic representa-
tion quoted earlier (see p. 167), uses Bernstein's 
vocabulary to articulate not a Durkheimian but a crudely 
Weberian model of a prescriptive version of institutional 
life which action-research must "painfully" and , 
"cautiously" oppose. The particular irony is that 
Holly's vocabulary for the principles of action-research 
reproduces Bernstein's vocabulary for the basis of the 
institutional order, thereby undermining the very 
- 205 -
distinction which Holly wishes to put forward and thus 
implicitly and accidentally putting forward the counter-
suggestion which is the theme of this section: that 
the institutional order is in itself available to 
action-research's project. 
To avail itself of this opportunity, what action. 
research needs is not the oppositional "caution" 
recommended by Holly, but a grasp of the complex but 
ultimately enabling relationship between on the one 
hand the potentially reflexive interactive processes 
of institutional life and professional practice, and, on 
the other hand, the reflexive processes of action-
research's own dialectic between theory and practice. 
In this way action-research "improves" institutionalized 
practices by exploring to their uttermost limits the 
discretionary possibilities within which they are 
(institutionally as well as epistemologically) constituted. 
In this way, also, action-researchers may differentiate 
between those dimensions of their professional and 
institutional lives which are amenable to concrete 
projects for "improvement" and others which - determined 
by political and economic forces beyond any influence 
from within their immediate institutional setting -
must indeed be treated as "constraints" and thus as 
beyond the scope of the particular project. This 
argument is in its own way "cautiously" balanced 
between an emphasis on possibilities and an equal 
emphasis on limits: it would be beyond the scope of 
this work to attempt to envisage or to estimate the 
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likelihood of a world in which professional practitioners 
in all institutions were simultaneously pressing to their 
limits the possibilities inherent in their roles~ 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ACTION-RESEARCH AND THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY 
Versions of "Validity" 
The previous chapter began to engage with an issue 
which must be analytically necessary and indeed central 
for any project of formulating a mode of investigation, 
namely its criteria for validity. So far the argument 
has centred on only one aspect of action-research's 
problem of criteria - its aspiration to "improve" 
practice. In this chapter the argument will be broadened: 
it is concerned with action-research's general problem of 
how it might conceptualize "validity" in accordance with 
its own processes and inherent problematic, ie. independently 
of such echoes of positivism as: accounts which purport 
to correspond "accurately" to an external object world, 
and interpretations which aspire to be "generalizable" 
propositions. 
Generalizability is of course the direct claim with 
which positivism challenges its rivals: its hypotheses 
are derived from "laws"; its experimental method produces 
statements of "significance" concerning "representative" 
populations, so that in turn its results can be claimed 
as potentially "law-like" or, at least, essentially 
"replicable". Action-research, by eschewing the 
axiomatic generality of empirical laws and statistical 
formats, opens itself to the charge that its validity 
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is limited to the concrete instances in which it is 
constituted. This is another way of accusing action-
research of failing to be more than a mundane action 
strategy, rather than an alternative, non-positivist 
research strategy. 
It is for this reason, perhaps, in order to 
authorize its validity claims, that action-research 
has claimed to draw upon the "established" methodological 
tradition of symbolic interactionism (see Elliott, 
]9S2b, p. 31). Hence also the importance of the 
notion of "case study" as a format for action-research 
inquiry (Elliott, 1975b, p. 356), which also enables 
action-research to claim kinship with institutionalized 
social science, ego "anthropology" (see Walker, 19S0, 
p. 33). The purpose of this chapter then is to analyze 
the forms of general validity which may be conceived, 
or which action-research as claimed, for the 
interpretation of the specific action contexts with 
which action-research is concerned. 
Elliott's article in the Journal of Curriculum 
Studies (Elliott, 1975b) presents action-research's 
claim, in a passage which raises many of the central 
questions, and it will thus serve as a starting point for 
the analysis of (in turn) "naturalistic theory", "concrete 
description", and "narrative form", as versions of 
"validity" for action-research accounts: 
"In explaining "what is going on", action-research 
tells a "story" about the event by relating it 
to a context of mutually interdependent 
contingencies, ie. events which "hang together" 
because they depend on each other for their 
occurrence. This "story" is sometimes called 
a case study. The mode of explanation in case 
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study is naturalistic rather than formalistic 
Relationships are "illuminated" by concrete . 
description rather than by formal statements 
of causal laws and statistical correlations. 
Case study provides a theory of the situation 
but it is a naturalistic theory embodied in 
narrative form, rather than a formal theory 
stated in propositional form" 
(op. cit., p. 356). 
"Naturalistic Theory" 
By the brevity of his presentation, Elliott seems 
to suggest that this could be a taken-for-granted 
category or a methodological device, rather than a 
contentious assertion which proposes to annihilate 
a central philosophical issue. At the very least it 
represents a grand epistemological irony and / or a 
methodological dilemma: how could theory be natural? 
How could nature be theoretical? How could either claim 
be grounded? Nevertheless, the writers in the symbolic 
interactionist tradition which Elliott seems here to be 
invoking also treat the elision as achievable. For 
example Schatzman and Strauss, in Field Research: 
strategies for a natural sociology (1973) - often used as 
a methodological text by action-research practitioners -
claim that it is a basic property of "the human scene" 
that social action is always an outcome of actors' 
theories or "perspectives" (op. cit., p. 5) and that the 
researcher is a naturalist" by direct analogy with the 
researcher in "zoology, archeology, and geology" 
(ibid., p. 14) in that he works by observing "the 
natural properties of his field" (ibid., p. vii), namely 
actors' perspectives. This seems at first to be the 
fairly simple point that it is the task of the researcher 
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to discover actor's rationalities, so that it is those 
actors in their "natural" world who are the a'rbi ters 
of what is to count as an adequate understanding. 
This would be a straightforward relativist argument, and 
it would coincide with Elliott's suggestion, at another 
point in the article quoted above, that action-research 
"interprets Iwhat is going on l from the point of view 
of those acting in the problem situation" and indeed 
"in the same language as they used" (Elliott, OPe cit., 
p. 356). 
However, the apparently non-ironic invocation of 
zoological parallels accomplished by the category 
"naturalistic theory" is indicative of a larger and 
even more problematic claim. In their account of 
"naturalistic" inquiry Schatzman and Strauss admit that 
researchers will begin their work with concepts 
("classes") presumed in advance on the basis of an 
academic discipline, but that the process of "observation" 
will make available the "classes" used by the members 
of the situation under observation. These two sets 
of "classes" will be synthesized in the course of "the 
experience of observation" (op. cit., p. 112) and it is 
specifically this synthesized set of categories which 
is termed "theoretica I " . They conclude: "thus we 
can anticipate the researcher will continue shifting 
his grounds as he creates or changes his classes, until 
all his presumed classes are displaced by those based 
b 'd 113) To suggest, in this upon observa tion" (i 1 ., p. . 
. bl f om observation is way, that concepts can be derlva e r 
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to present a metaphysics of naturalism, in which theory 
is encapsulated by nature. The rhetoric of the naturalist 
is used to suggest the possibility of an account which 
has "nature's" authority, thereby implying metaphorically 
what they analytically deny: that the human world is 
a world of objects available to inspection. The 
symbolic interactionist perspective (to which Schatzman 
and Strauss ostensibly subscribe) is, on the contrary, 
that the world of social actors is a world of subjects 
and their interacting "perspectives": the further 
interaction between actors' perspectives and researchers' 
perspectives can thus in no way be reduced to "the 
observation of nature", but is rather a central analytical 
problem in formulating the category of "theory" itself, 
and (as Becker himself says, in "Whose Side Are We On"?-
Becker, 1971) a dilemma in the social relations of 
validity claims. 
That symbolic interactionism and action~research 
should thus use the positivist metaphor of nature's 
passive open-ness to observation, when both wish also 
to emphasize the independent interpretive competence 
of the social actor, is highly suggestive. It relates 
to a failure to articulate fully the relationship 
between science and common-sense and, in particular, a 
failure to come to terms with positivism's powerful 
challenge in this respect, which is of crucial significance 
for the issue of generalizable validity. 
Zetterburg's argument (Zetterburg, 1962) 
~e 'h' between social theory and concerning A relatlons lP 
social actors' relevancies offers an instructive 
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contrast. For Zetterburg social theory is a set of 
general laws, ego "A person tends to modify his 
communications .•. so that they approximate those found 
among his associates" (op. cit., p. 81), and specific 
action contexts can be understood at the level of 
theory by being classified under a "systematic" 
combination of these laws (ibid., p. 132). "Common-
sense" on the other hand is "unable to make the right 
combination of ideas" (p. 132). Thus for Zetterburg, 
"case study" is merely "descriptive" and "intuitive": it 
lacks "analysis of the principles at work" (pp. 27-8). 
But Zetterburg's analytical problem is that he treats 
the relationship between law and instance as deductive -
the practitioner can deduce an understanding of the specific 
from the lesson of the law (see Zetterburg, OPe cit., 
p. 166 ff.: "The Calculation of Solutions"). But 
this is to ignore the process of inductive generalization 
by which the laws were originally formulated. This 
process is acutely complex even for natural science: 
for social science it is the problematic for the whole 
enterprise since it raises the central theoretical and 
methodical issue of the relationship between observers' 
categories and those of the social actors being observed. 
In thus treating "induction" as an available procedure, 
whose resources can be glossed as established, Zetterburg 
ignores more or less every sense of social science's 
specific challenge, and in particular - of course -
the issue of its inevitable reflexivity. 
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In formulating "grounded theory" or "naturalistic 
inquiry" (Denzin, 1978, p. 6) symbolic interactionism 
has tried to remedy Zetterburg's "problem", but has 
failed to do so because it has retained a positivist 
notion of theory construction as organized according to 
a classificatory logic. We have already seen that for 
Schatzman and Strauss "analysis" is a process of 
"class-ification" of instances under concepts, as though 
"analysis" could be a process of reducing language's 
metaphoricity to literalness. But such literalness 
could only be a prescription or a pragmatic interpretation 
(see Garfinkel, 1967, p. 192), and thus not an achievement 
of analysis, but itself the occasion for the analysis 
of that reductive process. Denzin makes the issue 
even clearer. He is "committed ... to theory that is 
grounded in the behaviours, languages, definitions, 
attitudes, and feelings of those studied" (Denzin, 
1978, p. 6) and yet also to "processes of sampling, 
generalization, (ibid., p. 19) and measurement" (p. 24), 
and to providing "causal explanations (p. 16) which are 
"repeatable and reliable" (p. 22). But if "languages, 
definitions, attitudes, and feelings" CQuid be sampled and 
measured, they would have to be formulated as observable 
behaviours, and this would dramatize Denzin's lack of 
a reflexive awareness; for we would then need analytic 
grounds for the crucial differentiation between those 
"languages and definitions" which are to be measured 
and the "languages and definitions" by means of which 
the measurement would be accomplished. Otherwise 
theory and the object of theory ("commonsense", say) 
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would remain undifferentiated. Zetterburg himself 
notes that each of the "theoretical" generalities he 
adduces is itself "well known to common sense" 
(Zetterburg, H., 1962, p. 132). Thus the notions 
of "system" and "law", in terms of which he presents 
the analytic Difference at issue, are essentially unaddressed 
metaphors for theory's claim to authority. As metaphors 
they evoke theory's Difference as a set of interesting 
problems; namely the relation between "law" as a social 
prescription and "law" as a general truth. As metaphors, 
"law" and "system" evoke social science's aspiration, its 
sense of its own Difference (from commonsense) as its 
ideal of "validity"; however, as Zetterburg presents 
them, they are proposed as rules-of-thumb, which could 
operate the Difference to whidh they refer as though 
it were a mere methodological device. 
For symbolic interactionism and action-research 
to address the irony inherent in "naturalistic theory", 
the question of general validity would have to be 
approached in terms qui te other than as a process of 
classification by progressive abstraction. Such a 
process denies in principle the need to address the 
grounds for its own selectivity, since it presents 
itself as having the warrant of an algorithm, and 
denies the creative doubtfulness of the web of metaphors 
which alone make classification possible. 
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Illumination by Concrete Description 
Ironically, the notion of explanation as 
"illumination" is taken by Elliott from a paper (Parlett 
and Hamilton, 1977) in which "evaluation as illumination" 
is presented as diametrically opposed to what the writers 
call "the agricultural-botanical paradigm", ie. as a 
rejection of the analogy between the human and the 
biological sciences which informs th~ "naturalism" 
of Schatzman and Strauss. The basis of the distinction 
for Parlett and Hamilton is that, whereas innovatory 
programmes in agriculture can utilize an "experimental 
testing" format for evaluation, educational programmes 
cannot do so (see Chapter Two above) . Instead: "the 
task is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
complex reality (or realities) surrounding the programme, 
in short to 'illuminate'" (Parlett and Hamilton, 1977, 
p. 21). Illumination thus involves an account of the 
"milieu" (op. cit., p. 11) surrounding the specific 
programme, and how therefore the latter is affected 
by "a network or nexus of cultural, social, institutional 
and psychological variables" (ibid., p. 11). Hence 
Elliott's emphasis (see above, pp.1.08-<t) on relating 
"the event" to "its context", and on the description of 
these "relationships". Thus, whereas the single 
variable focus of the experimental method leaves the 
event "obscure" (to follow up the metaphor), light is 
shed by tracing the "complexity" of which it is a part 
(Parlett and Hamilton, OPe cit., p. 11). Such complexity 
cannot be tested or measured directly, so "the primary 
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concern (of illuminative evaluation) is with description 
and interpretation" (ibid., p. 10). The question then 
becomes: how can "description and interpretation" be 
methods for the creation of valid accounts of this 
complexity? This is a crucial theme for writers on 
action-research in general and writers on case study in 
particular. 
For Midwinter "interpretative description" is 
"the attempted medium for relating the results of the 
(action-research) project" (Midwinter, 1972, p. 52), as 
a way of meeting "the need to balance action and research" 
(ibid., p. 54). For Midwinter the justification for 
"interpretative description" is that it is compatible 
with the rapidly changing, flexible, and interactive 
procedures of action-research (ibid., p. 53): he 
admits that this "is not often academic method research" 
(sic) (p. 52) but his whole argument for action-research 
is that inquiry is too urgent to be left to the slow 
pace of "theory-based" research (p. 51). He goes on 
to quote E.H. Carr on "the continuous process of 
interaction and the unending dialogue between facts 
and their interpreters" (p. 53). In other words, 
"interpretation" can be "valid" precisely because it 
allows the structure of experience to proceed uninterrupted. 
But this would return us to our original problem (see 
p. tOB, above): what forms of reflection does action-
research add to the pragmatic reflection which is the 
basis of mundane action? This is particularly important 
for Midwinter, since his projects and the case studies 
which report them are all predicated upon a specific 
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(I h t . 1'" d 1 f" . t eore lca 1 ea 0 cornrnunlty education", and thus 
require a principled basis for evaluative judgement if 
they are to constitute a form of inquiry at all, rather 
than a managerial process of "implementation". 
Midwinter's "anti-academic" emphasis is at 
variance with Parlett and Hamilton, for whom the method 
of "description and interpretation" places educational 
evaluation "unambiguously within the ... anthropological 
paradigm" (Parlett and Hamilton, OPe cit., p. 10) 
which also includes "participant observation research 
in sociology" (ibid., p. 7). Now these traditions 
of inquiry do have a basis for claims to general 
validity, and this basis is (again in contrast to 
Midwinter's emphasis on speed and non-intrusiveness) 
the comprehensive, painstaking variety of the investi-
gative process. Thus Denzin emphasizes "triangulation 
of methods" (Denzin, 1978, p. 21), Glazer and Strauss 
(1967) emphasize the need for a continuously "comparative" 
analysis and Becker stresses the importance of checking 
interpretations against possible negative instances 
(Becker, 1971, pp. 31-2). It is this emphasis which 
is found in the work of Rob Walker, who is concerned 
in general to relate the case study tradition in social 
science to educational research with a direct commitment 
to change professional practice. For example, he says 
that anthropology succeeds in preserving complexity 
of meaning through a research process which is highly 
time consuming (Walker, 1977, p. 18), and, in another 
paper: "Long term study is justified in terms of the 
need to determine areas of significance and to check the 
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reliability and consistency of data" (Walker, 1980, 
p. 30). 
At this point we can see, however, that the notion 
of validity being presented here presupposes a correspond-
ential conception of knowledge. If "validity" 
resides in the "complexity" of the factors influencing 
a situation, ie. if the aim of inquiry is to "describe" 
this complexity, then the longer the time spent in doing 
so, and the more varied the sources of information, the 
greater the chance that the resulting "interpretation" 
will correspond to the complexity it describes. But 
this returns the problem of adequate understanding to 
the infinite number of variables, which Parlett and 
Hamilton recognized as undermining the feasibility of 
the positivist paradigm they rejected, but which also under-
mines their own project of "description". Elliott 
himself (see the quotation on pp.'~3~, above) refers to 
"a context ... of events which 'hang together' because 
they depend on each other for their occurrence"; 
but how would such dependence be knowable except by 
invoking those same "causal laws" which he rejects? 
"Illumination by concrete ... description" evokes 
the ancient metaphor of knowledge as light, but to 
propose that by means of "description" the object of 
knowledge is "illuminated" does not formulate the process 
of knowledge; rather, it presupposes its accomplishment: 
to call, the process "illumination" presupposes that what 
is being shed is, indeed, light. 
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It is particularly important that action-research 
should be able to dissociate itself from a positivist 
notion of correspondential description, since as 
Walker himself goes on to argue (following Midwinter at 
this point), the time constraints of an inquiry which 
is intended to be of direct value to practitioners 
mean that description which is adequate in positivist 
terms can never be achieved before the situation itself 
changes (Walker, 1980, pp. 31-2). Underlying Walker's 
argument is the general principle of dialectical under-
standing (see chapter one, p. 1. a ) which wou ld make 
~ny project for the exhaustive description of phenomena 
self-contradictory: its implicit ambition of achieving 
finality is incompatible with the temporal, developmental 
quality of its object. Further: a recognition of 
the reflexivity of language allows us to argue that 
description cannot, in principle, merely "correspond" 
with the phenomenon described. 
How, then, have exponents of educational action-
research and educational case-study attempted to formulate 
"description" in terms other than Elliott's implicitly 
positivist version? Robert Stake presents "description" 
as a necessarily intersubjective process, with its own 
inherent principle of generalizability: "Our methods 
of studying human affairs need to capitalize upon the 
natural powers of people to experience and to under-
stand" (S take, 1980, p. 66). Understanding and experience 
involve "natU'Falistic generalization", which is a 
process whereby "intuitive" expectations based on 
"tacit knowledge" enable "a full and thorough knowledge 
of the particular, recoqnizinq it in new and foreign 
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contexts" (ibid., p. 69). Hence, if "the target case 
is properly described (p. 70) ... readers recognize 
essential similarities to cases of interest to them , 
(and thus) they establish the basis for naturalistic 
generalization" (p. 71). "Nature" here is no longer 
the nature which the "naturalist" observes, but in which 
he participates, as a member of a shared, culturally 
and linguistically constituted reality. In this 
sense Stake's argument has links with Hegel's analysis 
of the generalizing property of language (quoted in 
chapter one, see p. ~l ). However, whereas this 
intersubjective and generalizing property of the symbol 
is for Stake a methodical resoucrce, for Hegel it 
presents an irreducibly problematic quality: concrete 
objects cannot be referred to except through the 
universalism of language; the ontology of the concrete 
is thus a "whirling circle", and "it just is not possible 
for us ever to ... express in words a sensuous being 
that we MEAN" (Hegel, 2977, p. 79, p. 60). Indeed, 
if the issue of generalization were as straightforward 
as Stake suggests, then his argument would apply to any 
descriptive communication, and we would still lack 
grounds for inquiry's claim to be other than mundane 
interaction. For Stake, the complexity of the 
symbol is an affirmative answer to the question: 
can concrete meanings be generalizable? For Hegel, 
in contrast, this complexity poses the question: 
how can generalization be related to the concrete? 
Addressing this issue, Eisner presents the notion 
of "thick description", which "aims at describing the 
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meaning or significance of behaviour as it occurs in 
a cultural network saturated with meaning", and which 
"also aims at using language in a way so vivid that it 
enables the reader to participate vicariously in the 
quality of life that characterizes the events being 
described. It is in this sense that educational 
crl'ticism is an art form" (El'sner 1977 p 97) , ,. . 
A similar argument (linking description with aesthetic 
form and with an effect of "vicarious" experience) is 
made by Whitehead and Foster (1984, p. 44). The various 
ways in which aesthetic qualities have been invoked 
as part of a declaration against positivism will be 
the topic of the next section; meanwhile it is notable 
that for Eisner, as for Stake, "description" is not 
the transmission of exhaustive information, but involves 
the dialectical participation of writer and reader 
in a shared symbolic culture, and is thus constituted 
in the transcendental properties of language. However, 
it is clear that these properties are much too super-
ficially presented by Eisner as "vividness", and that 
"vicariousness" (as a claim for the effect of such 
vividness) is either exaggerated or merely cryptic. 
Both "vividness" and "vicariousness" are glosses for 
the intersubjective dialectics of language's effectiveness: 
how such effectiveness may be either sought or invoked 
as a criterion for validity remains to be analyzed. 
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Theory Embodied as Narrative 
In the passage originally quoted on pp.'oI-'J above, 
Elliott suggests that it is by constructing a "story" 
that the case studies of action research programmes 
find coherence, whereby contingencies "hang together" 
and "events" are related to their "context". In this 
way "theory is embodied in narrative form". Similarly 
Kemmis suggests "case studies work by example rather 
than by abstract argument . . . just as Tolstoy's theory 
of history is embedded in the ~tory of War and Peace" 
(Kemmis S., 1980, pp. 136-7). How might a theory be 
embedded in a story? McDonald and Walker declare: "Case 
study is the way of the artist, who achieves greatness 
when, through the portrayal of a single instance 
locked in time and circumstance, he communicates enduring 
truths about the human condition. For both scientist 
and artist, content and intent emerge in form". 
(McDonald and Walker, 1975, p. 3). The notion of an 
enduring truth within the specific instance is focussed 
in the idea of the "typical", and they cite Zola, the 
"naturalist", who achieved "scientific generalization" 
by "carefully researching the factual settings ... 
(and) .•. creating characters to represent the social 
type" (ibid., p. 3). This would make of Zola a 
"documentary"novelist, and McDonald and Walker do 
indeed also cite the "documentary" as a possible format 
for the presentation of case studies (p. 9). But 
both the documentary and the naturalistic novel raise 
the question: how are certain events and charaters 
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deemed to be "typical"? And this question is crucial 
if we wish to consider how Zola's "factual" research 
created social types rather than concrete reportage, 
and, in general, by what process either fiction or 
documentary can structure particular experiences into 
forms which might aspire to a validity beyond those 
particulars. 
~ Lukacs begins to answer this question through a 
distinction between "Naturalism" (as "mere" reportage) 
and "Realism", as the selection of detail through 
criteria of significance relating to an overall 
perspective (Lukacs, 2964, p. 51, p. 56). This "perspective" 
is embodied in a "typology" of significant, typical actors 
(e "t-ral 
ie. "characters", who thus act out the~meaning of the 
narrative as i t.s II p lot II In other words: "Characters 
are not in a novel; they constitute it, just as a 
typology a range of hypothetical possibilities -
constitutes one form of sociological theory. In both 
cases we are presented with a series of hypotheses 
set up in order to investigate the nature of the world" 
(Winter R., 1975, p. 34). For this argument the 
theoretical problem then becomes the origin and the 
grounds for the "perspective" which operates as the 
criterion of relevance. Lukacs relates it to a 
positively known "history", and he is in general 
opposed to the reflexive turn of "modernist" fiction 
which addresses the grounds of the writer's perspective 
as a central issue. On the other hand McDonald and 
Walker point to the issue without engaging it: 
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"Clearly, representativeness is an important consideration 
... instance and abstraction go hand in hand in an 
iterative process of cumulative growth" (McDonald and 
Walker, 1978, p. 4). "Hand in h d" " . an , accumulatlon", 
and "growth" are metaphors for the desirability of a 
theoretical relationship between instance and abstraction 
but do not specify what this relationship might be. 
The argument so far has presented a parallelism 
between positivist social science and realist fiction, 
a parallel which enables Becker to propose the valuable 
contribution of "Life Histories" to the "mosaic" of 
available "data" (Becker, 1971, pp. 70, 72) and to suggest 
that the sociologist's hypotheses can be inspired by 
reading novels as well as by reading sociological 
theory (ibid., pp. 21-3). But this parallel, although 
it rescues description from mere data collection, 
simply interposes a third term, "typology" or 
"perspective", to bridge the gap between "narrative" 
and "theory": the theoretic processes which might be 
involved remain unaddressed. In particular, it does 
not address the grounds of the analytical work carried 
out by the producer of a documentary in selecting 
interviewees, settings, and background "information", 
nor that of the fiction writer in devising a set of 
characters and their interaction in a narrative. Rather 
the notion of "typicality" is used as an unexplicated 
resource for generalization, a resource which can be 
treated as available for two reasons: 1) by reliance 
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upon what Stake calls "naturalistic generalization" , 
which the symbolic process itself seems to facilitate 
as soon as the symbol is treated as non-problematic, 
divorced from the reflexive issue of its invocation; 
ii) by reliance on the rationalist model of action 
invoked by both Weber and Schutz to create "ideal types" 
for actors' perspectives. In other words, the documentary 
and realist fiction are examples of how generalization 
from the concrete can be treated as achievable through 
cultural convention - the "vivid" example, the "typical" 
illustration. It is precisely the grounds for these 
conventions - the grounds for the possibility of 
generalization - which are not addressed. 
It is an indication of the significance of these 
issues for action-research that Walker has attempted 
to elaborate a methodological link between fiction 
and research, in an article called "On the Uses of 
Fiction in Educational Research", (Walker, 1981). 
Walker suggests, following Terry Denny ("Story Telling 
as a First Step in Educational Research"), that the 
format of a story can "communicate the general spirit 
of things" which is true to what people "mean" rather 
than what they merely (according to a tape-recorder) 
"say" (Walker, 1981, p. 155). But how is this achieved, 
7) He suggests ·. "A story asks Walker (op. cit., p. 15 • 
sets limits, it controls what the writer lets the reader 
see. h " In this sense a story is analogous to a t eory 
(ibid., p. 157). But this is, of course, to use a 
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prescriptive version of theory, which is alien to 
action-research and to "grounded theory", both of which 
desire to generate theory from the actions of participants. 
Walker's failure to consider any but a positivist 
theory of knowledge or any but a realist form of fiction 
finally leads him to say: "The attraction of fictional 
forms ..• is that they offer a license to go beyond 
what, as an evaluator / researcher, you can be fairly 
sure of knowing" (ibid., p. 163), and to propose that 
fictional forms can be "adopted" by a case study researcher 
as "a means of disguise" (ibid., p. 159), so that he 
can report his data-gathering while preserving its 
confidentiality. In this way, since he has no 
principled basis for adoressing the theoretic quality 
of fiction, fiction's particular form of truth, Walker 
cannot follow up his earlier statement that "a story 
is analogous to a theory" except in the superficial sense 
that a theory, like a story, is an observer's point 
of view. Hence fiction is finally aligned in opposition 
to "real" knowledge, as a form of "licensed" subjectivity. 
Fiction is not itself a knowledge-constitutive formi 
hence it can be "used" strategically in relation to 
knowledge, which is constituted as "objective", presumably, 
on other grounds. What is thus in urgent need of 
consideration is the sense in which fiction constitutes 
knowledge through its own forms, ie. fiction as a 
structuring of reality, fiction as a reflexive structuring 
of the relation between subject, object, and symbol. 
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This involves questioning precisely the conventions 
concerning art, science, reality, and knowledge, on 
which scientific positivism and aesthetic realism both 
rely. 
Action-Research and the Validity of the Concrete 
So far I have considered three aspects of action-
research's quest for a principle of "validity" which 
might guide its accounts of social situations. The 
argument has been, that the notion of "naturalistic" 
theory needs to be recast in terms of the reflexivity 
of theory and the metaphoricity of language, that the 
notion of "concrete description" raises the issue of 
the relation between the general and the concrete in 
terms which necessitate a dialectical theory of inter-
subjectivity, cu,lture, and symbolization, and that the 
notion of "narrative-as-theory" cannot simply utilize 
the assumptions of realism, but requires also an 
awareness of the reflexivity of aesthetic structuring. 
In the final section of this chapter (p. below) these 
arguments will be developed in a more positive and 
detailed form. But in order to prepare for that argument 
the next two sections will consider in general terms 
the relation between action-research's requirement 
of non-positivist formulations of validity and the 
principles of 1) reflexivity and 2) dialectics. 
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Action-Research, Validity, Reflexivity 
In Chapter One the reflexive quality of symbolization 
was emphasized, and it was argued that it is by addressing 
(rather than glossing) this feature that acts of 
communication (ranging from the spoken comment and the 
anecdote to the novel and the social research project) 
can attain a form of "completeness" and thus of 
"adequacy" . * Reflexivity was taken to be the under-
lying structure of the relation between consciousness 
and its objects (including of course, and in particular, 
"other" consciousnesses). Reflexivity (it was argued) 
is conventionally glossed, leaving communication open 
to the cultural contingencies of "bias", ie. the 
political and psychological pressures which socially 
distribute the plausibility and authority of interpreta-
tions. Such pressures cannot be abolished, although it 
is precisely the claim of positivism to do so by means 
of methodology, and thereby to transform interpretation 
into scientific knowledge. Rather it is by analyzing 
the irreducibly reflexive dimension of communicative 
acts (including such analyses themselves) that their 
grounds are revealed. "Validi ty" is thereby approached 
by taking as a topic the form and nature of communication 
itself, ie. the "conditions of its possibility", (see 
Chapter One, p. 1 ). "Bias" is thus neither glossed 
nor abolished but rather confronted, through anan~ytically 
* I am indebted to Paul Filmer for this point. 
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"complete" examination of the theoretical basis of the 
communicative act in the general (reflexive) structure 
of the relation between subject, symbOl, and object. 
Validity, in other words, becomes a quality of the inter-
pretive process whose grounds are adequately theorized, 
rather than a quality of a particular interpretation 
which itself can claim to be everyone's interpretation. 
How does this relate to action-research? Action-
research certainly recognizes the importance of its 
own process. Does that mean that it envisages the 
need for reflexive awareness? 
Lippett says: "Probably the best resource every 
group has for studying the problems and techniques of 
human relations is the life of the group itself" 
(Lippett, 1948, p. 110). However, this seems merely 
to point to the group as a conveniently available 
"example": the "life" of the group is said to exemplify 
the problems of human relations: a reflexive analysis 
would note rather that in attempting to address "the 
problems of human relations" those same problems would 
manifest themselves which would then raise the topic: 
"the problems of attempting to address the problems of 
human relations". 
Elliott, in the paper quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter, refers to criteria guiding the process 
of action-research by saying: "Action-research ... can 
only be validated in unconstrained dialogue" 
1978b, p. 356). He goes on to specify: 
(Elliott, 
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"The participants must have free access to the 
researcher's data, interpretations, accounts 
etc. and "the researcher" must have free acc~ss 
to "what is going on" ... Action 7research 
cannot be undertaken properly in the absence 
of trust established by fidelity to a mutually 
agreed ethical framework governing the collection 
use and release of data". (pp. 356-7) 
For McDonald and Walker (1975) the process is one of 
negotiation: the case-study worker does not produce 
one surnrnative interpretation but rather engages in a 
negotiating process: "the evaluator acts as broker in 
exchanges of information between differing groups" 
(op. cit., p. 7). For Elliott the "process" is 
, 
constituted in an "ethical framework", whereas for McDonald 
and Walker there is also a related political dimension: 
the "process" they outline is termed "democratic" 
evaluation, which they say is predicated on the notions 
of "confidentiality", "negotiation", "accessibility", and 
"the right to know" (ibid., p. 7). In both cases the 
process of investigation does indeed begin to be the 
topic of grounding principles, in which the epistemological 
adequacy of an account is described in terms of the 
interpersonal conditions of its possible production. 
However, both Elliott and McBonald and Walker formulate 
the investigative process at the level of mundane and 
rhetorical prescriptions which fail to consider the 
further reflexive processes by which such mundane rules 
would have to be interpreted. How would an adequate 
<!egree of "faithfulness to an ethical framework" be 
decided? How accessible is "accessible"? What are 
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the structure and (inevitable) limits of "a right to know"? 
In remaining at this level, these writers rely for 
their intelligibility upon the glossing procedures which 
a reflexive analysis would take as its topic. They 
have attempted to provide concrete answers, injunctions, 
and a method, where a reflexive analysis would provide 
questions, dilemmas, and a redirected problematic. 
However, another writer, Kemmis, does invoke the 
principle of reflexivity more explicitly: "The insights 
reached through case study are impermanent (they) 
must therefore be treated historically. Any useful 
social science is reflexive, and must be treated as 
such" (Kemmis, 1980, p. 133). For this to be more 
than an invocation, however, "history" itself would 
have to be formulated reflexively, rather than being 
treated (as it so often is within such arguments) as 
a taken-for-granted causal origin. More precisely 
Kemmis says: 
"In reporting the study, the case study worker 
demonstrates how, in his own case as a cognitive 
subject, the imagination of the case and the 
invention of the study have exerted controlling 
inf I uences on one another" (ibid., p. 126). 
Kemmis calls this a "~ialectical process" involving 
the subject, the object (ie. "the case"), and the method 
(ie. "the study") (ibid., p. 124). This, he says, 
is "a new perspective" which preserves "the interdeterrnin-
acy of knowledge" as a constructive alternative to the 
untenable claims of positivism (p. 117-9). 
However, Kemmis's formulation presents an 
interesting ambiguity. On the one hand he proposes a 
cognitive subject who "imagines" and "invents", and yet 
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the very activity of exerting the power of imagination 
and invention seems to constitute the subject once 
more in terms of "control" and "influence". This 
could only be addressed in terms of a reflexive theory 
of symbolization in general and of language in particular, 
which is exactly what Kemmis's paper lacks. On the 
contrary he oscillates between formulations of the 
subject as a master of language ("In all knowing, the 
knower .•. brings to bear his language and perceptual 
habits" - p. 108) and references to Wittgenstein (ibid., 
p. 101, p. 135) where language is an independent structure 
which masters the subject, by means of "conventions" 
and "games" (p. 135). By thus reducing the complex 
reflexivity of language to an unaddressed dichotomy, 
Kemmis can only imply the parameters of the reflexive 
awareness which must underlie a non-positivist process 
of inquiry, ie. imagination and control, indeterminacy 
and validity, contingency and necessity. He leaves us 
with the problem of how such a reflexive awareness 
could be formulated: analytically, in order to conceive 
of that form of validity which is compatible with the 
indeterminacy of knowlege; and yet descriptively, as 
a form of theorizing to w~ich an action-research study 
could aspire. 
In previous Chapters I have made two suggestions 
concerning a possible reflexive dimension to action-
research - both embodying the form of the question -
the mutual questioning of action and theory (Chapter Two) 
and the mutual questioning of professional and client 
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(Chapter Four) • In examining the nature of the 
"validi ty" wi th which reflexl' Vl' ty 'ht b mlg e concerned, 
it is once more the possibilities of the questioning 
mode of thought I wish to explore. Heidegger says 
that to understand "a thinker" is "to take up his 
thought's quest and pursue it to the core of his thought's 
problematic". In this way, he continues, "we are taking 
a way of questioning (Heidegger's emphasis) on which 
the problematic alone is accepted as the unique habitat 
and locus of thinking" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 185). 
Now, whereas questioning is taken to be the quintessence 
of "thinking", Heidegger's whole effort in the second 
half of What is Called Thinking is an elaborate dismantling 
of the syntactical structure of the assertion, in order 
to reveal the thinking which asserting conceals and, 
layer upon layer, glosses. In this he seems to be 
engaging directly with Hegel's problem (already cited): 
"It is not possible for us ever to say, or express 
in words, a sensuous being that we MEAN". In this 
respect both writers seem to suggest an argument that 
the "performative" functions of language's indicative, 
non-questioning mode (noted by Austin: How to Do Things 
With Words, 1962) constitute the problematic nature of 
language as an analytical means. To assert a meaning 
is to take part in the mundane world of unexplicated 
action (listed by Austin as: giving verdicts, exercising 
power, making commitments, and, in general, adopting 
rOles) . Extending this argument, then, one might 
suggest that it is the question which can interrupt this 
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mundane interchange by addressing the qrounds of 't 
_ 1 s 
intelligibility: since assertions can never give their 
own grounds, they can always only address one problematic 
by creating another; hence questioning alone is the 
"habitat" of the problematic in general. 
How, then, could "questioning" establish such a 
habitat within action-research? Action-research studies 
have frequently been described as "dialogue" between 
participants and as "brokerage" between the multiple 
viewpoints of those involved (eg. Elliott, 1978b, 
p. 356; McDonald and Walker, 1975, p. 7). The image 
of a "broker" neatly evokes, in a context of commercial 
trafficking, the ambition of a format acceptable to 
all "parties". But what would be its theoretic 
equivalent? 
Any set of viewpoints within a mundane situation 
will manifest a range of tensions or even incompatibilities. 
Merely to "exchange" the viewpoints among the parties, 
as McDonald and Walker suggest (op. cit., p. 7) is 
not necessarily more likely to generate a single 
mutually acceptable interpretation than to reinforce 
existing oppositions. And for the researcher to adopt 
a viewpoint on the basis of an elaborately justified 
adjudication between members' interpretations would 
still be to operate within that set of oppositions. 
To this extent, any justification of a particular 
preferred viewpoint will be "polemical" and thus, according 
to Heidegger, unlikely to constitute nor to develop 
"clarification". As Heidegger says, "Any kind of polemic 
fails from the outset to assume the attitude of thinking. 
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The opponent's role is not the thinking role. Thinking 
is only thinking when it pursues whatever speaks for a 
subj ect". Heidegger, 1968, p. 13). "Polemic" is the 
language of assertion, the language of what one might 
term "oppositional interpretation": it asserts the 
adequacy of this interpretation and the inadequacy of 
others. When this process is extrapolated one can 
see that the justification of asserted interpretation 
will merely serve to maintain the pressure of the mundane 
power struggle, within which any claims to validity will 
immediately be contested. The oppositional stance 
justifies one interpretation by attempting to annihilate 
the intelligibility of what it rejects: this is the 
rhetorical mode of the law-courts, of parliament, of 
wars,rows, and divorces. 
In contrast, reflexive interpretation is the 
language of questions: it questions my interpretation 
along with others; its extrapolation poses as problematic 
the origin, the coherence, the grounds, of all 
perspectives; it is a form of question which attempts 
to speak for not against its interlocutor (a formulation 
conventionally espoused within "counselling" for example). 
It creates a theoretic space by means of a general 
withdrawal from interpretation to problematic. This is 
a space therefore within which discourse can proceed 
under the auspices of theoretic grounds, which may be 
shared, and which thus may come to be agreed as valid 
theoretic grounds for the whole set of interpretations 
at issue. Further, and of crucial importance for 
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action-research's commitment to "change" and "improvement", 
the withdrawal from interpretation to problematic may 
create not only a theoretic space but also as it were 
a potentially political space, allowing for at least 
the possibility of a redefinition of the interpretations 
themselves, and hence, in turn, of new possibilities 
for action. 
In this way, Heidegger's notion of "thinking" 
as reflexive questioning can suggest a possible analytical 
form for action-research's metaphors of "negotiation" 
and "brokerage". But then a further question arises: 
if a reflexive questioning can constitute a theoretical 
space which allows the possibility of change, what form 
might this change take, such that change itself might 
be formulated analytically, rather than as mere contingency? 
It is in this context that I wish to examine the significance 
of the dialectic as a basis for critique and thus for 
transformation. Can the dialectic be formulated 
reflexively and thus constitute for action-research a 
further dimension for the process of theorizing? 
Action-Research, Validity, Dialectics 
Action-research has freqaently invoked the rhetoric 
of dialectics as a way of presenting its commitment to 
action and to change, and some of these presentations 
were considered in Chapter Two in order to explore the 
possible form, within action-research, for a dialectic 
between action and theory: in this section I wish to 
examine how far the form of the dialectic might allow 
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the action-research study itself to approach its 
inherent problem: how can the study of a single 
concrete situation claim a validity beyond that of a 
possible interpretation, a mundane actor's perspective? 
(see p. tOR above) . 
In one simple sense, "dialectic" can enable us 
to address once again the problem of "grounded theory", 
which (as I have a~gued earlier) is also action-research's 
problem. Theorists of grounded theory suggest that 
validity can be sought through "triangulation" of 
methods and viewpoints (Denzin, 1978, p. 21; Becker, 
1971, p. 58; Elliott, 1981, p. 19); but when they do 
so, what are the grounds for the Difference which produces 
the triangulation AS a triangulation, and thus creates 
the force of the metaphor of validity derived from 
trignometry? Problems in navigation can be solved 
by invoking Euclid's theories of the forms of triangles, 
but what are the equivalent theories and forms which 
problems in social science might require? A straight 
line identifies an infinite number of points: only 
the Difference created by a triangular form enables 
the One point to be identified. Similarly, the listing 
of a multiplicity of interpretations does not generate 
a basis for choice between them (nor for the construction 
from them of a further transcendental interpretation) 
until they are structured in terms of a principled 
conception of Difference. In the previous section 
this principled Difference separated reflexive from 
assertive analysis; in this section Difference is 
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examined in terms of Contradiction, as a principle 
which permits "dialectic" as a process of theorizing. 
Underlying the image of triangulation is the desire 
to create validity through the structure of inquiry, 
rather than by the multiplication of the objects of 
inquiry: for positivist social science validity can 
be located in the replication of similarity (generalization 
of the object-as-a-unity); for action-research and 
case study the object itself is non-replicable - only 
by comprehending the structure of the object as the 
set of Differences which constitute it, can validity 
be claimed in terms of a generalizable structure. 
However, grounded theorists and action-researchers are 
concerned that this structure sould be grounded in the 
object of the inquiry, rather than in an independent 
system of categories brought to the inquiry. Hence the 
relevance at this point of one of the major questions 
concerning the dialectic: where are contradictions 
located? 
Dabates within Marxist theory have attempted 
at times to provide clear-cut answers to this. For 
example, Colletti (1975) wishes to make a clear distinction 
be'tween conflicting forces in nature and logical 
incompatibilities in thought, but finally recognizes 
that such a dichotomy, resting as it does on a further 
dichotomy between "science" and "philosophy" merely 
leaves the social sciences "without a true foundation 
of their own", awaiting a "reconciliation" (op. cit., 
p. 29). In reply, Edgley (1977) proposes such a 
reconciliation by suggesting that social reality, being 
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a symbolic constellation, is therefore both "thought" 
and "nature", and hence in itself quite intelligibly 
constituted in contradictions which it is the task 
of analysis to expose and thus help to overcome. 
as McCarney says, "the realization of (Edgley's) 
science would be a society without contradiction. 
Yet, 
It is far from clear that such a state of affairs could 
be coherently described in any detail" (McCarney, 1979, 
p. 29). 
Yet each of these proposals seems to be an 
attempt to resolve an issue which seems in principle 
to be not susceptible of resolution, namely the problem 
of the irremediable tension between theory's desire 
for clarity of exposition, and the complexity of - on 
the one hand - its object (the contradictions of social 
reality) and - on the other hand - its relation with that 
object (theory's essential reflexivity). Formulations 
of the role of "contradictions" in social analysis must -
I would argue - embrace this complexity - a complexity 
which involves the symbol and the object, thought and 
reality, and indeed renders problematic those very 
categories. Hegel, for example, as we have seen, 
described "The Thing" as "a manifold" of contradictions: 
the One essence and the Many qualities, the universal 
and the concrete, the self-defined and the defined-in. 
relation-to-other (Hegel, 2977, pp. 67-71). Further: 
the consciousness which perceives the Thing cannot 
simply distinguish the Thing, Consciousness, and the 
act of perceiving: instead the act of perceiving 
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becomes "a complex assumption of responsibility" 
(ibid., p. 74) whereby the constitution of the Thing 
in consciousness becomes an act of self-definition, 
and thus the complexity of the Thing becomes reflected 
back as a structuring of consciousness itself (pp. 
73-5) • The ontology of the Thing is thus a "whirling 
circle" (p. 79) from which commonsense tries to escape 
by means of such simple dichotomies as single/plural, 
essence/qualities, concrete/universal, or - one might 
add - the contradictory/the logical. 
In this respect, as noted in Chapter One (see p. 
Lenin fOllows Hegel: 
"Dialectics is general as a method since, as 
Hegel noted, every proposition itself contains 
the contradiction of the relation between universal 
and individual" (Lenin, 1972, p. 361) 
Thus, "The universal exists only in the individual 
and through the individual" and conversely "Every individual 
is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds 
of individuals '1 (things, phenomena, processes, etc.) 
(ibid., p. 361) which seems to evoke not only a 
connected world of "nature" but also, potentially at 
least, that metaphorical aspect of thought which gives 
the development of knowledge always the property of 
a dialectic (ibid., p. 362) - a "spiral", so that for 
Lenin "rectilinearity" of thought is equivalent to 
"obscurantism" (p. 363). This emphasis is followed 
by Adorno for whom contradiction is that principle 
of ontology "which indicates the untruth of identity, 
the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing 
conceived" (op. cit., p. 5). What must be avoided 
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therefore is the apparent self-sufficiency of the 
concept (ibid., p. 12) and the implicit claim to unity 
of "systems" (p. 20). Instead, "philosophy" must 
"adhere as closely as Possible to the heterogeneous" 
(p.13). For these writers, then, dialectics proposes 
a way of encompassing the complexity of social experience, 
and the complexity of attempts to understand social 
experience, within a general structural principle, 
while allowing for the essential heterogeneity of the 
concrete. In other words, dialectics offers the 
possibility of grounding validity in experience, by 
formulating a principle for the structure of inquiry 
which is at the same time a principle for the structure 
of experience itself. 
Such seemed to be the value of dialectics for 
action-research, and, as such, inspired my article 
"Dilemma Analysis - A Contribution to Methodology for 
Action-Research", (Winter R., 1982) as an attempt to 
apply dialectical principles to action-research.* 
The following passage embodies the main line of the 
argument concerning validity and dialectics in an 
action-research context (in this example, a study of 
students on "teaching practice") : 
The nature of the action-research task 
A teaching practice, in common with many social 
situations, involves interaction between different 
parties who, as a consequence of their different 
roles in the situation have different aims, 
priorities, and definitions of reality. Also, 
* See also Whitehead and Foster (1984) p. 43. 
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the situation creates a hierarchy of power and 
status between these roles, hence, some of the 
problems typically encountered will rest on a 
failure by one party to appreciate the point of 
view of the other parties involved. The task I 
formulated for myself, as a teaching practice 
supervisor/researcher, was to attempt to transcend 
my view as a supervisor in order to create an 
I) account of the T.P. situation which would be 
faithful to the views of students, classroom 
teachers, and pupils, as well as those of 
fellow supervisors. This account had to gain 
the assent of all parties so that it could be 
used to illuminate for each party the point of 
view of the others, as a practical contribution 
to preparation for T.P. The different views 
therefore had to be presented plausibly as 
parallel rationalities, without the hierarchical 
valuation which conventionally discriminates 
2) between them. In other words, the analysis had 
to gain acceptance as "objective", evoking the 
main areas of tension in the siutation without 
generating immediate controversy by seeming 
partisan, which would of course lead to its 
being rejected in such terms as: "It's your 
point of view as a supervisor" or alternatively: 
"You've gone over to the other side". The 
action-research task then, in this case, and not 
(I think) untypically, was precisely that of 
2) creating an account of a situation which would be 
seen by a variety of others as convincing, ie. 
as "valid". 
The theoretical basis of the method 
It was earlier argued that basing an interpretation 
directly on social theory inevitably creates an 
interpretation imposed by the researcher. 
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However, I suggest that this difficulty can be 
overcome by providing a theoretical basis for the 
method rather than the interpretation. This 
entails working with a different level of theory, 
namely theory concerned not with patterns of 
motives, ideologies, or institutional structures 
and relationships, but with the most general 
characteristics of social reality itself. 
Hammersley M. (1980) uses the terms 
"substantive" and "formal" theory to articulate 
a similar distinction. Roughly then, I wish to 
distinguish between "substantive theory" which 
guides the interpretation of specific data and 
"formal theory" which guides the specific method 
for interpreting any data appropriate for that 
method. 
The formal theory which guides the method 
of Dilemma Analysis is what could loosely be 
called the sociological conception of "contra-
diction", which is used here in the form of a 
series of general, indeed all-embracing postulates: 
that social organizations at all levels (from 
the classroom to the state) are constellations 
of (actual or potential) conflicts of interest; 
that personality structures are split and 
3) convoluted; that the individual's conceptualization 
is systematically ambivalent or dislocated; 
tat motives are mixed, purposes are contradictory, 
and relationships are ambiguous; and that the 
formulation of practical action is unendingly 
beset by dilemmas. Hence a statement of an opinion in 
interview is taken to be a marginal option which 
conceals a larger awareness of the potential 
appeal and validity of different and even opposed 
points of view. (This is an elaboration of 
Winter, 1980b, p. 68). On this basis, then, 
it became intelligible to analyze the interview 
transcripts not in terms of particular opinions, 
but in terms of the issues about which various 
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opinions were held. The method is called 
"Dilemma Analysis" precl'sely t o emphasize the 
systematic complexity of the situations within 
which those concerned have to adopt (provisionally 
at least) a strategy. Beneath the analysis lie 
the conceptual underpinnings of Marxian and 
Freudian theory; at the literal surface of the 
analysis is the relatively non-controversial 
notion of the paradoxical nature of social 
existence. (op. cit., pp. 167-8) 
The article was written in 1980, before the present 
study was undertaken, and the extract above clearly 
reveals a number of weaknesses, some of which I have 
already criticized in other action-research work. 
Concerning the marginal numbers: 
1) Its own practice is presented as the articulation 
of viewpoints, a form of "brokerage" (see p. "10 above) . 
2) Its version of validity is seen as a concensus, 
without any reference to a process by which such 
a concensus might be created, except through the 
presumption of spontaneous empathy (cf. Eisner's 
"vicariousness", see p. ttl above) . 
3) Although there is a reference to the "ambivalence" 
of conceptualization, there is no specific reference to 
the reflexive problematics of language itself, and thus 
there is no awareness that the action-research worker is 
himself beset by the problematics he describes. 
The last point gives rise to a crucial weakness 
of the article: it attempts to provide a quasi-
mechanical "methodology" based on precisely the literal 
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specification of simple alternatives which Adorno 
dubs "bureaucratic thinking" (Adorno, 2973, p. 31). 
(See the "Teachers' Perspective Document" later in the 
article, which presents the various issues in terms of 
a repeated sequence of oppositions: "On the one hand 
BUT on the other hand" - pp. 271-3). Thus "Di lemma 
Analysis" attempts to be literal, where it should 
recognize the inevitability of metaphor; it attempts 
to be exhaustive, where it should recognize that it 
must remain "inconclusl've" (Adorno op Cl't p 33) , . . ,. ; 
and it locates contradiction in an external world of 
... 
actors' perspectives, where it should recognize that its 
own processes of cognition and expression are constituted 
in those same contradictions. Hence it attempts to 
prescribe a description by utilizing "contradiction" 
as a resource which could provide a method, where it 
should attempt to transcend description by reflexive 
analysis of the problematics of that resource in 
relation to its own process. 
Finally, and most disabling of all, it denies 
the temporal dimension required by its own theory. 
Contradictions are consti tuted as such .Q S terms in 
a dialectical process of transformation. (As Lenin* 
says: "The condition for the knowledge of all processes 
of the world, in their 'self-movement', in their 
spontaneous development, in their real life, is the 
knowledge of them as a unity of opposites" (Lenin, 1972, 
p. 360). In thus presenting contradictions as a 
h actl'on-research officer of all * "Lenin ... t e master 
time" (!) (Midwinter, 2972, p. 57). 
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series of static, if complex "perspectives", Dilemma 
Analysis fails to provide for its own process of 
inquiry which constitutes them, a further failure of 
reflexive awareness, and, more curiously, a failure of 
the basic spirit of action-research, whose ambition is 
essentially to constitute its theorizing within the 
developing action of its own process. 
In principle, however, as the above critique 
implies, the dialectic could provide a powerful theoretic 
basis for the conduct of action?research. It raises 
the possibility of an analytical basis for presenting 
the structure of concrete situations and thus for 
grounding the study of such situations in a general 
principle, a principle which would not be the pretext 
for a prescriptive methodology, such as "Dilemma 
Analysis", but an inherent epistemology which locates 
theorizing in relation to its own cognitive processes 
as well as to its apparent object. 
In this way, one might begin to formulate a 
constitutive relationship between the two principles 
of reflexivity and dialectics in terms of which I have 
tried to present "validity" in this chapter. One 
might suggest that there is an analogy between the 
questions which reflexivity poses to interpretive 
assertion ~ questions of grounds and possibility -
and the dialectical logic which, as Adorno says, is 
"one of disintegration ... of the prepared and 
objectified form of the concepts which the cognitive 
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subject faces" (Adorno, 1973, p. 145). 
"Dialectics 
is •.• the resistance which otherness offers to identity" 
(ibid., p. 161). The important point is that investi-
gators are themselves "cognitive subjects", and their 
own interpretations take on a quality of "identity" 
as soon as they are expressed, so that their own work 
must accept inevitable "disintegration"; it must itself 
face the resistanc~ of "otherness", and thus in the 
end "enact its inconclusiveness" (ibid., p. 32) .. 
It is such an emphasis that action-research requires, 
since action-research by its very nature is constituted 
in a dialectic between action and theory, and thus does 
not wish its inquiry to provide a conclusive prescription 
for action, but rather to allow action to open out 
developmentally on the basis of such provisional 
enlightenment as has been achieved by its inquiry, and 
on the basis of that achievement always to invite and 
require further phases of action-research itself. 
It is on such a basis, I would argue, that action-
research could begin to formulate the "validity" of 
its processes, and it is thus within this formulation 
that we must now seek a sense of "validity" for action-
research's descriptive accounts of the situations 
which are its topic and its occasion. 
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Dialectics, Reflexivity, and the Descriptive Text 
It was noted at the very beginning of this chapter 
that action-research has often attempted to authorize 
its validity claims in terms of "anthropological" 
case-study methods, and it is with an anthropological 
approach to the issue that this section commences , 
namely an analysis of "thick description", so unsatis-
factorily glossed by Eisner (see p. ""0 above) . The 
term originates with Gilbert Ryle, but its relevance 
for the present argument is elaborated by Clifford 
Geertz. 
Positivism, he argues, seeks "valid" description 
by reducing phenomena to the "thin-ness" of "operational", 
ie. behavioural, terms (Geertz, 1973, p. 5), so that a 
social action such as "winking" becomes "rapidly 
contracting (the) right eyelids" (ibid., p. 7). 
Validity here is: what-could-not-possibly-be-contested-
by-anyone. But this would be an entirely unhelpful 
formulation of validity in social inquiry, since it 
evades social inquiry's central task: to understand 
the significance of the action in question. The 
rapid eyelid contractor may have an involuntary muscular 
twitch (and behaviourists could indeed collect such 
instances, but he or she may be "winking", in which 
case the question is,whether the action is an enticement 
or a conspiracy, or even "practising a burlesque of a 
friend faking a wink to deceive an innocent into thinking 
a conspiracy is in motion" (Geertz, 1973, p. 7). 
Hence the description of social actions must be at least 
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as "thick" (ie. as complex, as multi-layered) as the 
meaning of the actions described. Now, it is clear 
from Geertz's example of how "meaning" is structured into 
layers of mutually imputed interpretation, that one 
such layer must be the interpretation imputed by the 
describer. This in turn implies that accounts of 
social meanings can never have the finality of a 
behavioural definition: "ethnographic assertion is 
essentially contestable" (Geertz, OPe cit., p. 29). 
. . . 
But this does not mean that interpretation is therefore 
merely a matter of private opinion or whim, which is so 
often the despairing response to a recognition of the 
impossibility of realizing positivism's ideal. On 
the contrary, meaning (says Geertz) is inherently 
"public" (ibid., p. 12" ie. it is constituted essentially 
in the dialectical intersubjectivity and interplay of 
cultural symbols (eg. "winks", "conspiracies", 
"fakes" , . Thus, although interpretations can never 
be finally "verified", they can always be "appraised" 
(ibid., p. 16), and this appraisal itself, being a 
further interpretation, is available for further 
appraisal, in the endless dialectic of inquiry. 
In other words, description may be considered 
as a hermeneutic experience and accomplishment: "The 
structure of the hermeneutical experience is ... the 
dialectic of question and answer" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 340). 
In more detai 1 : 
, h' h 
"The reconstruction of the questlon to w lC 
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the text* is presumed to be the answer takes 
place itself within a process of questionin 
through which we seek the answer to the qUe~tion 
that the text* asks us" 
(ibid., p. 337) 
This dialectic interweaves with another, and one which 
is particularly relevant to action-research: 
"Understanding (is) an event, and the task of 
hermeneutics ... consists in asking what kind of 
understanding, what kind of science it is, that 
is itself changed by historical change". 
(ibid., p. 276) 
In a sense Gadamer begins to answer his own question when 
he goes on to describe a third dialectical strand in 
his presentation of the process of interpretative 
description, "the great dialectical puzzle of the one 
and the many, which fascinated Plato" (ibid., p. 415), 
and which in Hegel's version has been cited frequently 
in this work. Gadamer presents it as follows: 
"The hermeneutical rule (is) that we must 
understand the whole in terms of the detail 
and the detail in terms of the whole" 
(ibid., p. 258) 
a rule which would need some reformulation in the 
context of social inquiry, of course, since social 
situations do not have the finite boundaries of a "whale" 
text. In fact, Geertz's analysis of ethnogr~phic 
meaning construction (outlined above) could serve as 
such a formulation of "hermeneutics" as applied to social 
actions, and in particular to the process of action-research. 
* For "text" read "social action" in the context of 
'b'l't of this the present argument. The POSSl 1 1 Y 
, ," The Mode I equivalence is asserted by Rlcoeur~ ln xt" 
of the text-meaningful action consldered as a te , 
in the same volume as Ricoeur (1981). See p. 
below. 
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Meaning is a relation between social actions and their 
cultural matrix; interpretations of this relation 
and appraisal of those interpretations must endlessly 
succeed one another, since interpreters are situated 
within the same process of historical change as the 
social actions they describe. 
At this stage in the argument we have moved once 
more to the central role of reflexivity. How can we 
approach description in reflexive terms? We can begin 
to pursue this question by considering Levi-Strauss's 
essay "The Science of the Concrete" (in Levi-Strauss, 
1966) • Levi-Strauss approaches the issue of the 
relation between concrete experience and validity of 
meaning by distinguishing between "two strategic levels 
at which nature is accessible to scientific inquiry: 
one roughly adapted to that of perception and the 
imagination; the other at a remove from it". (op. cit., 
p. 15). These two strategies are labelled (with 
specific reference to manJs interaction with the world 
of inanimate objects) "engineering" and "bricolage" 
(ibid., p. 17). The engineer operates with "concepts" 
whereas the bricoleur uses "signs", the distinction 
being that, "although either may be substituted for 
something else, concepts have an unlimited capacity in 
this respect, while signs have not" (p. 18). The 
bricoleur therefore "interrogates ... an already existent 
set made up of tools and materials, to consider or 
. . d f' lly and above all to 
reconsider what lt contalns, an lna 
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engage in a sort of dialogue with it ... to widen the 
possible answers ... to discover what each of them could 
'signify' and so contribute to the definition of a set 
which has yet to materialize but which will ultimately 
differ from the instrumental set only in the disposition 
of its parts". (p.28). In other words this is an 
essentially reflexive review of biographically 
situated resources and their possibilities. The 
engineer, armed with the unlimited referential scope 
of "concepts" can interrogate "the universe": he can 
claim to transcend his culture, while the bricoleur 
knows he must stay within it (p. 29). In this way, 
Levi-Strauss's account of the concrete science of the 
bricoleur evokes a way of formulating the possible 
achievement and the necessary limitation of the social 
scientist's descriptive case-study. He allows us to 
reformulate "concrete description" in terms of the 
possibility of an analytical and reflexive strategy based 
on the multiple meanings of the culturally defined sign, 
leaving the larger claims of the logically constructed 
concept to those who wish to define their social science 
in positivist terms* (cf. Popper, whose apparent modesty 
in restricting his claims to "social engineering" is 
thus revealed as mock modesty indeed!) 
* There is however a tension in Levi-strauss'~ work 
" 'b h own between passages where he clearly descrl es 1S 
myth-ology as bricolage ("a precarious assemblage of 
odds and ends" - 1981, p. 562, and other passages . 
where he seems to anticipate a future state of affa1rs 
when the human sciences will indeed transcend, ' 
bricolage through an "absolute" methodology (lb1d., 
p. 686). 
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The notion of "concrete description" as carried 
out by "observers" .(who could . b POSSl ly - if they wished _ 
choose to do "abstract" description instead) raises the 
unanswerable question of how such observers could select 
their concrete details from the infinite range available, 
and thus of how any such selection could be either 
replicable or representative. In contrast, Levi-Strauss's 
notion of "bricolage" as a science OF the concrete 
avoids the epistemological trap of the residually positivist 
formulation by treating "the concrete" as the inevitable 
habitat of social inquiry, a habitat which delimits 
cognitive resources as culturally constructed and 
contingently available, arid constitutes "validity" as 
a provisional, essentially temporary achievement. 
As "bricoleurs", in other words, interpreters of the 
social world know the limitations of their resources 
and their achievements) as constituted by their situational 
availability: only self-styled "engineers" could consider 
themselves able to ignore the reflexivity of their work 
and thus to claim "universal" validity. 
Levi-strauss goes on to make the reflexive dimension 
of his work quite explicit, and in doing so addresses 
the other important theme raised by the action-research 
writing reviewed at the beginning of this chapter, 
namely the relationship between descriptive structuring 
and aesthetic form. He suggests that any symbolic 
process (science, myth, myth-ology, ritual, or art) can 
be considered as constituted in a relationship between 
" between the contingent and the 
"structure" and "event , 
necessary (Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 21 ff.). In general 
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original distinction: what event could be so simple 
that it was not also a structure, and what structure 
could be either so eternal or so instantaneous that it 
did not also constitute a complex event? However, 
the value of Levi-Strauss's argument is that he provides 
a level of analysis which can-encompass the aesthetic 
as a mode of comprehension and expression in juxtaposition 
to other forms of symbolization, and that it allows a 
consideration of the nature of the aesthetic to be 
formulated, which is precisely what the writers 
previously discussed have merely glossed as an available 
convention. Levi-Strauss's proposal is that the 
expression itself is the "structure", and that this 
structure must be considered in relation to its three 
constitutive contingencies: the occasion of the work, 
the execution of the work, and the purpose of the work 
(op. cit., p. 27). Or: "The process of artistic 
creation therefore consists in trying to communicate 
(within the immutable framework of a mutual confrontation 
of structure and accident) either with the model (ie. the 
reality-to-be-represented - RW) or with the material or 
wi th the future use". (ibid., p. 27). (These are 
not of course mutually exclusive alternatives,) 
The importance of this argument for action-research 
is two-fold. Firstly it enables us to envisage a 
"reflexive description" as one which makes explicit 
the relation between, on the one hand, its own structure 
and, on the other hand, its symbolic resources, its 
audience, and the events which are its topic. Secondly, 
it makes possible an analogy between social research 
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and a formulation of art which is not merely concerned 
with a model (which realism and positivism might claim 
or admit - see above, p. t~1), but also with both the 
"material" and the audience for the symbolic process, 
ie. a reflexive formulation of the aesthetic, which 
would parallel action-research's own ambition to transcend 
positivism by addressing the principled relation between 
action and theory (the "materials" of its research 
process, and between research and its audience, namely 
its attempts to formulate such possibilities as i) the 
action-researching professional as one who is simultaneously 
artist and audience, or ii) the case study researcher 
whose work is a continuous negotiation with the practitiners 
whom he serves and in whose concerns he wishes to 
"ground" his theory. In both cases there is a consti-
tutive relation between expressive process, audience, 
and theoretic resource. 
A reflexive formulation of the aesthetic would 
find support in, for example, Kenneth Burke's contention 
that (literary) "form would be the psychology of the 
audience ..• the creation ••• and the adequate 
, t 1.' n the mind of the auditor" satisfying •.• of an appet1. e 
(Burke, 1968, p. 31), an emphasis which for Barthes 
leads to "the realization of the relation of writer, 
reader, and observer (critic)" (Barthes, 1977, p. 156), 
and transforms the closure of the author's descriptive 
O f the reader's interpretive work into the open-ness 
interaction with a text (ibid., pp. 155-6). Hence, 
whereas literature previously employed a supposedly 
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transparent language for the description of "Nature" 
, 
"Literature is (now) openly reduced to the problematics 
of language" (Barthes, 1967, p. 8). (However, this 
"reduction" is better described - without nostalgia _ 
as a principled recognition) . The general thesis that 
the essence of a modernist aesthetic is its reflexivity 
is the theme of Gabriel Josipovici: The World and the 
Book: "The modern writer ... makes his art out of the 
exploration of the relation between his unique life 
and the body of literature, his book and the world". 
(Josipovici, 1971, p. 291). This argument applies not 
only to such explicit and well-known exponents of 
"modernism" as James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, and Samuel 
Beckett, but to aesthetic form in general,( see Chapter 
One, p. 'l' and Chapter Three, p. 160 ) . 
The relevance of this for social science is taken 
up by Michael Clarke, who contrasts literature's 
tradition of reflexive self-questioning with science's 
strategy of insulating the person of the scientist from 
his data by means of his "methodology" (Clarke M., 
'975, p. 99). In other words, whereas "artists" 
have accepted (and indeed, latterly, embraced) a role 
which casts them simultaneously as hero and as victim, 
"scientists" persist in attempting to evade any destiny 
whatever, by seeking a role of principled invisibility 
through an ideology of technicism (cf. the analysis 
the "wounded healer", Chapter Three, p. 141 ) . 
of 
The way in which action-research can learn from 
literature is not, then, to borrow its "realist" 
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claims as an alternative approach t th o e generalizing 
format of scientific positivism - which action-research 
recognizes it must try to avoid. Rather, by analogy 
with a "modernist" aesthetic, its claims to a theoretic 
status can be made through an explicit recognition of 
the reflexive form of its own process. 
The above argument constitutes the process and 
the effect of art (and, by implication, of inquiry) 
as essentially reflexive in terms of its confrontation 
with its contingent conditions ("material", audience, and 
"mode I ") . What about the aesthetic structure itself, 
which so far has only been referred to (within a realist 
problematic) through the positivist metaphor of a 
"typology" expressing a "perspective"? At this point it 
is once more helpful to invoke the principle of dialectics 
as the inherent structure of social phenomena. Even 
here a lead is given by action-research writers them-
selves, namely McDonald and Walker. Having said, "the 
kind of case-studies which we believe education needs 
have characteristics which call for a fusion of the style 
of the artist and the scientist", they go on immediately 
to quote Freud: "the case histories I write ••• read like 
short stories" (McDonald and Walker, 1975, p. 3). 
Now a Freudian case history is a narrative rather like 
a "whodunnit": the questionable meaning of a dream 
sequence, for example, is progressively "solved" 
as a structure of "rationality". Since dreams are 
themselves narratives, this resolution is itself a 
narrative of a narrative. Freud'~ theory of the 
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representative strategies of the dream thus becomes 
a possible entry to the question: how can narrative 
"embody 'truth'''? H' t lS argumen concerns the two 
basic dimensions of symbolization, synchronicity and 
diachronicity. The chronology of the narrative 
transforms causal relations into a sequence (Freud, 
1976a, p. 427), and logical relations into contiguity 
(ibid., p. 424). The metaphoricity of the narrative 
unifies opposites (p. 429) and fragments similarities 
into contrasts (p. 431). In general, dreams constitute 
a systematic distortion of an original reality, often 
to the point of "reversal" (p. 441). To understand the 
dream, by means of the case history, is to clarify 
the distortion, to reverse (as it were) the reversal. 
As with much of Freud's work, an ingenious insight 
into symbolic process is limited by an ambition towards 
a mechanical methodology (leading, in the present 
argument, to the apparent implication that "rationality" 
may be "decoded" unproblematically out of "distortion"" 
but what Freud does seem to provide here is the notion 
of narrative structure constituted in a dialectic 
both of action and of meaning, such that one might 
tentatively suggest that to understand the "truth" 
of narra ti ve is to grasp its s tructure ~ dia lectic . 
It is of course dialectical structure which 
underlies Levi-Strauss's analysis of the meaning of 
mythic narrative (see Chapter Three, p. 137 ) . For 
example: 
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~FO~ a myth to be engendered by thought and for 
It In turn to engender other myths l't' 
, , , lS necessary and,s~fflcle~t that an initial opposition should 
be In]ected lnto experience, and as a con 
th 't' , sequence, o er OppOSl lons wlil spring into being". 
(Levi-Strauss, 1981, p. 604). 
In an analysis of mythic structures which has clear 
parallels with Freud's previosly cited account of 
the dream process, Levi-Strauss suggests (1979, 
pp. 224-9) that opposites may be resolved into an 
intermediate term, producing a "triad", that characters' 
contradictory qualities involve them in relations 
which gradually mediate an original opposition, and 
that the events of the myth may "transpose" its original 
semantic terms. Levi-Strauss sums up: "The purpose 
of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming 
a contradiction" (ibid., p. 229). And we may follow 
Northrop Frye in taking myth to be an underlying pattern 
for aesthetic form in general (Frye, 1957, pp. 263-
225) . 
However, this "logic" of mythic or aesthetic form 
is not a prescription nor a "typology" but a set of 
possibilities made available by the ambiguities, meta-
phors, contradictions, reversals, etc. embodied in the 
narrative itself. This "logiC" is embodied in the 
narrative in the sense that its constituent units 
are "bundles of relations" which are sufficiently large 
as to function both synchronically and diachronically 
1972, 221-2~, and thus it constitutes (Levi-Strauss, 
meaning at the level of metaphorical structures 
(protagonists, settings) and dialectical structures 
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(actions, transformations), or rather: at the level 
where metaphor and dialectic are mutually con t't ' s 1. ut1.ve, 
namely, as Derrida notes, the level of symbolization.' s 
intrinsic process of "Differencing". 
In this way we can perhaps make sense of Elliott's 
original suggestion that action-research can seek, as 
part of a non~positivist approach to inquiry, to embody 
"truth" in narrative (see pp,10f-'labove). Narrative 
recognizes, in Levi-Strauss's original terms, the 
analytic confrontation between the necessary and the 
contingent, structure and event, general and particular. 
This confrontation is expressed in narrative's under-
lying pattern of metaphor and dialectic, ie. its pattern 
of transformation both at the level of meaning and of 
action, which parallels action-researchts own ultimate 
ambition to transform meaning by means of action. 
Positivist description seeks to dichotomize the necessary 
and the contingent in terms of method and data. it seeks 
to isolate data so that they have no inherent structural 
or temporal properties, and so are purely available 
to be gathered (by means of "method"} into a literal 
and ahistorical "truth" " the form of representation 
accomplished by narrative allows truth to be metaphorical, 
and dialectical: the narrative of action can show 
action's own semantic transformations. 
Finally, then, how could these various considerations 
be related to a possible set of principles for action-
research's descriptive accounts. Three of the central 
ideas seem to be related in the following way: 
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1) A reflexive description can only se k " e valldlty 
through a structure which embodies a principled 
recognition of the 
(see references to 
problematics of ,its own possibility 
Barthes, on p.1 Sb above). 
2) The scope of the problematic noted in 1) as 
applied to social inquiry, is given by the relationship 
between the descriptive account and a) its symbolic 
resources, b) its audience, and c) its "model" - ie. the 
experience(s) "described" (following Levi-Strauss's 
formulation, see p. 1.SCf. above) 0 
3) The structure of each of the problematic relation-
ships noted in 2, is dialectical, as fOllows: 
a) Symbolic resources for a descriptive account 
are, for example: actors' perspectives, institutional 
documents, interpretive theories, and narrative structures 
for specific events - which embody mythic/ideological 
patternings of its semantic terms, such as its 
constitutive "characters" and "plots". The relation 
between these elements will be dialectical, ie. a 
combination of intimacy AND incongruity, similarity AND 
difference, between ideals and experiences, between 
claims and actions, between long-term and short-term 
rationalities, and between the ideals, ideologies, reported 
experiences, and rationalized interpretations of different 
social actors. (This is an extension of the principle 
behind "Dilemma Analysis" - see p.1.43 above) . The 
the descrl'ption and such resources relationship ~b~e~t~w~ ~e~n~~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~~~~-----
will be dialectical, ie. its coherence will take the 
form of making explicit the dialectical play between 
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elements, in a structure whose unity is that of irony 
rather than of resolution and negotiated concensus. 
In this it may resemble the documentary or the news~ 
report which presents "different sides" in a studied 
stance of abstention from authorial imposition" (cf. 
Barthes on the "death of the author" in the reflexively 
conceived text - see p.1Ss above). In this respect, it 
may also resemble a story with a complex plot and character 
and wi th one or severa 1 protagonists but - following 
the principle of ironic play - without a hero, taking 
"hero" here as typically embodying a mythologized 
elaboration of an authorial perspective. (See Brown R., 
- 1977, chapter 5 - for an elaboration of sociological 
accounts as structures of irony). 
There is another sense in which description will 
have a dialectical relation with its resources: it will 
recognize the historically situated quality of its 
collection, and will explicitly present its collection 
as contingent and provisional, rather than as exhaustive 
or final. It will thus be structured by its principled 
and necessary anticipation of a continuation (ie. 
amendment and critique), since description will have 
a dialectical relation with its audience. 
* In mundane examples of such reportage, this 
"abstaining" stance is, of course, merely a carefully 
Presented illusion: it is the textual structure t , th' o1.'nt in my argumen . 
which is being cons1.dered at 1.S P 
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b) The audience for descriptive accounts will 
have both necessary and contingent features (see the 
presentation of Levi-Strauss's argument, p. tS1 a bove>. 
At one level the rhetorical processes of ' wr1ting are 
structured by the requirements of an analytically 
presupposed intelligibility to a readership. This is 
the dialectical structure of intersubjectivity necessarily 
required by acts of communication (see Chapter One 
p. 11.). "Validity", then, would be the achievement 
of persuasiveness. But audiences are also historically 
contingent. A description may anticipate a highly 
specific audience, one which shares a particular stand-
point or set of relevancies, and may achieve a persuasive 
validity for that limited audience, while other audiences -
with whom the description in question does not anticipate 
a dialectically constitutive relationship - would 
characterize such a description as, say, "tendentious", 
and would note "inadequacies" in a variety of dimensions. 
"Objectivity", within this argument, can then be seen 
as the quality of a description which anticipates a 
constitutive dialectic with a highly varied audience, 
ie. a description which structures a dialectical relation 
between a wide variety of its own heterogeneous elements, 
and thereby achieves persuasiveness for audiences which 
begin their reading of the description from a position of 
provisional identification with only a limited range of 
those elements. Hence the persuasive task of description 
can be seen as establishing, through its own processes, 
that the heterogeneity of phenomena does indeed represent 
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a dialectical (ie. a mutually transformative) I ' re atl0n, 
rather than that simple antagonism between "similar" 
and "different" in which they are constituted by the 
pragmatic requirements of daily life. 
c) The "model" for description is a set of 
experiences, whereas description itself is, of course, 
constituted symbolically, and - in particular, linguisti-
cally.* It has already been argued at a number of points 
that linguistic representations cannot be seen simply as 
"labels". Rather their reference to experience must 
be seen as metaphorical, and thus as always located 
within the dialectic between reference and difference 
noted by Hegel (see p.1.1.o and p. "1~ above) . Again, 
Richard Brown makes this point explicitly and at length: 
"A theory must be metaphorical: if it were literally 
identical with what it theorizes about, it would not, 
could not tell us anything new". (Brown R., 1977, p. 
101) • This would hold true for description, as a 
communication between One ·who-has-had-an-experience and 
Others, who have not had that identical experience but 
who could be brought to understand that experience in 
the light of different but potentially similar experiences 
which they have had. Hence the central function of 
metaphor's dialectic between similarity and difference. 
t f this section 
* In principle much of the argumen 0 . t' 
could be appiied to descriptions em~odie~ ~~ pal~ lng, 
film ballet, music, marble, or pap ler-macde, oan , "f th Bu t to 0 s indeed as comblnatlons 0 ese. t of 
would further complicate an already compl~Xa~~ _ 
ideas, and the verbal sign plays a centra 
arguably - indispensable role. 
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(Description is not engaged in between people who are 
both present at an event. Rather, one says to the other 
for example: "Just look - isn't that a terrible/ 
beautiful ... "? One might indeed say, "It reminds me 
of ••. " but that, precisely, would return us to the 
principle of metaphoricity) • "Metaphor", then, is 
itself a metaphor for the problematics of description 
and interpretation, the problem of the general and the 
parcicular, of description's always ambiguous ambition 
to be description (rather than - say - a random association 
or an eccentric vision) . Thus "validity" for description 
must ultimately reside in its recognition of the very 
ambiguity of its own aspiration; it must explicitly 
recognize that its metaphorical structure, no matter 
how densely and subtly woven, can never claim a literal 
or final correspondence with its object. For positivist 
description this would be a matter for despair (as though 
"validity" were to be given up as impossible); for a 
reflexive and dialectically structured description it 
marks a rigorous requirement for critical awareness, 
and thus a dimension of validity itself. 
But, and finally, what form might be taken by 
description's 'recogni tion" of its dialectical ambigui ties 
and limits? In general terms we may remember once 
more Gadamer's axiom that "the structure of the hermeneuti-
, th dialectic of question and 
cal experience .•• lS e 
answer" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 340), quoted on p. t4~ above). 
But it is more helpful at this stage in the argument to 
"reverse" 
_ or rather to extend - Gadamer's statement, 
, t' f answer and question, in 
and to consider a dlalec lC 0 
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which description's answers to its presupp d ' ose questlons 
are presented in conjunction with the questions it in 
turn raises. This would then enable us to formulate 
"description" as emb d ' , o ylng a slmilar "questioning dialectic" 
to that relating action and theory, presented at the end 
of Chapter Two and on p. llJ..b above. And the format 
that this might take in the context of a descriptive 
account is in fact suggested by a comment of Lawrence 
stenhouse, the doyen of writers on educational action. 
research - a comment which in fact makes curiously 
little sense in its original context (a proposal for 
Popperian "scientific method") but which seems to have a 
very precise relevance for the present argument. 
Stenhouse says that, "The dialectic between 
proposition and critique ... is personified in the 
relationship between artist and critic". (stenhouse, 
1975, p. 124). Now although much "art criticism" 
displays a numbing combination of blandly unreflexive 
evaluation and crude technicism, there is a certain ideal 
for critical writing on works of art which could indeed 
be taken as a formulation of the moment of analytical 
recognition in the complex dialectic of description. 
h " ' t' " (at bes t) wrl.' tes a commentary In this sense, t e crl l.C 
structure of a work in order to make which accompanies the 
, l' 't pattern of its complex internal explicit the l.mp lCl 
relationships; in order to do so, it will reveal 
to dl'alectl'cal relations between elements, ironies, point 
h d t '1 in terms of the show ramifications, analyze tee al. 
d 'ble complexity of the whole, and insist upon the irre UCl 
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whole as (at least) the sum of all its details _ 
hermeneutics, after all, originated as a method for 
textual criticism. In this way, if "description" is 
to be, as has been argued, a dialectical structure of 
irony and metaphor (rather than - positivistically _ 
a unified structure of concensus and literal reference), 
then perhaps the descriptive text can be differentiated 
from, say, the novel or the documentary (as an analytical 
from a rhetorical text) by the inclusion within the 
text itself of a "critical" commentary. in the sense 
outlined here, one which addresses directly its own 
problematic and how its processes address that problematic.* 
Here, then, is a final dimension for the "validity" 
of descriptions, namely the adequacy of its own explicit 
recognition of its reflexive and dialectical structure. 
There is a link between this suggestion and the comments 
of Peter McHugh et ale on the collaborative process 
of their own text, in which "response papers seek to 
enter into relationship with the original by transforming 
its present but unexplicated features" (McHugh et al., 
1974, p. 5). The point is, that texts are open, 
"plural" structures, (Barthes, 1977, p. 159) intelligible 
h f the reflexivity of language and only in the lig t 0 
the constitutive dialectic between writer and reader. 
* I am indebted for this argument to my cOlle~guee 
David Ball and to members of the Essex Instltut 
M Ed course in Educational Research. 
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Textual openness and plurality have been fully explored 
as principles for the understanding of literature 
(see p. 't. S5 above), which may exp lain the ff' a lnity for 
aesthetic forms expressed by a number of action-research 
writers, who thus perhaps sense the general argument of 
this Chapter: that such openness is a necessary 
requirement for action-research, since action-research is 
predicated upon the assumption that a descriptive 
account will not be a finality but a moment in a 
continuing process. 
The "validity" of description, in this context, 
then, is not a matter of being "correct", but of 
adequately representing "the conditions for its 
possibility" (see Chapter One) . Or, following Levi-
Strauss's argument - see p. 1.S 5 above - "validi ty" 
concerns the necessary rather than the contingent 
features of aescription. The contingencies of 
"correctness", on the other hand, will not be entirely 
unintelligible when the dialectics of action-research 
moves to the moment of action, when - as was argued 
at the end of Chapter Two - the question becomes: 
of the possibilities made explicit through the open 
text of "description ll would be a feasible practical 
strategy now? But, in general, the notion of 
"validity", as applied to the complex processes of 
action-research, may not be sought in terms of a 
which 
t't' "account" 
"correspondence" between two simple en 1 les -
and "reality" - but rather in the appropriately complex 
- 269 -
principles of reflexivity and dialectics, which (it 
has been argued in this chapter) can guide the internal, 
textual structuring of action-research's accounts, as 
well as - at the same time and without incoherence -
the other moments of action-research's process. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
My aim in this study has been to reconstruct 
the intelligibility of action-research by disentangling 
its inherent possibilities from its heterogeneous claims. 
Some of these claims are simply borrowed from positivist 
social science - claims to possess an authoritative 
methodology for the production of accurate descriptions 
or of "grounded theory", for example - and others seem 
to be defensive counter-claims, made against positivism's 
rejection of action-research's adequacy - claims to 
flexibility, creative idiosyncracy, immediate practical 
relevance, democratic process, and aesthetic form, for 
example. The contradiction between these two sets 
of claims can be traced to the contradictions in the 
relationship between orthodox social science and the 
social world which is its topic and its resource. 
The Good of action-research is that it glimpses the 
need to reformulate this relationship between science 
and world, knowledge and action, theory and practice; 
the Lack of action-research is its failure to carry 
through this reformulation. At various points in this 
study _ especially in the final section of each chapter -
aspects of this reformulation have been presented. 
In this concluding chapter I wish only to draw together 
, the potential contribution 
an overall statement concernlng 
(l'n the reflexive and dialectical of action-research 
put forward) to social inquiry as a formulation I have 
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general project. It is a conclusion only in a d' 1 . 1a ect1cal 
sense: it draws together the phase of t d ' s u y 1nto a 
moment of reflection which anticipates 
, now, an explorative 
and ultimately trans formative continuat1'O th n, rough 
attempts at exemplification in particular contexts. 
"Conclusion", otherwise, would threaten to overwhelm 
one of the central themes of the study with the unaddressed 
irony of its implication of finality, and hence of 
theory's claims to prescribe methods for practice. 
It is to the danger of that irony that the following 
section is addressed. 
Action-research, Factuality, Meta-theory 
At the centre of action-research stands its hyphen: 
it proposes an axiomatic and inescapable relation between 
action (which must treat knowledge as adequate) and 
research (which must treat knowledge as problematic). 
Yet the clumsiness of the phrase lIaction~researchll, 
as a mere juxtaposition - with or without a hyphen -
expresses the irremediable problem of the relationship. 
Unlike other expressions (such as lIapplied science" 
or "theoretical practicell)which have their syntactical 
point of rest in one term or other, "action-research
ll 
merely vibrates with its own irony, its unresolved 
difference, and hence its interminable internal question: 
the dialectic of action_research-action-research-action ... 
b 't is without ending, can begin anywhere, and once egun, 1 
since it is without prescription, and thus without a 
principle for completion. 
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It is through this unending quality of its dialectic that action-
research provides for the irremediably pr bl to o ema ~c combination of irony 
and responsibility which characterizes theorists' relation to their 
social context, a relation which ~ in contrast -- orthodox social 
science would wish to formulate either as ~-ironic (leaving the socia 
scientist as an employee: of one sUb-sectiorn or other of an insti tutiona 
order which provides both topics and purposes) or as ~-responsible 
(leaving social scientists proclaiming both their free-floating abstrac 
from all social interasts and their potential availa"bili ty to ~ suoh 
interest. ) 
Now, ac~ion-research's principled commitment 
to both irony and responsibility enables it to grasp 
the problematic status of "theory" in relation to the 
"action" which constitutes theory's social world. In 
a crucial sense, there is no action which is not informed 
by theory, and this applies in a broadly similar fashion 
to the following series: a racist street brawl, police 
arrests of some but not all protagonists, a government 
inquiry into urban law and order, a survey of attitudes 
carried out by the Commission for Racial Equality, and 
a study of the ideological bases of government inquiries. 
In each case "theory" takes the form of factual knowledge 
generalized as a justificatory principle for a range 
of envisaged action. In this way, knowledge is 
continuously being socially constructed within the 
( rning capitalism, technical/moral debates conce 
° etc., etc.) which industrialization, urbanizatlon, 
pattern of discursive constitute~everyday culture as a 
agendas. These agendas only exist because their 
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relevance is relatively urgent, and thus the theory 
with which they are infoFmed tends to be presented 
in a rhetorically persuasive, maximally plausible form _ 
namely as "facts". However, the irony of factuality 
is that, as a practical rhetorical format, it is utilized 
by all competing interest groups, with the result that, 
although all claims to factuality are made in the name 
of an objective validity that aims to silence opposition, 
all such claims are immediately contested as distorted 
selections. Hence the typical format for social 
science knowledge has become the "highly-significant-
statistical-finding", presented in a prestigious journal 
with all the mythic trappings of mathematical absolutism, 
only to be dismissed in the next issue as a random 
illusion created by some-one's crass technical blunder. 
The general form of the problem, of course, is 
that "theoretical knowledge", here, is differentiated 
from "common~sense" only by the capital- and/or 
labour-intensiveness of its resourcing, by its technical 
but not its epistemological sophistication. Hence, 
positivist social science can only relate "theory" 
to "practice" by constructing a factual claim for the 
authority of a particular interpretation - and thus of 
the practical policies which require this interpretation -
, lways liable to 
even though this factual authority lS a 
"theoretl'cal" debates either merely be challenged, so that 
'th' practl'ce itself, or they are 
reflect debates Wl In 
concerned with methodological technique. Clearly, 
Cognl'tive claim and challenge within the sequence of 
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these technical/moral debates constitutes one of the 
basic processes of politics, culture 
, and the daily 
life of institutions and professions,· b t h u t is is to 
characterize such debates as, precisely, topics of 
the deepest sociological interest, whose nature it 
must be sociology's task to address. And here the 
merit of a reflexive action-research begins to emerge. 
For it is clear that the political clash of rival 
factualities and their attendant theoretical generalities, 
will not be addressed (but will, rather, be taken as 
given, sustained, and prolonged) by a social science 
which invokes a methodological warrant for its ~ 
factualities, its own theories-as-generalizations. 
Instead, what a reflexive action-research would offer 
to its action context is not "theory" in this sense at 
all (since there is, as it were, enough theory there 
already) but rather what might loosely be called 
"Meta-theory". 
"Meta-theory" conventionally means, in some sense, 
"the theory of theory", but this is potentially highly 
in 
misleading, and we must therefore carefully ask: 
what sense? Firstly, if (as has been argued above) 
"theory" conventionally takes· the form of persuasively 
organized factual grounds for interpretation (and 
dl'fferentl'ation from the practical thereby loses its 
rhetorics of everyday life), "meta-theory" can be taken 
d factual grounds for the as: "persuasively organize 
t 1 grounds" for inter-
persuasive organization of fac ua 
pretation. d me
ta-theory would become 
In other wor s, 
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the prescriptive elaboration of absolute 
techniques 
for the achievement of"objectivityl,~ that 
combination of 
logic, statistics, and reductive behav' , lourlsm which 
is to be found (variously disguised)' , In lnnumerable 
text-books on "methodology". M t th 
- e a- eory in this 
version makes a merely technical contribution to the 
presentation of interpretive theory, just as the latter 
is hardly distinguishable from a "j argon" for the stylistic 
re-articulation of social actors' common-sense. At 
both levels, then, the emphasis on techniques for the 
creation of persuasive factuality prevents a "critical" 
or independent formulation of theory's task in relation 
to social purposes and categories. Secondly, the 
conventional sense of "the theory of theory" suggests 
a double move away from practice, whereas the specific 
contribution of both the principled recognition of 
reflexivity and of even conventional action-research 
is to reassert the mutual dependence of theory and 
practice. Action-research as meta-theory proposes, 
then, as a first step, to subject the factualities and 
organizing conceptions of specific bodies of professional 
expertise to the critical recognition of their located-ness 
within the practices whose intelligibility they serve. 
"b d" a form Action-research thus proposes a move eyon 
of theory which prescribes and justifies a basis for 
more abstract 
action not to be a more rarified theory, a 
, --
, t'f' t;on but to a reflexive prescription or JUs l lca ~ , 
dialectic between theory and action, which sustains 
their mutuality while transforming both. 
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It is in 
is essentially 
this way that a reflexive action-research 
and inevitably committed both to the 
theoretical critique of action's taken-for-granted 
rationalities and to the continued possibilities of 
action in its mundane context; it can be content 
nei ther wi th providing a mere technical service (of 
refining the factual basis of expertise) which leaves 
action uninterrupted, nor with providing a mere theoretical 
ideal or model which (by threatening to interrupt 
action's mundane process for ever) must necessarily, 
in the end, be ignored by practitioners. In other words, 
reflexive action-research is proposed here as a way of 
reconciling that central dilemma of social inquiry: 
its inherent tension between theory and practic~between 
"critique" and "relevance". In the following (final) 
section this general contention is illustrated by 
reference to the general principles by which its 
epistemology is embodied in its process. 
Principles for a Reflexive Action-Research 
A) Action-research is grounded in the topics of 
professional expertise, but also has grounds for 
transforming them. (Action-research will not simply 
report members' topics and categories; organize and 
as merely illustrative 
neither will it encapsulate them 
of prior theoretical systems). Action-research will 
resources which underpin 
begin by recording the cognitive 
expertise in the specific 
the invocation of professional 
f pJauslbly warranted 
context - its particular range 0 
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"factual" bases, and its particular set f o concepts 
which provide for the intelligibility of those "facts" 
in relation to the requirements of action in that 
context, ie. concrete versions of normality, d' t b pre l.C a ility, 
event, motive, chance, relevance t , e c. Action-research 
will then make explicit the essentially reflexive 
basis of this expertise, its grounds in contextually 
specific judgements, rather than in general laws. 
By drawing attention to the process and structure of 
these judgements, action-research transforms the assumed 
resources of expertise into topics, and transforms 
received topics into questions. By drawing attention 
to the contextual basis for claims to generality, 
expertise's "necessity" is transformed into contingency, 
and "irrelevancies" are transformed into thinkable 
possibilities. 
B) Action-research is grounded in the phenomena of 
practical experience, but also has grounds for trans-
forming them. (Action-research will not simply treat 
members' meanings as criteria for its own adequacy; 
neither will it treat members' meanings as merely 
epiphenomena produced by supposedly objective societal 
processes) • Action-research will begin by recording 
members' experiential accounts of the centext - as sets 
d phenomena organized into relatively of relatively unifie 
, of s1.'m1.'lar1.'ty and difference. fixed relat1.ons 
the dialectical basis 
Action-research will then explore 
exploring the differences which of these phenomena, 
" the similarities 
have been collected as "similar, 
which have been set apart as "different", and the 
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historical (and "futurological") dime ' nSlons within 
which current categories of similarity d d'f an 1 ference 
may be seen as both contingent and transient. By 
drawing attention to the developing contradictions within 
the categories of experience, implicit necessities 
(as labels of the present) will be transformed into 
explicit possibilities (as metaphors for thinkable 
futures) • 
C) Action-research's resources are personal, but 
its transformative outcomes have valid grounds. 
(Action-research will not simply claim to discover 
objective empirical generalizations; neither will its 
outcomes merely be expressions of personal opinion). 
Action-researchers are constitutive elements of their 
contexts-in-question. Wher. they begin to subject 
contexts to a principled reflexive and dialectical 
critique (see A and B above), they are required by 
those same principles to initiate and/or accept a 
reflexive and dialectical critique of their own resources 
which have provided for the original critique. Clearly 
this is to embrace a form of potential "infinite 
regress" which would strike terror into the hearts of 
't' 't but actl'on-research, in contrast, logical POSl lV1S S; 
must accept and require the recognition of this risk as 
the ontological and epistemological structure of its 
(reflexive and dialectical) intersubjectivity. Two 
consequences are important. Firstly, by means of 
f ac tion-research, subjective the inter-personal process 0 
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commitments to interpretation ("points-of-view") will be 
deconstructed by a review of possible resources for 
such commitments, ie. the pragmatic and rhetorical 
unity of subjectivity will be required to recollect 
its fundamental potential for disunity, and hence its 
resources for alternative commitments. Secondly, 
and consequently, subsequent commitemnts to interpretation 
(re-made in the light of such recollections) will 
recognize the limits of their specific personal and 
contextual resources as part of a provisional, reviewable, 
interpersonal, and contextual strategy. Reflexive 
action-research does not seek to replace personal 
resources with "im-personal" techniques or "universal" 
theories, but rather to push to their here-and-now 
limits the inherent resources of interpersonal 
contextualized understanding. 
D) Action-researchers recognize that they will 
suffer the transformations of the processes they initiate. 
~ction-researchers' interactions with members will 
not simply provide prescriptions for action; neither 
will they merely result in interpretive insights which 
members can take or leave). Action-researchers 
as well as from others, 
will require from themselves, 
d t xtual limits a recognition of the reflexive an con e 
" d the dialectical 
of their interpretlve Judgements, an 
of thel'r activities _as action-researchers contradictions 
(see C above). th Y 
enact their Only insofar as e 
upon their own activities will they be requirements 
practitioners that these requirements able to persuade 
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are indeed requirements for all ' 
___ , lncluding practitioners 
rather than special requirements tYPl'cally , lnflicted 
upon others by, say, "theorists", and thus carrying no 
persuasive import (but only a rejectable instruction) 
for those who are "practitioners-but-NOT-theorists". 
Hence, whatever understandings action-researchers bring 
, 
to a context (in terms of methods 
- , interpretive theories, 
and anticipations of the processes of action-research 
itself) will - they know - be transformed by their 
enactment first in this and then in that con~ext. In 
this way, reflexive action-research will not be a 
version of "aEplied science" (as though procedures 
for social inquiry had been created "somewhere else", 
so that action ("here", could simply learn from science) 
but a formulation of social inquiry's own capacity to 
develop ("everywhere") as a dimension of social 
inquiry's constitutive relation with its social world. 
E) Action-research transforms the relationship 
between the disparate elements in an action context, but 
it does not attempt to construct them into a unity. 
(Action-research will not simply attempt to negotiate 
a concensus in order to supercede contradictions; 
neither will it merely record contradictions as they 
present themselves). Given that action-research's 
frames of reference will be challenged by its own 
f an unending development process, and are thus part 0 
f reporting action-research's (see D above), the format or 
l'ntegrated descriptive account, outcomes will not be an 
specific state-of-affairs, but, 
presenting a reader with a 
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rather, for example, a sort of "collage t t" . 
- ex WhlCh 
artfully sets in playa dialectical (and h ence always 
potentially ironic) pattern of relationships between 
alternating elements, authored by various members of 
the action context, including explicitly reflexive 
accounts (see A above), dialectical analyses (see B 
above), reviews of possibilities and of grounds for 
commitments (see C above), and diaries of action. A key 
element in this "plural text" will be a series of 
contributions which attempt to make explicit the 
structure of the relationships enacted in the sequence 
as a whole. Such an "open" text will express both the 
contradictions of its origin and its non~prescriptive 
availability to its varied audience for their varied 
and unpredictable purposes and responses (including 
responsive action). Action-research will thus be able 
to turn to its own advantage the inescapable and 
fundamental tensions in which it is constituted (between 
theory and action, between the valid and the concrete) 
by learning from and drawing upon those rich traditions 
of ironic and/or reflexive symbolization (narrative, 
drama, myth, rhetoric, counterpoint, and aesthetic 
criticism) which are so much more securely g~ounded in 
the structures of consciousness than the recent but 
d t dably seductive) politically prestigious (and hence un ers an 
procedures of positivist social science. 
F) h h grou
nds for the critique of 
Action-researc as 
g rounds require also action-research's action, but these 
(transformative) continuation of action. commitment to the 
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(Action-researchers will not simply be observers, who 
can arrive with a repertoire of k'll s l s, re-describe 
the action scene, and depart u s th d n ca e and unimplicated; 
neither will they be participant members, who learn 
merely by taking part in the implementation of practical 
change) • Action-research's moment of critique (see 
A and B above) assembles and expands a range of previously 
"repressed" possibilities (see C above). But these 
possibilities are derived from action's own cogriitive 
resources, and will not be left merely as possibilities 
"in theory" (as realizable in, say, an ideal world but 
not here-and-now) since action~research's dialectic 
requires that the possibilities created by critique be 
confronted by the requirements of action, always given 
that action's limits will have been transformed by the 
exploration of its possibilities. It is this double 
confrontation (the question posed to practice by theory, 
and the question posed theory by practice) which 
ensures that no-one will escape the transformations of 
the action-research process (see D above), a process 
whose dialectic disqualifies claims either to be an 
observer who can leave to others any responsibility for 
the continuation of action, or to be a practitioner 
who can leave to others any responsibility for 
originating the transformation of action. Action-
research formulates action as inescapably responsible 
t ransformability by theorizing, to the grounds for its 
and theory as grounded in its responsibility for 
action's transformed necessity. 
h " "Action-researc thus 
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expresses a double responsibility as well as a double 
irony. 
The prevous principles (A - E) formulate the 
nature of action-research's inherent resources and 
processes; this final principle refers most directly 
to action-research's fundamental capacity for structuring 
(however delicately, ironically, provisionally, and 
non-prescriptively) that crucial interplay between 
theory and practice, critique and responsibility, 
ideal and actual, Reason and politics, which constitutes 
the central problematic of social inquiry. 
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